SceLibSsl: Difference between revisions

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This module implements TLS for the PS Vita in most use cases (including PSN access). Notably, WebKit does not seem to use this but it shares the CA list in <code>vs0:data/external/cert/CA_LIST.cer</code>. CA_LIST.cer includes all the usual root CAs and in addition, 5 SCE signed ROOT CAs. Note that because the SCE root CAs are also used in WebKit and other apps (email for example), it is possible for Sony to do a [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack MITM] attack on any of their users. This is a privacy hole for users, but it seems that the same policy is in place in PSP, PS3, and likely PS4 as well. Although CA_LIST.cer is unsigned, just like in later PS3 firmwares, Sony stores the hash of all certificates in [[SceLibSsl]] (which itself is signed). This makes impossible a theoretical attack of adding a root CA on an updated PS Vita in order to extract the platform passphrase.
This module implements TLS for the PS Vita in most use cases (including PSN access).
 
[[SceLibSsl]] is a port of RSA BSAFE® Crypto-C Micro Edition. See also the unstripped binaries of [https://github.com/sakata2kr/sso/tree/main/webagent/CAPKI/CAPKI5/Linux/amd64/64/lib RSA BSAFE® Crypto-C Micro Edition].
 
Notably, WebKit does not seem to use this but it shares the CA list in <code>vs0:data/external/cert/CA_LIST.cer</code>. CA_LIST.cer includes all the usual root CAs and in addition, 5 SCE signed ROOT CAs. Note that because the SCE root CAs are also used in WebKit and other apps (email for example), it is possible for Sony to do a [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack MITM] attack on any of their users. This is a privacy hole for users, but it seems that the same policy is in place in PSP, PS3, and likely PS4 as well. Although CA_LIST.cer is unsigned, just like in later PS3 firmwares, Sony stores the hash of all certificates in [[SceLibSsl]] (which itself is signed). This makes impossible a theoretical attack of adding a root CA on an updated PS Vita in order to extract the platform passphrase.


== Module ==
== Module ==
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{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Version !! Name !! World !! Privilege
! Version !! World !! Privilege
|-
|-
| 3.60 || SceLibSsl || Non-secure || User
| 3.60 || Non-secure || User
|}
|}


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<source lang="C">int internal_get_ca(int id1, int id2, int unk, char *buf, int unk2, size_t *size);</source>
<source lang="C">int internal_get_ca(int id1, int id2, int unk, char *buf, int unk2, size_t *size);</source>


== Subroutines ==
=== SSL_CIPHER_description ===
{| class="wikitable"
! Version !! Platform !! Offset !! Mode
|-
| 3.60 || CEX/DEX/Tool || 0x19B92 || Thumb
|}
<source lang="C">char *SSL_CIPHER_description(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len);</source>
=== SSL_CIPHER_get_version ===
{| class="wikitable"
! Version !! Platform !! Offset !! Mode
|-
| 3.60 || CEX/DEX/Tool || 0x19E02 || Thumb
|}
<source lang="C">char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c);</source>
=== ERR_raise ===
{| class="wikitable"
! Version !! Platform !! Offset !! Mode
|-
| 3.60 || CEX/DEX/Tool || 0x1B7C0 || Thumb
|}


[[Category:Modules]][[Category:Usermode]]
[[Category:ARM]]
[[Category:Usermode]]
[[Category:Modules]]
[[Category:Library]]

Latest revision as of 21:09, 1 May 2023

This module implements TLS for the PS Vita in most use cases (including PSN access).

SceLibSsl is a port of RSA BSAFE® Crypto-C Micro Edition. See also the unstripped binaries of RSA BSAFE® Crypto-C Micro Edition.

Notably, WebKit does not seem to use this but it shares the CA list in vs0:data/external/cert/CA_LIST.cer. CA_LIST.cer includes all the usual root CAs and in addition, 5 SCE signed ROOT CAs. Note that because the SCE root CAs are also used in WebKit and other apps (email for example), it is possible for Sony to do a MITM attack on any of their users. This is a privacy hole for users, but it seems that the same policy is in place in PSP, PS3, and likely PS4 as well. Although CA_LIST.cer is unsigned, just like in later PS3 firmwares, Sony stores the hash of all certificates in SceLibSsl (which itself is signed). This makes impossible a theoretical attack of adding a root CA on an updated PS Vita in order to extract the platform passphrase.

Module

Version World Privilege
3.60 Non-secure User

Libraries

Known NIDs

Version Name World Visibility NID
3.60 SceSsl Non-secure User 0xCAF5F2E9
3.60 SceSslInternal Non-secure User 0x68D6C3FF

SceSslInternal

internal_get_ca

Version NID
3.60 0x064DFC99

Obtains a certificate from vs0:data/external/cert/CA_LIST.cer. If unk, buf, and unk2 are zero, then get the size of the certificate. Otherwise, load the certificate (PEM) into buf. The file offset and size in CA_LIST.cer are hardcoded into the function for each given id pair. There is also a hardcoded list of SHA1 hashes for each certificate that is checked against before returning. 

int internal_get_ca(int id1, int id2, int unk, char *buf, int unk2, size_t *size);

Subroutines

SSL_CIPHER_description

Version Platform Offset Mode
3.60 CEX/DEX/Tool 0x19B92 Thumb 
char *SSL_CIPHER_description(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len);

SSL_CIPHER_get_version

Version Platform Offset Mode
3.60 CEX/DEX/Tool 0x19E02 Thumb 
char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c);

ERR_raise

Version Platform Offset Mode
3.60 CEX/DEX/Tool 0x1B7C0 Thumb
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