Secure Modules Functions

Depending on the F00D SELF that is currently loaded, different commands are handled.

Request Buffer

Each request that is made sends a page aligned buffer that has a max size of a page. After as 64 byte header common to all commands, the data afterwards is specific to each command. The documentation for each command below specifies the data that goes after the header. The special command id of -1 (0xFFFFFFFF) is used to shut down the currently loaded F00D SELF.

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x4	Size of buffer
0x4	0x4	Command ID
0x8	0x4	Return value (output)
0xC	0x34	Unknown/Unused
0x40	Variable (max 0xFC0)	Command specific buffer

Physical Address List

A common format used in these requests is a list of physical address and size. This simple structure is defined below. See sceKernelVARangeToPARangeForDriver for information on creating this list.

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x4	Physical Address
0x4	0x4	Size

This data format is used when passing large buffers of data to F00D. This is because the memory manager in kernel could allocate contiguous virtual addresses that corresponds to varying physical addresses.

kprx_auth_sm.self

This is a special SELF that is found in the boot SLB2 partition. The raw (encrypted) SELF is found in secure world memory (placed there by an early bootloader). It is used to decrypt SELFs for ARM. The SELF header is passed into a page aligned buffer and a paddr list is generated from it.

0x10001 - sceSblAuthMgrAuthHeader

Used by sceSblAuthMgrAuthHeaderForKernel.

Checks the SELF header for decryption. The header is copied to the F00D private memory region first (on 1.69 with 0x1000 sized header, it is at 0x00811CC0 in F00D memory space.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x130	SceSblSmCommContext130
0x170	0x4	Number of paddr list entries for buffer
0x174	0x4	Physical address of paddr list

0x20001 - sceSblAuthMgrSetupAuthSegment

Used by sceSblAuthMgrSetupAuthSegmentForKernel.

Set the program segment to decrypt. This corresponds to the segment index in the ELF program headers in the SELF header passed in with the command above.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Segment number
0x44	0x4	Return value. 0x1 if not compressed, 0x2 is compressed.
0x48	0x8	Unknown

0x30001 - sceSblAuthMgrLoadBlock

Used by sceSblAuthMgrAuthSegmentForKernel.

Decrypt a buffer from the SELF corresponding to the program segment number passed in above. The segment is read in 0x10000 bytes chunks and is decrypted in place (the input buffer will contain the decrypted data). A paddr list is generated from the buffer. The input buffer and output buffer can be the same.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Number of entries in input paddr list
0x44	0x4	Physical address of the input paddr list
0x48	0x4	Number of entries in output paddr list
0x4C	0x4	Physical address of the output paddr list

0x40001 - sceSblAuthMgrGetEKc

Decrypts provided buffer in ECB mode using one of three keys (NPDRM keys ?).

Used by sceSblAuthMgrGetEKcForDriver for getting klicensee.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x100	Data Buffer (under 0x100 bytes)
0x140	0x4	Data Size - must be under 0x100
0x144	0x4	Key ID (0, 1, 2)
0x148	0x4	Set to 0
0x14C	0x4	Set to 0

0x50001 - sceSblAuthMgrSetDmac5Key

Used by sceSblAuthMgrSetDmac5KeyForKernel to set key for decryption.

This uses an unknown secret to derive the final key, then writes it into dmac5 keyring.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x8-0x10	Key (64/128/196/256 bits)
0x140	0x4	Key size (in bytes)
0x144	0x4	Key ID
0x148	0x4	Slot ID
0x14C	0x4	Key size & 0xF (Should be 0)

0x60001 - sceSblAuthMgrClearDmac5Key

Used by sceSblAuthMgrClearDmac5KeyForKernel for clearing the Dmac5 Key.

This function writes zeroes into dmac5 keyring.

0x70001 - sceSblAuthMgrDecBindDataForDriver

Used by sceSblAuthMgrDecBindDataForDriver and SceNpDrm for gamecard binding data used in conjunction with the RIF license file on the gamecard for deriving the klicensee.

0x80001 - sceSblAuthMgrVerifySpsfo

Used by sceSblAuthMgrVerifySpsfoForDriver.

act_sm.self

0x1 - check_activation_code_1

Removed on FW 2.10.

Verify SceKitActivationData derived from AFV.

Use "internal" keys (?internal kits maybe? Not used on PDEL kernel).

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x80	SceKitActivationData

0x2 - check_activation_code_2

Removed on FW 2.10.

Verify SceKitActivationData derived from AFV.

Use PDEL/PTEL keys. (maybe also latest DEM)

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x80	SceKitActivationData

0x4 - check_cmac

Verify ?NVS? activation data. Maybe checks CMAC.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x80	input and output: SceKitActivationData

0x5 - gen_act_cmac

Removed on FW 2.10.

