Secure Modules Functions: Difference between revisions

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Depending on the F00D SELF that is currently loaded, different commands are handled.
Depending on the [[Secure_Modules|Secure Modules]] that is currently loaded, different commands are handled.


== Request Buffer ==
== Request Buffer ==


Each request that is made sends a page aligned buffer that has a max size of a page. After as 64 byte header common to all commands, the data afterwards is specific to each command. The documentation for each command below specifies the data that goes after the header. The special command id of -1 (<code>0xFFFFFFFF</code>) is used to shut down the currently loaded F00D SELF.
Each request that is made sends a page aligned buffer that has a max size of a page. After as 64 byte header common to all commands, the data afterwards is specific to each command. The documentation for each command below specifies the data that goes after the header. The special command id of -1 (<code>0xFFFFFFFF</code>) is used to stop the current loaded [[Secure_Modules|Secure Module]].


{| class="wikitable"
Command buffer structure (as seen on FWs 3.60-3.73):
 
{| class='wikitable'
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset
! Size
! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Size of buffer
| 0x0
| 0x4
| Size of the structure (header + data)
|-
|-
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Command ID
| 0x4
| 0x4
| Command ID
|-
|-
| 0x8 || 0x4 || Return value (output)
| 0x8
| 0x4
| Command return value is written here by the SM
|-
|-
| 0xC || 0x34 || Unknown/Unused
| 0xC
| 0x4
| unk2
|-
|-
| 0x40 || Variable (max 0xFC0) || Command specific buffer
| 0x10
| 0x30
| padding
|-
|-
| 0x40
| variable, chosen by NS Kernel, max=0x1000-0x40
| data buffer
|}
|}


=== Physical Address List ===
On FW 0.931, and maybe in later prototype FWs, the data buffer is located at offset 0x10 instead of 0x40. Thus we can wonder why has been added the 0x30 bytes padding.


A common format used in these requests is a list of physical address and size. This simple structure is defined below. See [[SceSysmem#get_paddr_list]] for information on creating this list.
=== Physical Address Vector ===
 
A common format used in these requests is the Physical Address Vector which is a list of Physical Address Ranges. The simple structure of Physical Address Range is defined below. See [[SceSysmem#sceKernelVARangeToPARangeForDriver|sceKernelVARangeToPARangeForDriver]] for information on creating this vector.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 32: Line 51:
|-
|-
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Size
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Size
|-
|}
|}


This data format is used when passing large buffers of data to F00D. This is because the memory manager in kernel could allocate contiguous virtual addresses that corresponds to varying physical addresses.
This data format is used when passing large buffers of data to [[CMeP]]. The reason is that the memory manager in kernel could allocate contiguous virtual addresses that corresponds to varying physical addresses.


== kprx_auth_sm.self ==
== kprx_auth_sm.self ==


This is a special SELF that is found in the boot [[SLB2]] partition. The raw (encrypted) SELF is found in secure world memory (placed there by an early bootloader). It is used to decrypt SELFs for ARM. The SELF header is passed into a page aligned buffer and a [[F00D Commands#Physical Address List|paddr list]] is generated from it.
[[Kprx auth sm]] is a special SM stored in the [[SLB2]] partition. The raw (encrypted) SELF is stored in ARM [[TrustZone]] memory. It is placed there by an early bootloader.
 
kprx_auth_sm is used to decrypt SELF and SPSFO files for ARM. The CF header is passed into a page aligned buffer and a [[#Physical Address Vector|PA vector]] is generated from it.


=== 0x10001 ===
=== 0x10001 - sceSblAuthMgrAuthHeader ===


Parses the SELF header for decryption. The header is copied to the F00D private memory region first (on 1.69 with 0x1000 sized header, it is at <code>0x00811CC0</code> in F00D memory space.
Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr#sceSblAuthMgrAuthHeaderForKernel|sceSblAuthMgrAuthHeaderForKernel]].
 
Checks the SELF header for decryption. The header is copied to the cmep private memory region first (on FW 1.69 with 0x1000 sized header, it is at <code>0x00811CC0</code> in cmep memory space.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Unknown
| 0x0 || 0x130 || [[SceSblSsSmComm#Types|SceSblSmCommContext130]]
|-
|-
| 0x44 || 0x4 || 0x1 if user SELF, otherwise 0x0
| 0x130 || 0x4 || Number of PA vector entries for buffer
|-
|-
| 0x48 || 0x8 || <code>0x2808000000000001LL</code>
| 0x134 || 0x4 || Physical address of PA vector
|}
 
=== 0x20001 - sceSblAuthMgrSetupAuthSegment ===
 
Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr#sceSblAuthMgrSetupAuthSegmentForKernel|sceSblAuthMgrSetupAuthSegmentForKernel]].
 
