Secure Kernel Commands
Handler starts with a switch statement that handles reset commands.
For a command 0x100401 0x10 is size of shared buffer that's used by f00d handler, 0x4 is command ID, 0x1 is validity flag(?).
None of the following 5 commands are enabled/disabled depending on f00d-state. These are all unconditional.
Reset ScePervasiveResetReg +0x190 to enable re-writing the mask for the protected memory (keyring) Set mask to 0x10 for slots 0x20E and 0x20F (set in 0xE0070008)and trigger reset with 0 and 1 to device control 0xE0070000
Reads protected mem/keyring slot 0x50C. If lower 4 bits are nonzero: Reset ScePervasiveResetReg +0x190 to enable re-writing the mask for the protected memory (keyring) Set mask to 0x10 for slots 0x20E and 0x20F (set in 0xE0070008)and trigger reset with 0 (not 1 this time) to device control 0xE0070000
Reads protected mem/keyring slot 0x50C. If lower 4 bits are nonzero: Does same thing as 0xB01.
Does same thing as 0xB01. Then reads 3 times from ScePervasiveMisc. If it is ASCII 0x20 0x30 or 0x31 then it writes 6 to 0xE0070014.
It encrypts a block of size 0x80 with key=eeprom_blk_515, and hardcoded iv from .data.
Block looks like this: +0x00: Magic (0xACB4ACB1) +0x04: One +0x08: Random (read from 0xE005003C) +0x0C: Zero +0x10: EEPROM sector 0x511 +0x30: EEPROM sector 0x512 +0x50: EEPROM sector 0x517 +0x70: AES-256-CMAC using key from EEPROM sector 0x514.
It memcpys this encrypted info-blk size 0x80 to 0x4001FF00. Then it programs (u32)1, followed by zeroes, to EEPROM sector 0x516.
After processing, 0xFFFFFFFF is written to 0xE0000010. Then comes the real switch. This one gives different func-ptrs. But before func-ptr is called there's a check in a table-lookup based on f00d-state. So not all cmds are allowed in all states. If not allowed error 0x8029 is sent.
Then it reads lower u16 of f00d mailbox. If all zeroes then it returns 0x802D. Then it reads lower u16 and now wants it to be 0, if not it returns 0x802D.
After this it finally calls the funcptr for cmdhandler. For unknown cmdid it returns 0x802A.
The allowed commands are as follows:
State: 0 Allowed: 0 State: 1 Allowed: 0 State: 2 Allowed: 2 State: 3 Allowed: 78E State: 4 Allowed: 2 State: 5 Allowed: 72 State: 6 Allowed: 42 State: 7 Allowed: 2 State: 8 Allowed: 2 State: 9 Allowed: 0 State: 10 Allowed: 0
todo: Decode these.
Sets food-state to 9. This will later cause main() to return, triggering memclr + infloop.
Then it writes 0xF to control bus addr 0. Control bus addr 0 is interrupt controller, but bits don't match architecture doc. Corrupt code? Followed by 3 NOPs. Wat.
Reads 0x50 bytes from ArmBuffer into buf. If *(buf+4) and *(buf+8) are not aligned to 4 it fails. Then it TZ-checks addr *(buf+4) size 4. Then it TZ-checks addr *(buf+4) size 8. If any of these 3 checks fail, return code is 0x8016 or panic.
Then it sets food-state to 4.
memcpy(sp+0x68, buf+0x30, 0x20); *(sp+0x58) = *(buf+0x28) *(sp+0x5C) = *(buf+0x2C) *(sp+0x178) = *(buf+0x24) *(sp+0x54) = *(buf+0x20)
Then it calls the big function to load the SM with args (sp, sp+0x50). If it fails then either panics or returns 0x800000FF.
It saves the address for "0x40-buf", without checking it to be in Tz. This is okay because they check before writing to it.
Then it gets the address for the "shared buf", and loads arg0-arg3 from this ptr.
Then it sets epc to 0x0080B000, sp to 0, gp to 0. And uses reti to jump to it.
Reads 0x10 bytes from shared buf. Checks alignment on stuff also. TZ-check on *(buf+4) size 4, *(buf+8) size 8, *(buf+12) size 0x18. On fail sends 0x8016. After that it sets state to 4.
Then it calls the big restore function.
If it fails it sends zeroes module region, sends reply 0x8024, sets state to 3, and sends 0x102. If success, it sets the "0x40-buf" to *(buf+8), sets state to 5, and sends back 0x103.
Reads 0x10 bytes from shared buf. Verifies alignment on *(buf+4), *(buf+8), *(buf+12). Verifies the following tz-ptrs: *(buf+8) size 4 *(buf+4) size 8 *(buf+12) size 0x18 If bad it returns 8016.
Sets f00d-state to 6. If sm is not ready for suspend, it saves the buf in bss. Also sets the flag that suspend has been requested then returns.
If sm is ready to suspend, it calls the suspend function.
Sets f00d-state to 6. If sm is ready to be suspended, sends 0x108 and move into state 7.
Sets f00d state to 6. Then it calls a function that: * Calls a function that appears to stop DMAC. * Zeroes the module region. * Flushes cache. * Writes some unknown DMAC registers. * Does a soft-reset.
Shared buf: +0: Addr +4: Size
Checks that region is valid TZ, then sets them in the state. On bad addr, it sends error 0x8016, otherwise it sends 1. It also prints "rev %s\n" with "5679", however that only happens for some OTP configs.
Reads 8 bytes from "shared buf". Calls the function to set the revocation list. If that function returns error x, the error that gets sent back is x&0xFF. On success, 1 is sent back.
secure_kernel supports tracing to a buffer.
Enabled by -7FF8h($gp) being non-zero. Out-buf address is stored in -7FF4($gp). It writes in a loop, 16 bytes at a time, inserting a null-terminator at buf each "line".
After out-buf is written, writes 0x20000 to 0xE0000000. This will either signal ARM or disable ARM communications. Then inf-loop, this is a panic function.
Addresses are xored with a stack cookie that's fixed for all functions.
SuspendEncrypt BadAddr: 00000003 SWI 1 BadAddr: 00000004 SWI 1 UnreachableCode: 00000006 SWI 7 UnreachableCode: 00000007 Addrcheck IntegerOverflow Food: 0000000B Addrcheck IntegerOverflow Kernel: 0000000B Addrcheck IntegerOverflow Module: 0000000C IRQ register func w irq enabled: 0000000E Force exit dmac w irq enabled: 0000000F Crypto irq enabled: 00000010 Resuming suspendbuf w irq enabled: 00000012 Creating suspendbuf w irq enabled: 00000013 Reset: 00000014 <xored-exception-lr> <xored-exception-pc> <exception-lr> RI: 00000015 <xored-exception-pc> ZDIV: 00000016 <xored-exception-pc> Trace: 00000017 <func-addr> SWI 7: 00000018 <xored-r1> DMAC when updating suspendbuf key: 00000019 <ret-val> DMAC cmac bad enum: 0000001A <enum-value> Bad enum to suspend AES-CBC function: 0000001B <enum-value> Generating new suspendbuf key failed: 0000001C Creating suspendbuf w irq8 module-registered: 0000001D Addrcheck IntegerOverflow Tz: 0000001E Addrcheck IntegerOverflow Tz2: 0000001F Bad ptr to suspend AES-CBC function: 00000020 IRQ register func w bad irq number: 00000022 Recieved unknown IRQ: 00000023