Get activation data. The returned data is written to NVS at offset 0x520 or 0x530.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Magic "act\0"
0x44	0x4	Issue number
0x48	0x4	Start validity time unix timestamp
0x4C	0x4	End validity time unix timestamp
0x50	0x10	Unknown (returned data) ?CMAC?

0x7

Removed on FW 2.10.

Check if activation is valid. The input activation data is read from NVS at offset 0x520.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x10	SceKitNVSActivationData without CMAC
0x50	0x20	SceKitNVSActivationData

0xA - gen_activation_with_sig

Introduced in FW 2.10.

Check if new activation is valid. Extended activation check with a signature. This is ran when installing a new afv.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x80	SceKitActivationData (new activation data)
0xC0	0x100	RSA signature over new activation data
0x1C0	0x80	SceKitActivationData (previous activation data)
0x240	0x100	RSA signature over previous activation data
0x340	0x20	Output: SceKitNVSActivationData (same as command 0x4)

0xB - check_activation_with_sig

Introduced in FW 2.10.

Check if current activation is valid. Extended activation check with signature. This is ran on boot.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Unknown
0x44	0x4	Current time
0x48	0x8	Some return value
0x50	0x8	Unknown
0x58	0x20	SceKitNVSActivationData (same as command 0x4)
0x78	0x80	AFV data
0xF8	0x100	RSA signature over activation data

aimgr_sm.self

0x1 - GetConsoleId

Returns the console's ConsoleId.

Used in sceSblAimgrGetConsoleIdForDriver.

0x2 - GetOpenPsId

Returns the console's OpenPsId.

Used in sceSblAimgrGetOpenPsIdForDriver.

0x3 - GetVisibleId

Returns the console's VisibleId.

Used in sceSblAimgrGetVisibleIdForDriver.

0x4 - GetPsCode

Returns the console's PsCode.

Used in sceSblAimgrGetPscode2ForDriver.

0x5 - GetPassPhrase

Used in sceSblSsCreatePassPhraseForDriver.

compat_sm.self

0x10006 - sceCompatSecLoadSCBootCode

Load SC (SysCon?) Boot Code.

Called on init and before resume of PSP.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Unknown
0x44	0x4	Set to 0 (unused)

On FW 3.73-CEX (simplified):

*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 4;
syncm();
memcpy(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100000, g_0080c1f0, 0x1000); // PRE-IPL
memcpy(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100fbc, &cmd_data[0], 4);    // Offset 0x40 above
memcpy(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100fc0, g_0080d1f0, 0x40);   // Challenge (?XOR key?)
syncm();
*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 0;

If there was an error:

memset(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100000, 0, 0x1000); // PRE-IPL
syncm();
*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 10;

0x20006 - sceCompatSecSetSSRAMAcl

Set Shared Static Random Access Memory Access-control list.

Removed since FW 3.50 and replaced by command 0x30006.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Set to 0
0x44	0x4	Set to 0

0x30006 - sceCompatSecSetSSRAMAcl2

Set Shared Static Random Access Memory Access-control list 2.

Appeared on FW 3.50 as replacement for command 0x20006. This change is related to the huge memory management improvement since FW 3.50. See PSVita System software 3.50 adds 30% more memory for game use.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Unused

On 3.73-CEX (simplified):

If there was an error:

*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 4;
syncm();
ret = memcmp(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100fc0, g_80c1b0, 0x40); // Check challenge output
if (ret == 0) {
    // Success!!
}
syncm();
*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 10;

encdec_w_portability_sm.self

This seems to be used to do some kind of key derivation. May also be used as a general purpose encryption engine.

0x1000A - EncryptWithPortability

Encrypt data. Actually it always returns 0x800F1725, so it does nothing and is never used.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Key ID (max 0xA)
0x44	0x4	Output Length
0x48	0x20	Output
0x68	0x4	Input Length (max 0x20)
0x6C	0x20	Input
0x8C	0x10	IV

0x2000A - DecryptWithPortability

Used by sceSblSsDecryptWithPortabilityForDriver.

Decrypt data by using AES-256-CBC with an internal key selected by key_id.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Key ID (1 - 20)
0x44	0x4	Input Length (max 0x20)
0x48	0x20	Input
0x68	0x4	Output Length (must match Input Length)
0x6C	0x20	Output
0x8C	0x10	IV

Return value of 0x800f0002 means invalid service ID. For encdec_w_portability_sm, only commmands 0x1000A and 0x2000A are supported.

Return value of 0x800f1716 means invalid argument such as invalid key ID. Valid key IDs are only 1-20.

gcauthmgr_sm.self

0x1000B

This is one of variable sized buffers that can be placed inside Request_Buffer

Type definition is located here sm_comm_context

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Set to 1
0x44	0x4	Command (0x4, 0x7, 0xC etc.)
0x48	0x800	Data Buffer (Input/Output)
0x848	0x4	Key ID (different meaning for different commands. usually used to select one of specific static keys)
0x84C	0x4	Data Buffer Length - Input/Written - Output
0x850	0x4	Set to 0

Supported GC commands and structures

0x4 - kirk_encrypt

Original PSP Kirk 4 service for encrypting data.