Set the program segment to decrypt. This corresponds to the segment index in the ELF program headers in the SELF header passed in with the command above.
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x50 || 0x8 || <code>0xF000C000000080LL</code>
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x58 || 0x8 || <code>0xFFFFFFFF00000000LL</code>
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Segment number
|-
|-
| 0x60 || 0x10 || Unknown
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Return value. <code>1</code> if not compressed, <code>2</code> if compressed.
|-
|-
| 0x70 || 0x8 || <code>0xC300003800980LL</code>
| 0x8 || 0x8 || Unknown
|}
 
=== 0x30001 - sceSblAuthMgrLoadBlock ===
 
Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr#sceSblAuthMgrAuthSegmentForKernel|sceSblAuthMgrAuthSegmentForKernel]].
 
Decrypt a buffer from the SELF corresponding to the program segment number passed in above. The segment is read in <code>0x10000</code> bytes chunks and is decrypted in place (the input buffer will contain the decrypted data). A [[Secure Modules Functions#Physical Address Vector|PA vector]] is generated from the buffer. The input buffer and output buffer can be the same.
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x78 || 0x8 || <code>0x8009800000LL</code>
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x80 || 0x8 || Unknown
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Number of entries in input PA vector
|-
|-
| 0x88 || 0x8 || <code>0xFFFFFFFF00000000LL</code>
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Physical address of the input PA vector
|-
|-
| 0x90 || 0x8 || Unknown
| 0x8 || 0x4 || Number of entries in output PA vector
|-
|-
| 0x98 || 0x40 || Not used
| 0xC || 0x4 || Physical address of the output PA vector
|}
 
=== 0x40001 - sceSblAuthMgrGetEKc ===
 
Decrypts provided buffer in AES ECB mode using one of three keys (NPDRM keys ?).
 
Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr#sceSblAuthMgrGetEKcForDriver|sceSblAuthMgrGetEKcForDriver]] for getting klicensee.
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0xD8 || 0x60 || Return data (0x90 length overwriting) ?
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x138 || 0x10 || Copy of data at <code>0x68</code>
| 0x0 || 0x100 || Data Buffer
|-
|-
| 0x148 || 0x10 || Unknown
| 0x100 || 0x4 || Data Size. Max value is 0x100.
|-
|-
| 0x158 || 0x4 || <code>0x10</code>
| 0x104 || 0x4 || Key ID. Must be 0, 1 or 2.
|-
|-
| 0x15C || 0xC || Unknown
| 0x108 || 0x4 || Set to 0
|-
| 0x168 || 0x4 || [[F00D Commands#SELF Path Code|SELF path code]]
|-
| 0x16C || 0x4 || Unknown
|-
| 0x170 || 0x4 || Number of paddr list entries for buffer
|-
| 0x174 || 0x4 || Physical address of paddr list
|-
|-
| 0x10C || 0x4 || Set to 0
|}
|}


==== SELF Path Code ====
=== 0x50001 - sceSblAuthMgrSetDmac5Key ===


This code is found by the path the SELF was loaded from. It's used by F00D to check if the SELF being loaded from an allowed partition. A path that does not start with any of the following will have <code>0</code> returned as the code. It could also be used to select the key used in decryption.
Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr#sceSblAuthMgrSetDmac5KeyForKernel|sceSblAuthMgrSetDmac5KeyForKernel]] to set a key in DMAC5 keyring for decryption.


{| class="wikitable sortable"
This SM function uses AES128ECB or AES128CBC and hardcoded AES keys and IVs to encrypt the provided key into the final DMAC5 key. Then it writes the final DMAC5 key into the chosen [[DMAC#DMAC5|Dmac5]] keyring.
 
Input/output size is 0x110 bytes. Buffer is untouched by the SM function as it makes an internal copy.
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Path !! Code
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| sd0: || 1
| 0x0 || 0x20 || Key. Key that will be encrypted with kprx_auth_sm hardcoded keys and written to DMAC5 keyring.
|-
|-
| os0: || 2
| 0x20 || 0xE0 || Reserved.
|-
|-
| vs0: || 3
| 0x100 || 0x4 || Key size (in bytes). Usually 0x10 or 0x20 bytes. Not used in kprx_auth_sm function 0x60001 as it entirely clears selected 0x20 bytes DMAC5 keyring.
|-
|-
| vd0: || 4
| 0x104 || 0x4 || Mode. Affects both AES mode (ECB or CBC), AES key and IV and data size (0x10 or 0x20 bytes). Possible values: 0 (aes128ecb on 0x10 bytes), 0x10000 (aes128ecb on 0x10 bytes), 0x10001 (aes128ecb on 0x10 bytes, requires QA flag 0xF mask 1), 0x20000 (aes128cbc on 0x10 bytes), 0x20001 (aes128cbc on 0x20 bytes).
|-
|-
| tm0: || 5
| 0x108 || 0x4 || Destination DMAC5 Keyring ID. Possible values: 0-0x1A, 0x1C-0x1F. 0x1B is forbidden by kprx_auth_sm for unknown reason.
|-
|-
| ur0: || 6
| 0x10C || 0x4 || Unused. Key size & 0xF. Should be 0.
|}
 
=== 0x60001 - sceSblAuthMgrClearDmac5Key ===
 
Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr#sceSblAuthMgrClearDmac5KeyForKernel|sceSblAuthMgrClearDmac5KeyForKernel]] to clear the Dmac5 Key.
 