Does not use any specific data structure in Data Buffer.

Just encrypts data located in Data Buffer.

Uses one set of keys.

Available Key ID values are (key is encrypted with key from keyslot 0x345 and put into keyslot 0x21): 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83

Special Key ID 0x100 is available. Uses keys from keyslots 0x601 and 0x602.

Key 0x601 is scrambled and used as seed.

Key 0x602 is scrambled and used as key.

seed is aes cbc encrypted with key to produce resulting key.

0x7 - kirk_decrypt

Original PSP Kirk 7 service for decrypting data

Does not use any specific data structure in Data Buffer.

Just decrypts data located in Data Buffer.

Uses two sets of keys.

Available key ids are (key is encrypted with key from keyslot 0x345 and put into keyslot 0x21): 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83

Available Key ID values are (key is encrypted with key from keyslot 0x340 and put into keyslot 0x10): 0x44, 0x53, 0x57, 0x63, 0x64, 0x68, 0xC0, 0xC1, 0xC2, 0xC3

Special Key ID 0x100 is available. Uses keys from keyslots 0x601 and 0x602 (will be documented later).

Key 0x601 is scrambled and used as seed.

Key 0x602 is scrambled and used as key.

seed is aes cbc encrypted with key to produce resulting key.

0xC - kirk_ecc160_generate_keys

Original PSP Kirk 0xC service for Generating a 160bit ECC private/public keypair. Call with an empty buffer of length 0x3C. The structure below is the return structure.

Private key dA is obtained by:

1. Generating 0x40 sized random number rng.

2. dA = rng mod N

Public key Qa us obtained by:

Qa = dA * G

Output:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x14	Private Key
0x14	0x14	Public Key X component
0x28	0x14	Public Key Y component

0xD - kirk_ecc160_multiply

Original PSP Kirk 0xD service for multiplying a 160bit ECC curve point with a value. Call with a multiplier, x and y point value.

Input:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x14	Multiplier Value
0x14	0x14	Point X component
0x28	0x14	Point Y component

Output:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x14	New Point X component
0x14	0x14	New Point Y component

0xE - kirk_ecc160_generate_random

Original PSP Kirk 0xE service for 160bit Random number generation. Call with an empty buffer, the result structure is below.

Output:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x14	Cryptographic Random Number

0x10 - kirk_ecc160_sign

Original PSP Kirk 0x10 service for 160bit ECC signing.

Specific nonce is used for signing.

For example if you will implement it with openssl it will be used to calculate precomputed parts of signing operation (kinv and rp).

nonce is obtained by:

1. Generating 0x40 sized random number rng.

2. nonce = rng mod N

Input:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x20	Encrypted private key (see kirk-engine implementation for fuse_id process for encryption)
0x20	0x14	SHA1 hash of the content you want signed

Output:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x14	ECC Signature R component
0x14	0x14	ECC Signature S component

0x11 - kirk_ecc160_verify

Original PSP Kirk 0x11 service for 160bit ECC signature verification. Call with the below structure, then function will return pass or fail.

Input size is 0x64 bytes.

Input:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x14	Public Key X component
0x14	0x14	Public Key Y component
0x28	0x14	SHA1 hash of the content that is signed
0x3C	0x14	ECC Signature R component
0x50	0x14	ECC Signature S component

No output.

0x12 - verify_cmac_signature

This function checks that CMAC of Message equals Encrypted CMAC value.

CMAC value of Message is calculated using key from keyslot 0x212.

Encrypted CMAC value is decrypted using a key from keyslot 0x0.

Key in keyslot 0x0 is derived using key from keyslot 0x204 with static seed value.

Input:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0xA8	Message
0xA8	0x10	Encrypted CMAC value

0x14 - kirk_ecc224_generate_keys

New Vita Kirk 0x14 service for Generating a 224bit ECC private/public keypair. Call with an empty buffer of length 0x54. The structure below is the return structure.

Private key dA is obtained by:

1. Generating 0x40 sized random number rng.

2. dA = rng mod N

Public key Qa us obtained by:

Qa = dA * G

Output:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x1C	Private Key
0x1C	0x1C	Public Key X component
0x38	0x1C	Public Key Y component

0x15 - kirk_ecc224_multiply

New Vita Kirk 0x15 service for multiplying a 224bit ECC curve point with a value. Call with a multiplier, x and y point value.

Input:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x1C	Multiplier Value
0x1C	0x1C	Point X component
0x38	0x1C	Point Y component

Output:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x1C	New Point X component
0x1C	0x1C	New Point Y component

0x16 - kirk_ecc224_generate_random

New Vita Kirk 0x16 service for 224bit Random number generation. Call with an empty buffer, the result structure is below.

Output:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x1C	Cryptographic Random Number

0x17 - kirk_ecc224_sign

New Vita Kirk 0x17 service for 224bit ECC signing.

Specific nonce is used for signing.

For example if you will implement it with openssl it will be used to calculate precomputed parts of signing operation (kinv and rp).

nonce is obtained by:

1. Generating 0x40 sized random number rng.

2. nonce = rng mod N

Input:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x20	Encrypted private key
0x20	0x1C	SHA224 hash of the content you want signed

Output:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x1C	ECC Signature R component
0x1C	0x1C	ECC Signature S component

0x18 - kirk_ecc224_verify

New Vita Kirk 0x18 service for 224bit ECDSA signature verification. Call with the below structure, then function will return pass or fail.

Input:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x1C	Public Key X component
0x1C	0x1C	Public Key Y component
0x38	0x1C	SHA224 hash of the content that is signed
0x54	0x1C	ECC Signature R component
0x70	0x1C	ECC Signature S component

0x19 - verify_cmac_signature

This function checks that CMAC of Message equals Encrypted CMAC value.

CMAC value of Message is calculated using key from keyslot 0x212.

Encrypted CMAC value is decrypted using a key from keyslot 0x0.

Key in keyslot 0x0 is derived using key from keyslot 0x204 with static seed value.

This function is related to IdStorage somehow.

Input:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0xD8	Message
0xD8	0x10	Encrypted CMAC value

0x1B - check_gc_authenticity

New Vita Kirk 0x1B service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data validation service with no response. Size of request is 0x53.

- packet 7 should contain challenge0 for the card that can be encrypted (by card) with key_id and master_key.

- packet 8 should contain encrypted message which can be decrypted (by vita) with key_id and master_key.

- part of message should be card_challenge0.

- another part of the message should be equal to challenge0.

- this way we know that card knows how to properly encrypt.

- kirk service 1B will decrypt packet 8 with key_id and master_key

- then it will verify challenge0

Offset	Size	Description
0x00	0x20	cmd56 packet6 chunk
0x20	0x10	cmd56 packet7 chunk
0x30	0x23	cmd56 packet8 chunk

0x1C - generate_vita_authenticity_proof

New Vita Kirk 0x1C service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data generation service. Size of request is 0x40. Size of response is 0x33.

- kirk service 1C will generate packet 9

- it will decrypt packet 8 to retrieve challenge0 and card_challenge0

- then challenge0 and card_challenge0 will be tweaked

- then it will generate secondary_key0

- then packet 9 will be encrypted with key_id and master_key

- packet 9 should contain encrypted message which can be decrypted (by card) with key_id and master_key.

- message should have secondary_key0, tweaked challenge0 and tweaked card_challenge0.

- this way card will know that we know how to properly encrypt the data and we know the layout of the data because we tweak and reorder certain fields.

Request:

Offset	Size	Description
0x00	0x20	cmd56 packet6 chunk
0x20	0x20	cmd56 packet8 chunk

Response:

Offset	Size	Description
0x00	0x01	command
0x01	0x01	unknown
0x02	0x01	size
0x03	0x30	packet 9 chunk

0x1D - challenge_handshake

New Vita Kirk 0x1D service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data validation service with no response. Size of request is 0xA3.

- packet 13 should contain challenge1 for the card that can be encrypted (by card) with key_id and master_key.

- packet 14 should contain challenge1 and master_key that are encrypted (by card) with key_id and master_key.

- kirk service 0x1D will decrypt secondary_key0 from packet 9 with key_id and master_key

- then it will decrypt packet 14

- then it will verify challenge1 in packet 13 against decrypted packet 14

- then it will verify master_key in packet 6 against decrypted packet 14

Offset	Size	Description
0x00	0x20	cmd56 packet6 chunk
0x20	0x30	cmd56 packet9 chunk
0x50	0x10	cmd56 packet13 chunk
0x60	0x43	cmd56 packet14 chunk

0x1E - generate_packets_15_17_with_cmac_signature

New Vita Kirk 0x1E service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data generation service. Size of request is 0x51. Size of response is 0x33.

- kirk service 0x1E will generate packet 15

- it will decrypt secondary_key0 from packet 9 with key_id and master_key

- then it will generate secondary_key1

- then it will create a buffer with tweaked secondary_key1 and tweak_padding

- then it will encrypt the buffer using secondary_key0

- then it will create cmd56 input like buffer with encrypted buffer

- then it will calculate cmac of cmd56 like buffer using secondary_key0

- encrypted buffer and cmac will be the resulting data of packet 15

Request:

Offset	Size	Description
0x00	0x20	cmd56 packet6 chunk
0x20	0x30	cmd56 packet9 chunk
0x50	0x01	parameter (value 2 or 3)

Response:

Offset	Size	Description
0x00	0x01	command
0x01	0x01	unknown
0x02	0x01	size
0x03	0x30	packet 15/17 chunk

0x1F - decrypt_packet_16

New Vita Kirk 0x1F service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data validation service. Size of request is 0xB3. Size of response is 0x20.