This function writes zeroes into the chosen [[DMAC#DMAC5|DMAC5]] keyring.
 
Input/output size is 0x110 bytes. Buffer is untouched by the SM function as it makes an internal copy.
 
It has exactly same structure as kprx_auth_sm function 0x50001 and is parsed in the same kprx_auth_sm subroutine function.
 
=== 0x70001 - sceSblAuthMgrDecBindData ===
 
Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr#sceSblAuthMgrDecBindDataForDriver|sceSblAuthMgrDecBindDataForDriver]] and [[SceNpDrm]] for gamecard binding data used in conjunction with the RIF license file on the gamecard for deriving the klicensee.
 
Input/output size is 0x18 bytes. Buffer is untouched by the SM function as it makes an internal copy, however encrypted bind data at specified physical address will be decrypted after SM function execution.
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| host0: || 7
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| ud0: || 11
| 0x0 || 0x8 || Bind data PA Range. Must be 0x40-byte aligned and of maximum length 0x1000 bytes.
|-
|-
| ux0:app || 23
| 0x8 || 0x8 || Seed PA Range. Must be 0x40-byte aligned and of maximum length 0x1000 bytes.
|-
|-
| ux0:patch || 24
| 0x10 || 0x4 || HMAC-SHA256 Key revision. Only revision 0 is supported on FW 3.60.
|-
|-
| ux0:data || 25
| 0x14 || 0x4 || Unknown. Must be zero on FW 3.60.
|}
 
Algorithm:
* Compute HMAC-SHA256 of seed. It gives a 0x20-byte digest.
* First 0x10 bytes of the digest make the AES128CBC key and last 0x10 bytes make the AES128CBC IV.
* AES128CBC decrypt bind data.
 
=== 0x80001 - sceSblAuthMgrVerifySpsfo ===
 
Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr#sceSblAuthMgrVerifySpsfoForDriver|sceSblAuthMgrVerifySpsfoForDriver]].
 
== applier_sm.self ==
 
applier_sm is used to decrypt and even encrypt SELFs for ARM. It is only present in some old prototype System Software builds like 0.931.010.
 
=== 0x10001 - sceSblApplierSmOpen ===
 
=== 0x20001 - sceSblApplierSmClose ===
 
=== 0x30001 - sceSblApplierSmSetupSegment ===
 
=== 0x40007 - sceSblApplierSmDecryptSegment ===
 
=== 0x50007 - sceSblApplierSmEncryptSegment ===
 
=== 0x60007 - sceSblApplierSmVerifySegment ===
 
== act_sm.self ==
 
=== 0x1 - check_activation_code_1 ===
 
Removed on FW 2.10.
 
Checks SceKitActivationData read from sd0:/act.dat.
 
Uses different keys (AES256CBC and AES256CMAC) than check_activation_code_2.
 
Used only on TOOL rev 3.
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| ux0:user || 0
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| ux0: || 12
| 0x0 || 0x80 || Input: [[SceSblSsMgr|SceKitActivationData]]
|}
 
=== 0x2 - check_activation_code_2 ===
 
Removed on FW 2.10.
 
Checks SceKitActivationData read from sd0:VITA.ACT.
 
Uses different keys (AES256CBC and AES256CMAC) than check_activation_code_1.
 
Used on any Kit other than TOOL rev 3 (uses command 1), TEST, TOOL rev 4, Manufacturing Mode and QA flagged (bypasses activation).
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| gro0:app || 13
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| grw0:patch || 14
| 0x0 || 0x80 || Input: [[SceSblSsMgr|SceKitActivationData]]
|}
 
=== 0x4 - check_nvs_cmac ===
 
Not present on FW 0.931.
 
Checks NVS activation data authenticity using CMAC.
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| sa0: || 15
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
| mfa0: || 16
|-
| mfb0: || 17
|-
| lma0: || 18
|-
| lmb0: || 19
|-
| lmc0: || 20
|-
| lmd0: || 21
|-
| pd0: || 22
|-
|-
| 0x0 || 0x20 || Input: [[SceSblSsMgr|SceNVSKitActivationData]]
|}
|}


=== 0x20001 ===
=== 0x5 - gen_nvs_cmac ===
 
Removed on FW 2.10.