- kirk service 0x1E will decrypt secondary_key0 from packet 9 with key_id and master_key

- then it will combine data from packet 16 into a cmd56 like buffer

- then it will calculate cmac of that cmd56 like buffer using secondary_key0

- then it will verify calculated cmac against cmac from packet 16

- then it will decrypt secondary_key1 and tweak_padding from packet 15

- then it will decrypt secondary_key1 and unknown data from packet 16

- then it will verify decrypted secondary_key1 from packet 15 against decrypted secondary_key1 from packet 16

- then it will verify that decrypted tweak_padding from packet 15 is properly tweaked

- then it will return unknown decrypted data from packet 16

Request:

Offset	Size	Description
0x00	0x20	cmd56 packet6 chunk
0x20	0x30	cmd56 packet9 chunk
0x50	0x20	cmd56 packet15 chunk
0x70	0x43	cmd56 packet16 chunk

Response:

Offset	Size	Description
0x00	0x20	decrypted packet16 chunk

0x20 - get_klicensee_keys_with_rif_cmac_signature

New Vita Kirk 0x20 service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data generation service. Size of request is 0x116. Size of response is 0x34.

Generated data is used to obtain klicensee using sceSblAuthMgrDecBindDataForDriver

Request:

Offset	Size	Description
0x00	0x20	cmd56 packet6 chunk
0x20	0x30	cmd56 packet9 chunk
0x50	0x20	cmd56 packet17 chunk
0x70	0x43	cmd56 packet18 chunk
0xB3	0x10	cmd56 packet19 chunk
0xC3	0x53	cmd56 packet20 chunk

Response:

Offset	Size	Description
0x00	0x20	keys that are used to obtain klicensee
0x20	0x14	cmac signature that should be same as rif data at offset 0xE0

0x21 - kirk_ecc160_sign

New Vita Kirk 0x21 service for 160bit ECC signing.

Specific nonce is used for signing.

For example if you will implement it with openssl it will be used to calculate precomputed parts of signing operation (kinv and rp).

nonce is obtained by:

1. Generating 0x40 sized seed which is derived from message hash and static private key using hmac256 and sha256.

2. nonce = seed mod N

Input:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x20	unknown, must be zeroes
0x20	0x14	message hash

Output:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x14	ECC Signature R component
0x14	0x14	ECC Signature S component

0x22 - kirk_ecc224_sign_sceebootpbp

New Vita Kirk 0x22 service for 224bit ECC signing.

Specific nonce is used for signing.

For example if you will implement it with openssl it will be used to calculate precomputed parts of signing operation (kinv and rp).

nonce is obtained by:

1. Generating 0x40 sized seed which is derived from message hash and one of two static private keys using hmac256 and sha256. Key can be selected with key id 0 or 1.

Private key 0 is only used for signing __sceebootpbp files for firmware versions before 1.8X, otherwise private key 1 is used for signing __sceebootpbp.

2. nonce = seed mod N

Input:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x20	unknown, must be zeroes
0x20	0x1C	message hash

Output:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x1C	ECC Signature R component
0x1C	0x1C	ECC Signature S component

0x23 - generate_cmac_signature

New Vita Kirk 0x23 service.

Input:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x10	Message

Output:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x10	Encrypted Message
0x10	0x10	Encrypted Message CMAC

pm_sm.self

sceSblPmMgrAuthEtoIForDriver uses "sd0:sm/pm_sm_sd.self" whilst other PmSm functions use "os0:sm/pm_sm.self".

Services 9 and 0xA appeared on 1.03 (maybe 1.00). They are not present on 0.990 and earlier.

0x1 - get_product_mode

Used by sceSblPmMgrGetProductModeFromNVS.

Data size is 0x28 bytes. (0x20 bytes used)

Input: 0x20 buffer read from NVS at offset 0.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Output: product mode
0x44	0x4	zeroed
0x48	0x20	input only: NVS data read at offset 0

0x2 - set_product_mode

Used by sceSblPmMgrSetProductMode.

Data size is 0x28 bytes. (0x20 bytes used)

Input: 0x20 bytes buffer read from NVS at offset 0, to which is written the new product mode to set.

Output data: 0x20 buffer to write to NVS at offset 0.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	new product mode
0x44	0x1C	output only

0x3 - gen_req_hello

Input: 0x30 bytes buffer.

This is the first JIG auth command. The 0x28 buffer content is for the first time set by this service.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	arg1 (6 or 14)
0x44	0x4	arg2 (1 when arg1 in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when arg1 in [14]; otherwise undefined)
0x48	0x28	output only

0x4 - gen_challenge

Input: 0x30 bytes buffer.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	arg1 (6 or 14)
0x44	0x4	arg2 (1 when arg1 in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when arg1 in [14]; otherwise undefined)
0x48	0x28	input and output

0x5 - check_response

Input: 0x30 bytes buffer.

Returns 0 on success, doesn't modify the input buffer.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	arg1 (6 or 14)
0x44	0x4	arg2 (1 when arg1 in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when arg1 in [14]; otherwise undefined)
0x48	0x28	input only

0x6 - gen_req_result

Input: 0x30 bytes buffer.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	arg1 (6 or 14)
0x44	0x4	arg2 (1 when arg1 in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when arg1 in [14]; otherwise undefined)
0x48	0x28	input and output

0x7 - check_result

Input: 0x30 bytes buffer.

Returns 0 on success, doesn't modify the input buffer.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	arg1 (6 or 14)
0x44	0x4	arg2 (1 when arg1 in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when arg in [14]; otherwise undefined)
0x48	0x28	input only

0x8

Used on 1.03+ by sceSblPmMgrGetProductModeFromNVS.

Input: 0x70 bytes buffer.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	new product mode
0x44	0x4	0
0x48	0x4	out1: current product mode
0x4C	0x4	out2
0x50	0x60	unk

0x9 - gen_jig_message

Only on 1.03+.

Input: 0x10C bytes buffer.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	arg1: flag.
0x44	0x4	arg2
0x48	0x104	output

0xA - check_jig_response

Only on 1.03+.

Input: 0x10C bytes buffer.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	arg1: flag.
0x44	0x4	arg2
0x48	0x104	input

qaf_sm.self

0x0

Decrypt or check QAF Token. Used on 1.03 PDEL.

0x4 - decrypt QAF version

Input: 0x20 buffer read from NVS offset 0x2A0.

Output: QAF version in this buffer of size 0x20:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x4	unk
0x4	0x4	QAF version
0x8	0x18	unk

0x5 - encrypt QAF version

Input QAF version in this buffer of size 0x20:

Offset	Size	Description
0x0	0x4	unk
0x4	0x4	QAF version
0x8	0x18	unk

Output of size 0x20 is then written to NVS offset 0x2A0.

0x6 - check_flag (decrypt)

Input: 0x20 buffer read from NVS at offset 0.

Returns error if flag is bad, 0 on success.

Output

0x7 - set_flag (encrypt)

Input: 0x20 buffer.

Output: 0x20 encrypted buffer that can be written to NVS at offset 0.

rmauth_sm.self

Removable Media (Memory Card) authentication. Used by SceMsif.

0x1 - get_key_master_gen_no

Response (size 0x20 bytes):

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x10	unknown
0x50	0x4	Returned ID?
0x54	0xC	unknown

0x2 - set_index_key

Scrambles and sets the DMAC5 keyslot 0x1C key. The scrambling process consists of encrypting the first and second halves of the key seed with a private internal (could be considered as a couple of 0x10 keys) rmmauth_sm key using AES128-CBC.

Request (size 0x20 bytes):

Offset	Size	Description
0x00	0x20	Key seed

0x3

?clear_index_key?

Clears the DMAC5 keyslot 0x1C key (to 0).

spkg_verifier_sm_w_key_2.self

This is an extension of update_service_sm.self. It was added to support command 0xE0002.

0xE0002 - sceSblUsSmAuthSpkgWithKey2

Used to decrypt downloaded lists (SPKGs). Same format as 0x40002.

Lists URLS:

.list_0_version:0000000125.list_0_url:http://vitacl.ww.dl.playstation.net/vitacl/ww/j/list_launch_vita.dat
.list_1_version:0000000111.list_1_url:http://vitacl.ww.dl.playstation.net/vitacl/ww/j/list_launch_emu.dat
.list_2_version:0000000001.list_2_url:http://vitacl.ww.dl.playstation.net/vitacl/ww/j/list_launch_teleport.dat

update_service_sm.self

This is used by SceSblUpdateMgr to decrypt update packages extracted from PUP files. Both 0x40002 and 0x50002 reference buffers in the following way: an inner paddr list is generated for the buffer containing the data to encrypt/decrypt, then an outer paddr list is generated for the inner list. That means there's two levels of indirection in the paddr list.

0x10002 - sceSblUsSmAuthPupHeader

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_PUP_HEADER.

Verify PUP header.

Input data size: 0xFF0.

Input: PA vector of the PUP header including the PUP Hash (size: 0x80 + segment_num * 0x60 + 0x20)

0x20002 - sceSblUsSmAuthPupSegment

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_PUP_SEGMENT.

Verify PUP segment.

Input data size: 0xFF0.

0x30002 - sceSblUsSmAuthPupWatermark

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_PUP_WM.

Verify PUP watermark.

Input data size: 0xFF0.

Input data: a packet embedding at least two paddr (or PA vectors): PUP Watermark (0x1000 bytes) and PUP Hash (0x20 bytes).

0x40002 - sceSblUsSmAuthSpkg

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_SPKG.