Set the program segment to decrypt. This corresponds to the segment index in the ELF program headers in the SELF header passed in with the command above.
Generate CMAC of NVS activation data. The returned data is written to NVS at offset 0x520 or 0x530.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 157: Line 272:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Segment number
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Magic "act\0"
|-
|-
| 0x44 || 0x4 || Return value. <code>0x1</code> if not compressed, <code>0x2</code> is compressed.
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Issue number
|-
|-
| 0x48 || 0x8 || Unknown
| 0x8 || 0x4 || Start validity time unix timestamp
|-
|-
| 0xC || 0x4 || End validity time unix timestamp
|-
| 0x10 || 0x10 || Output: CMAC of the 0x10 input bytes
|}
|}


=== 0x30001 ===
=== 0x7 ===


Decrypt a buffer from the SELF corresponding to the program segment number passed in above. The segment is read in <code>0x10000</code> chunks and is decrypted in place (the input buffer will contain the decrypted data). A [[F00D Commands#Physical Address List|paddr list]] is generated from the buffer. The input buffer and output buffer can be the same.
Removed on FW 2.10.
 
Check if activation is valid. The input activation data is read from NVS at offset 0x520.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 173: Line 293:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Number of entries in input paddr list
| 0x0 || 0x10 || [[SceSblSsMgr|SceNVSKitActivationData]] without CMAC
|-
| 0x44 || 0x4 || Physical address of the input paddr list
|-
| 0x48 || 0x4 || Number of entries in output paddr list
|-
| 0x4C || 0x4 || Physical address of the output paddr list
|-
|-
| 0x10 || 0x20 || [[SceSblSsMgr|SceNVSKitActivationData]]
|}
|}


=== 0x40001 sceSblAuthMgrGetEKc ===
=== 0xA - gen_activation_with_sig ===
Decrypts provided buffer in ECB mode using one of three keys.


Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr]] for getting some key?
Introduced in FW 2.10.
 
Check if new activation is valid. Extended activation check with a signature. This is ran when installing a new afv.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 192: Line 308:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x100 || Data Buffer (under 0x100 bytes)
| 0x0 || 0x80 || Input: [[SceSblSsMgr#|SceKitActivationData]] (new activation data)
|-
|-
| 0x140 || 0x4 || Data Size - must be under 0x100
| 0x80 || 0x100 || Input: RSA signature over new activation data
|-
|-
| 0x144 || 0x4 || Key ID (0,1,2)
| 0x180 || 0x80 || Input: [[SceSblSsMgr|SceKitActivationData]] (previous activation data)
|-
|-
| 0x148 || 0x4 || Set to 0
| 0x200 || 0x100 || Input: RSA signature over previous activation data
|-
| 0x14C || 0x4 || Set to 0
|-
|-
| 0x300 || 0x20 || Output: [[SceSblSsMgr|SceNVSKitActivationData]]
|}
|}


=== 0x50001 sceSblAuthMgrSetDmac5Key ===
=== 0xB - check_activation_with_sig ===
Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr]] to set key for decryption.


This uses an unknown secret to derive the final key, then writes it into dmac5 keyring.
Introduced in FW 2.10.
 
Check if Kit Activation Data is valid and not expired. Extended activation check with signature. This command is ran on boot.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 213: Line 329:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x8-0x10 || Key (64/128/196/256 bits)
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Input: Previous return value
|-
|-
| 0x140 || 0x4 || Key size (in bytes)
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Input: Current time
|-
|-
| 0x144 || 0x4 || Key ID
| 0x8 || 0x4 || Output: License Status
|-
|-
| 0x148 || 0x4 || Slot ID
| 0xC || 0x4 || Output: Expire Date
|-
|-
| 0x14C || 0x4 || Set to 0
| 0x10 || 0x8 || Reserved
|-
|-
| 0x18 || 0x20 || Input: [[SceSblSsMgr|SceNVSKitActivationData]] (read from NVS offset 0x520)
|-
| 0x38 || 0x80 || Input: [[SceSblSsMgr|SceKitActivationData]] (read from tm0:activate/act.dat)
|-
| 0xB8 || 0x100 || Input: RSA signature over activation data (read from tm0:activate/actsig.dat)
|}
|}


=== 0x60001 sceSblAuthMgrClearDmac5Key ===
== aimgr_sm.self ==
Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr]] for clearing the Dmac5 Key
 
=== 0x1 - GetConsoleId ===
 
Returns the console's [[ConsoleId]].
 
Used in [[SceSblSsMgr#sceSblAimgrGetConsoleIdForDriver|sceSblAimgrGetConsoleIdForDriver]].
 
=== 0x2 - GetOpenPsId ===
 
Returns the console's [[OpenPsId]].
 
Used in [[SceSblSsMgr#sceSblAimgrGetOpenPsIdForDriver|sceSblAimgrGetOpenPsIdForDriver]].
 
=== 0x3 - GetVisibleId ===
 
Returns the console's [[VisibleId]].
 
Used in [[SceSblSsMgr#sceSblAimgrGetVisibleIdForDriver|sceSblAimgrGetVisibleIdForDriver]].
 
=== 0x4 - GetPsCode ===
 
Returns the console's [[PsCode]].