Decrypt a SPKG. Allocate a page aligned buffer and read the complete SPKG file into the buffer. The buffer is decrypted in place.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x8	Set to 0x0
0x48	0x8	Set to 0x1
0x50	0x14	struct paddr_list_req for Paddr list below
0x64	0x14	struct paddr_list_req for pkg buffer
0x78	Variable (max 0xF48)	Copy of paddr list for pkg buffer (contents described at 0x50)

0x50002 - sceSblUsSmEncryptIndividualSLSK

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_ENCIND_SLSK.

Re-encrypt individual SLSK files (.enp files).

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x8	Unknown/Zero
0x48	0x8	Set to 1
0x50	0x14	struct paddr_list_req for paddr list copied to 0x78. Only count field is used.
0x64	0x14	struct paddr_list_req for inner paddr list. Not used.
0x78	Variable (max 0xF88)	outer paddr list / paddr list to paddr list to encrypt

Each inner paddr list is first copied to temporary f00d memory, then they all are checked for validity at once. Maximum size of inner list is 0xff7 (so probably 0xff7 / 8 * 8 = 0xff0). Any lengths higher than that result in SCE_SBL_ERROR_SL_ENOMEM = 0x800f020c.

How it works:

• first, all inner entries are checked for validity, if something's invalid, bail out SCE_SBL_ERROR_SL_EINVAL 0x800f0216
• start at last outer entry and move towards the first
• if current entry looks valid (length >= 8), proceed to inner paddr encryption
• if no valid entries found, error=SCE_SBL_ERROR_SL_EINVAL 0x800f0216
• if multiple valid entries found, error=SCE_SBL_ERROR_SL_EIO 0x800f0205 (???) (but the first one found is always encrypted)
• if only one valid entry is found, return success

Bugs(?):

• encrypting same paddr twice or more times within a single inner paddr list always results in same output, no matter what input was, reproducible with length=0x10 or less
• sum(inner list sizes) must be <= 0xFF0, but there's no overflow check, a large inner list causes f00d to overwrite memory with data like:

00:00:26	0 // this is paddr 0x1F000000
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	2000
00:00:26	8
00:00:26	812d40
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	1f000020 // this is paddr 0x1F00001C
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	2000
00:00:26	8
00:00:26	812d40
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	1f000040
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	2000
00:00:26	8
00:00:26	812d40
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	1f000060
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	2000
00:00:26	8
00:00:26	812d40
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	1f000080

0x60002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsEncryptSectors

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_SNVS_ENC_SECTORS.

The input is plain SNVS sectors read from NVS.

Calculates a XTS Encrypt using the per console keys in keyring slot 0x502, and 0x503 for the tweak and decryption keys. Appears to be intended for up to 0x3E0 bytes in size, but the size in F00D packet +4 derives the XTS size and memcpy.

The result is XTS encrypted SNVS sectors.

Data size is 8 bytes + sectors size.

typedef struct data { // size is variable, at least 0x28 bytes
  int sectors_index; // input: between 1 and 20 (SNVS sectors)
  int sectors_count; // input
  char sectors[0x20 * sectors_count]; // input: read from NVS.
} data;

0x70002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsDecryptSectors

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_SNVS_DEC_SECTORS.

The input is XTS encrypted sectors.

Calculates a XTS Decrypt using the per console keys in keyring slot 0x502, and 0x503 for the tweak and decryption keys. Appears to be intended for up to 0x3E0 in size, but the size in F00D packet +4 derives the XTS size and memcpy.

The result is plain sectors.

Data size is 8 bytes + sectors size.

typedef struct data { // size is variable, at least 0x28 bytes
  int sectors_index; // input: between 1 and 20 (SNVS sectors)
  int sectors_count; // input
  char sectors[0x20 * sectors_count]; // input: read from NVS.
} data;

0x80002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsEncryptMgmtData

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_SNVS_ENC_MGMT.

The input are the new status and flags, and the current Mgmt Data sector read from NVS at offset 0.

Calculates a XTS Decrypt using the per console keys in keyring slot 0x502, and 0x503 for the tweak and decryption keys. It then calculates an HMAC using the keyring 0x504 to check the block passed in. If ok, then it uses the seed 0xACA9B1AC to recalculate the block, generate a new hmac, and xts encrypt the block.

The result is a new Mgmt Data sector, which is to be written to NVS at offset 0.

Data size is 0x28 bytes.

typedef struct data { // size is 0x28 bytes
  int status; // input
  char flags[4]; // input
  char sector[0x20]; // input: read from NVS at offset 0. Likely to be 0x10 bytes of data followed by 0x10 bytes of HMAC.
} data;

0x90002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsDecryptMgmtData

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_SNVS_DEC_MGMT.

The input is the current Mgmt Data sector read from NVS at offset 0.

Calculates a XTS Decrypt using the per console keys in keyring slot 0x502, and 0x503 for the tweak and decryption keys. It then calculates an HMAC using the keyring 0x504 to check the block passed in.