=== 0x70001 sceSblAuthMgrDecBindData ===
Used in [[SceSblSsMgr#sceSblAimgrGetPscode2ForDriver|sceSblAimgrGetPscode2ForDriver]].
Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr]] and [[SceNpdrm]] for game card binding data used in conjunction with the RIF license file on the gamecard in deriving the per game klicensee key.


=== 0x80001 ===
=== 0x5 - CreatePassPhrase ===
Used by [[SceSblAuthMgr]] for used by the VSH function _vshSblAuthMgrVerifySpsfo.


== act_sm.self ==
Creates NP passphrase (per-console and per NP account).


=== 0x2 ===
Used in [[SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsCreatePassPhraseForDriver|sceSblSsCreatePassPhraseForDriver]].


Verify afv data
Input size is 0x220 bytes.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 244: Line 384:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Magic "act\0"
| 0x0 || 0x8 || Secure Tick
|-
|-
| 0x44 || 0x1 || Format version
| 0x8 || 0x4 || Unknown. Maybe version or reserved. ex: 0.
|-
|-
| 0x45 || 0x3 || Unused
| 0xC || 0x4 || Arguments size in usermode (0x18 bytes)
|-
|-
| 0x48 || 0x4 || Issue number (increment each activation, prevent rollback)
| 0x10 || 0x10 || NP Account ID in ASCII
|-
|-
| 0x4C || 0x4 || Start validity time unix timestamp
| 0x10 || 0x200 || IdStorage leaf 0x44 (contains PS Vita IDPS Certificate)
|}
 
Output size is 0x220 bytes.
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x50 || 0x4 || End validity time unix timestamp
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x54 || 0x10 || Activation key
| 0x0 || 0x8 || Secure Tick
|-
|-
| 0x64 || 0x1C || Unused
| 0x8 || 0x4 || Unknown. Maybe version or reserved. ex: 0.
|-
|-
| 0x80 || 0x40 || Encrypted Data (I think 0x20 byte data + 0x20 byte HMAC)
| 0xC || 0x4 || Arguments size in usermode (0x18 bytes)
|-
|-
| 0x10 || 0x10 || NP Account ID in ASCII
|-
| 0x20 || 0x200 || NP PassPhrase
|}
|}


=== 0x4 ===
== compat_sm.self ==


Verify activation data
Compat SM functions only works on DEX and CEX units, or on units in Manufacturing Mode or with a certain QA Flag. This is why most DevKit units don't have access to PSPEmu.
 
=== 0x10006 - sceCompatSecLoadSCBootCode ===
 
Load Secure CPU Boot Code. PSP main CPU (Tachyon codename) is an Allegrex 32-bit little-endian RISC CPU with FPU and VFPU, 1 ~ 333MHz, MIPS III-based.
 
Called on init and before resume of PSP.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 272: Line 426:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Magic "act\0"
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Boot/resume cookie. Pass 0 when cold booting, <code>resume_handler ^ magic</code> when resuming
|-
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Set to 0 (unused)
|}
 
On FW 3.73 (simplified):
 
<source lang="C">
*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 4;
syncm();
memcpy(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100000, g_pre_ipl, 0x1000);  // PRE-IPL
memcpy(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100fc0, g_challenge, 0x40);  // Challenge (IPL XOR key)
memcpy(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100fbc, &cookie, 4);        // Boot/resume cookie
syncm();
*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 0;
</source>
 
If an error occurs during SCBootCode loading:
 
<source lang="c">
memset(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100000, 0, 0x1000); // PRE-IPL
syncm();
*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 10;
</source>
 
The cookie, which represents the address where PRE-IPL will jump to when resuming, is passed by MIPS to ARM (written to <code>0xBFC001FC</code>) just before suspending, and it is calculated the same way as [https://github.com/mathieulh/Utopia_PSP/blob/master/371_main.bin.c#L409 on actual PSP], only that using <source lang="c">u8 data[] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x00, 0xde, 0xf0 };</source> as input to the SHA1, instead of the MAC address.
 
=== 0x20006 - sceCompatSecSetSSRAMAcl ===
 
Set Shared Static Random Access Memory Access-control list.
 
Removed since FW 3.50 and replaced by command 0x30006.
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x44 || 0x4 || Issue number
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x48 || 0x4 || Start validity time unix timestamp
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Set to 0
|-
|-
| 0x4C || 0x4 || End validity time unix timestamp
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Set to 0
|}
 
=== 0x30006 - sceCompatSecSetSSRAMAcl2 ===
 
Set Shared Static Random Access Memory Access-control list 2.
 
Appeared on FW 3.50 as replacement for command 0x20006. This change is related to the huge memory management improvement since FW 3.50. See [https://www.neogaf.com/threads/ps-vita-system-software-3-50-adds-30-more-memory-for-game-use.1028194/ PS Vita System software 3.50 adds 30% more memory for game use].
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x50 || 0x10 || Unknown (see below)
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Unused
|}
|}


=== 0x5 ===
On 3.73-CEX (simplified):
<source lang="c">
*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 4;
syncm();
ret = memcmp(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100fc0, g_challenge_result, 0x40); // Check challenge output
if (ret == 0) {
    // Success!!
}
syncm();
*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 10;
</source>
 
== encdec_w_portability_sm.self ==
 
This seems to be used to do some kind of key derivation. May also be used as a general purpose encryption engine.


Get activation data. The returned data is sent to Syscon at offset 0x520.
=== 0x1000A - EncryptWithPortability ===
 
Encrypt data. Actually it always returns <code>0x800F1725</code>, so it does nothing and is never used.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 292: Line 505:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Magic "act\0"
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Key ID (max 0xA)
|-
|-
| 0x44 || 0x4 || Issue number
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Output Length
|-
|-
| 0x48 || 0x4 || Start validity time unix timestamp
| 0x8 || 0x20 || Output
|-
|-
| 0x4C || 0x4 || End validity time unix timestamp
| 0x28 || 0x4 || Input Length (max 0x20)
|-
|-
| 0x50 || 0x10 || Unknown (returned data)
| 0x2C || 0x20 || Input
|-
|-
| 0x4C || 0x10 || IV
|}
|}


=== 0x7 ===
=== 0x2000A - DecryptWithPortability ===
 
Used by [[SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsDecryptWithPortabilityForDriver|sceSblSsDecryptWithPortabilityForDriver]].


Check if activation is valid. The activation data is read from Syscon at offset 0x520.
Decrypt data by using AES-256-CBC with an internal key selected by <code>key_id</code>.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 312: Line 528:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Unknown
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Key ID (1 - 20)
|-
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Input Length (max 0x20)
|-
|-
| 0x44 || 0x4 || Current time unix timestamp
| 0x8 || 0x20 || Input
|-
|-
| 0x48 || 0x8 || Unknown
| 0x28 || 0x4 || Output Length (must match Input Length)
|-
|-
| 0x50 || 0x20 || Activation data
| 0x2C || 0x20 || Output
|-
|-
| 0x4C || 0x10 || IV
|}
|}


=== 0xA ===
Return value of 0x800f0002 means invalid service ID. For encdec_w_portability_sm, only commmands 0x1000A and 0x2000A are supported.
 
Return value of 0x800f1716 means invalid argument such as invalid key ID. Valid key IDs are only 1-20.
 
== gcauthmgr_sm.self ==
 
=== 0x1000B ===
 
Execute KIRK services.


Introduced in 2.12. Check if new activation is valid. Extended activation check with a signature. This is ran when installing a new afv.
This is one of the variable sized buffers that can be placed inside [[#Request_Buffer|Request_Buffer]].
 
Response value returned to Kernel comes from [[#Request_Buffer|Request Buffer]] at offset 8.
 
<source lang="C">
// gc_param is generated by game card and has value 0x01
typedef struct SceSblSmCommGcData { // size is 0x814
int unk_0; // 1
int command;
char data[0x800];
int key_id;
int size;
int unk_810; // 0
} SceSblSmCommGcData;
</source>


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 330: Line 571:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x80 || Same buffer as command 0x2 (new activation data)
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Set to 1
|-
|-
| 0xC0 || 0x100 || Signature over new activation data
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Command (0x4, 0x7, 0xC etc.)
|-
|-
| 0x1C0 || 0x80 || Same buffer as command 0x2 (previous activation data)
| 0x8 || 0x800 || Data Buffer (Input/Output)
|-
|-
| 0x240 || 0x100 || Signature over previous activation data
| 0x808 || 0x4 || Key ID (different meaning for different commands. usually used to select one of specific static keys)
|-
|-
| 0x340 || 0x20 || Same buffer as command 0x4 (new activation buffer from syscon)
| 0x80C || 0x4 || Data Buffer Length - Input/Written - Output
|-
|-
| 0x810 || 0x4 || Set to 0
|}
|}


=== 0xB ===
Following are the supported Kirk services.
 
==== 0x4 - encrypt_with_portability ====
 
Original PSP Kirk 4 service for encrypting data.


Introduced in 2.12. Check if current activation is valid. Extended activation check with signature. This is ran on boot.
Does not use any specific data structure in <code>Data Buffer</code>.