The result is the current status and flags.

Data size is 0x28 bytes.

typedef struct data { // size is 0x28 bytes
  int status; // output
  char flags[4]; // output
  char sector[0x20]; // input: read from NVS at offset 0. Likely to be 0x10 bytes of data followed by 0x10 bytes of HMAC.
} data;

// SCE_SBL_SS_SNVS_FLAGS
#define SCE_SBL_SS_SNVS_UPDATER_FLAG_INDEX 0

If flags[SCE_SBL_SS_SNVS_UPDATER_FLAG_INDEX] is not set, updater init is skipped:

      if (((byte)flags & 1) == 0)
        sceKernelPrintfLevelForDriver(2, "skip init for updater\n");
      else {
        sceKernelPrintfLevelForDriver(2, "do init for updater\n");
        if (SpkgInfoUtilInitForUpdater(&status, &flags) != 0)
          sceKernelPrintfLevelForDriver(2,"SpkgInfoUtilInitForUpdater() failure = 0x%x\n",iVar2);
      }

0xA0002 - sceSblUsSmAuthAdditionalSign

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_PUP_AS.

Verify PUP Additional Signatures.

0xB0002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsEncryptDecryptSector

Added on FW 1.03. Usage similar to pm_sm command 8.

Data size is 0x88 bytes.

typedef struct data { // size is 0x88
  uint mode; // 0 before read, 1 after read, 2 before write, 3 after write
  uint sector_index; // between 1 and 20 (SNVS sectors)
  char base_buf[0x20]; // input: full of 0xdeadbeef
  char inter_buf[0x30]; // output: input for nvs_read_special or nvs_write_special
  char final_buf[0x30]; // input: output for nvs_read_special or nvs_write_special
} data;

Usage:

• 1) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xB0002, &f00d_resp, data, 0x88);

For read:

• 2) nvs_read_special(data + 0x28, 0x10, data + 0x58, 0x30)

For write:

• 2) nvs_write_special(data + 0x28, 0x30, data + 0x58, 0x10);
• 3) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xB0002, &f00d_resp, data, 0x88);

0xC0002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsEncryptDecryptMgmtData

Added on FW 1.03. Usage similar to pm_sm command 8.

Data size is 0x70 bytes.

typedef struct data { // Size is 0x70 bytes on FW 3.60
  int mode; // ex: 0 before read, 1 after read, 2 before write, 3 after write
  int sector_count; // always 0 (Mgmt Data)
  int status; // not set for read, set for write
  int flags; // not set for read, set for write
  char unk_10[0x30]; // output: input for nvs_read_special or nvs_write_special
  char unk_40[0x30]; // input: output for nvs_read_special or nvs_write_special
} data;

Usage:

• 1) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xC0002, &f00d_resp, data, 0x70);

For write:

• 2) nvs_write_special(data + 0x10, 0x30, data + 0x40, 0x10);

For read:

• 2) nvs_read_special(data + 0x10, 0x10, data + 0x40, 0x30);
• 3) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xC0002, &f00d_resp, data, 0x70);

0xD0002

Syscon update related. Usage is to proxy encrypted data F00D <=> Syscon.

Data size is 0x58 bytes.

typedef struct data { // Size is 0x58 bytes on FW 3.60
  int mode; // ex: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
  int unk_4; // Maybe unused
  char unk_8[0x28]; // input: syscon command 0xD2 output
  char unk_30[0x28]; // output: syscon command 0xD2 input
} data;

Usage:

• 1) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xD0002, &f00d_resp, data, 0x58);

For modes 0, 1 and 3:

• 2) memcpy(data + 8, data + 0x30, 0x28); SceSysconForDriver_4D03754A(data + 8, 0x28, data + 0x30, 0x28);
• 3) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xD0002, &f00d_resp, data, 0x58);

utoken_sm.self

0x1 - verify_utoken

Verify SceUtoken buffer.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Paddr of SceUtoken buffer
0x44	0x4	Size of SceUtoken buffer (usually 0x800)
0x48	0x4	Time (got using sceRtcGetCurrentSecureTickForDriver or 0xFFFFFFFF (-1)
0x4C	0x10	OpenPsId

0x2 - decrypt utoken

Decrypt SceUtoken buffer, in order to get UT Flags.

Offset	Size	Description
0x40	0x4	Paddr of SceUtoken buffer
0x44	0x4	Size of SceUtoken buffer (usually 0x800)
0x48	0x4	Time (got using sceRtcGetCurrentSecureTickForDriver or 0xFFFFFFFF (-1))
0x4C	0x10	OpenPsId

mgkm_sm.self

MagicGate Key Manager secure module. These commands seem to be used to set keys (on FW 0.990 and 1.50). There are debug strings referencing these F00D commands as "set_key_command") on Dmac5. This key seems to be used to do stuff with TripleDES and another unknown encrypt algorithm.