Just encrypts data located in <code>Data Buffer</code>.
Uses one set of keys.
Available <code>Key ID</code> values are (key is encrypted with key from keyring 0x345 and put into keyring 0x21): 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83.
Special <code>Key ID</code> 0x100 is available. Uses keys from keyrings 0x601 and 0x602.
Key 0x601 is scrambled and used as seed.
Key 0x602 is scrambled and used as key.
Seed is aes cbc encrypted with key to produce resulting key.
==== 0x7 - decrypt_with_portability ====
Original PSP Kirk 7 service for decrypting data.
Does not use any specific data structure in <code>Data Buffer</code>.
Just decrypts data located in <code>Data Buffer</code>.
Uses two sets of keys.
Available key ids are (key is encrypted with key from keyring 0x345 and put into keyring 0x21): 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83.
Available <code>Key ID</code> values are (key is encrypted with key from keyring 0x340 and put into keyring 0x10): 0x44, 0x53, 0x57, 0x63, 0x64, 0x68, 0xC0, 0xC1, 0xC2, 0xC3.
Special <code>Key ID</code> 0x100 is available. Uses keys from keyrings 0x601 and 0x602 (will be documented later).
Key 0x601 is scrambled and used as seed.
Key 0x602 is scrambled and used as key.
Seed is aes cbc encrypted with key to produce resulting key.
==== 0xC - ecc160_generate_keys ====
Original PSP Kirk 0xC service for Generating a 160bit ECC private/public keypair. Call with an empty buffer of length 0x3C. The structure below is the return structure.
Private key <code>dA</code> is obtained by:
1. Generating 0x40 sized random number rng.
2. dA = rng mod N
Public key <code>Qa</code> us obtained by:
Qa = dA * G
Output:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Unknown
| 0x0 || 0x14 || Private Key
|-
|-
| 0x44 || 0x4 || Current time
| 0x14 || 0x14 || Public Key X component
|-
|-
| 0x48 || 0x8 || Some return value
| 0x28 || 0x14 || Public Key Y component
|}
 
==== 0xD - ecc160_multiply ====
 
Original PSP Kirk 0xD service for multiplying a 160bit ECC curve point with a value. Call with a multiplier, x and y point value.
 
Input:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x50 || 0x8 || Unknown
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x58 || 0x20 || Same buffer as command 0x4 (activation buffer from syscon)
| 0x0 || 0x14 || Multiplier Value
|-
|-
| 0x78 || 0x80 || Same buffer as command 0x2
| 0x14 || 0x14 || Point X component
|-
|-
| 0xF8 || 0x100 || Signature over activation data
| 0x28 || 0x14 || Point Y component
|}
 
Output:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
| 0x0 || 0x14 || New Point X component
|-
| 0x14 || 0x14 || New Point Y component
|}
|}


== aimgr_sm.self ==
==== 0xE - ecc160_prngen ====


=== 0x1 ===
Original PSP Kirk 0xE service for 160bit Random number generation. Call with an empty buffer.


Returns 16 byte console id (used in vshSblAimgrGetConsoleId)
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
| 0x0 || 0x14 || Output: Pseudo Random Number
|}


=== 0x3 ===
==== 0x10 - ecc160_sig_gen ====


Used in vshSblAimgrGetVisibleId
Original PSP Kirk 0x10 service for 160bit ECC signing.


=== 0x2 ===
Specific <code>nonce</code> is used for signing.


Returns the console's OpenPSID. Also known as the "activation key" for PDEL and PTEL.
For example if you will implement it with openssl it will be used to calculate precomputed parts of signing operation (kinv and rp).


=== 0x4 ===
<code>nonce</code> is obtained by:


Used in vshSblAimgrGetPscode2
1. Generating 0x40 sized random number rng.


== compat_sm.self ==
2. nonce = rng mod N


=== 0x10006 ===
Input:
Seems to be called on init and before resume of PSP
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
| 0x0 || 0x20 || Encrypted private key
|-
| 0x20 || 0x14 || SHA1 hash of the content to sign
|}


Output:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Unknown
| 0x0 || 0x14 || ECC Signature R component
|-
| 0x44 || 0x4 || Set to 0
|-
|-
| 0x14 || 0x14 || ECC Signature S component
|}
|}


=== 0x20006 ===
==== 0x11 - ecc160_sig_verify ====


Original PSP Kirk 0x11 service for 160bit ECC signature verification. Call with the below structure, then function will return pass or fail.
Input size is 0x64 bytes.
Input:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Set to 0
| 0x0 || 0x14 || Public Key X component
|-
| 0x14 || 0x14 || Public Key Y component
|-
| 0x28 || 0x14 || SHA1 hash of the signed content
|-
|-
| 0x44 || 0x4 || Set to 0
| 0x3C || 0x14 || ECC Signature R component
|-
|-
| 0x50 || 0x14 || ECC Signature S component
|}
|}


== encdec_w_portability_sm.self ==
No output.
This seem to be used to do some kind of key derivation. May also be used as a general purpose encryption engine.
 
==== 0x12 - cert_verify ====
 
This function checks that CMAC of <code>Message</code> equals <code>Encrypted CMAC value</code>.
 
CMAC value of <code>Message</code> is calculated using key from keyring 0x212.


=== 0x1000A ===
<code>Encrypted CMAC value</code> is decrypted using a key from keyring 0x0.


Encrypt data
Key in keyring 0x0 is derived using key from keyring 0x204 with static seed value.


Input:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Key ID (max 0x0A)
| 0x0 || 0xA8 || Message
|-
|-
| 0x44 || 0x4 || Output Length
| 0xA8 || 0x10 || Encrypted CMAC value
|}
 
==== 0x14 - ecc224_generate_keys ====
 
New Vita Kirk 0x14 service for generating a 224bit ECC private/public keypair. Call with an empty buffer of length 0x54. The structure below is the return structure.
 
Private key <code>dA</code> is obtained by:
 
1. Generating 0x40 sized random number rng.
 
2. dA = rng mod N
 
Public key <code>Qa</code> us obtained by:
 
Qa = dA * G
 
Output:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x48 || 0x20 || Output
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x68 || 0x4 || Input Length (max 0x20)
| 0x0 || 0x1C || Private Key
|-
|-
| 0x6C || 0x20 || Input
| 0x1C || 0x1C || Public Key X component
|-
| 0x8C || 0x10 || IV
|-
|-
| 0x38 || 0x1C || Public Key Y component
|}
|}


=== 0x2000A ===
==== 0x15 - ecc224_multiply ====


Decrypt data
New Vita Kirk 0x15 service for multiplying a 224bit ECC curve point with a value. Call with a multiplier, x and y point value.


Input:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Key ID (max 0xA)
| 0x0 || 0x1C || Multiplier Value
|-
|-
| 0x44 || 0x4 || Input Length (max 0x20)
| 0x1C || 0x1C || Point X component
|-
| 0x38 || 0x1C || Point Y component
|}
 
Output:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x48 || 0x20 || Input
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x68 || 0x4 || Output Length
| 0x0 || 0x1C || New Point X component
|-
|-
| 0x6C || 0x20 || Output
| 0x1C || 0x1C || New Point Y component
|}
 
==== 0x16 - ecc224_prngen ====
 
New Vita Kirk 0x16 service for 224bit Random number generation. Call with an empty buffer.
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x8C || 0x10 || IV
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0 || 0x1C || Output: Pseudo Random Number
|}
|}


==== 0x17 - ecc224_sig_gen ====


Return of 0x800f0002 means invalid service ID. For encdec_w_portability_sm, only 0x1000A and 0x2000A are supported.
New Vita Kirk 0x17 service for 224bit ECC signing.


Return of 0x800f1716 means invalid key slot. Valid key slots are only 1-10.
Specific <code>nonce</code> is used for signing.


== gcauthmgr_sm.self ==
For example if you will implement it with openssl it will be used to calculate precomputed parts of signing operation (kinv and rp).
 
<code>nonce</code> is obtained by:
 
1. Generating 0x40 sized random number rng.


=== 0x1000B ===
2. nonce = rng mod N


Input:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x4 || Set to 1
| 0x0 || 0x20 || Encrypted private key
|-
|-
| 0x44 || 0x4 || GC Command
| 0x20 || 0x1C || SHA224 hash of the content you want signed
|}
 
Output:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x48 || 0x800 || GC Buffer (Input/Output)
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x848 || 0x4 || Unknown GC param
| 0x0 || 0x1C || ECC Signature R component
|-
| 0x84C || 0x4 || GC Buffer Length/Written
|-
| 0x850 || 0x4 || Set to 0
|-
|-
| 0x1C || 0x1C || ECC Signature S component
|}
|}


Supported GC commands and structures
==== 0x18 - ecc224_sig_verify ====


==== 0x4 ====
New Vita Kirk 0x18 service for 224bit ECDSA signature verification. Call with the below structure, then function will return pass or fail.
Original PSP Kirk 4 service for encrypting data


Input:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x4 || Set to 5
| 0x0 || 0x1C || Public Key X component
|-
|-
| 0x4|| 0x4 || 0
| 0x1C || 0x1C || Public Key Y component
|-
|-
| 0x8|| 0x4|| 0
| 0x38 || 0x1C || SHA224 hash of the content that is signed
|-
|-
| 0xC || 0x4 || Key Slot (1-0x7F not all available)
| 0x54 || 0x1C || ECC Signature R component
|-
|-
| 0x10|| 0x4 || Data Length
| 0x70 || 0x1C || ECC Signature S component
|}
 
==== 0x19 - cert_verify_new ====
 
This function checks that CMAC of <code>Message</code> equals <code>Encrypted CMAC value</code>.
 
CMAC value of <code>Message</code> is calculated using key from keyring 0x212.
 
<code>Encrypted CMAC value</code> is decrypted using a key from keyring 0x0.
 
Key in keyring 0x0 is derived using key from keyring 0x204 with static seed value.
 
This function is used to verify PS Vita new IdStorage Certificates.
 
Input:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x14|| 0x7EC || Data to encrypt
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0 || 0xE8 || Input: Certificate
|}
|}


==== 0x7 ====
==== 0x1B - check_gc_authenticity ====
Original PSP Kirk 7 service for decrypting data
 
New Vita Kirk 0x1B service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr.
This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol.
This is a data validation service with no response. Size of request is 0x53.
 
- packet 7 should contain challenge0 for the card that can be encrypted (by card) with key_id and master_key.
 
- packet 8 should contain encrypted message which can be decrypted (by vita) with key_id and master_key.
 
- part of message should be card_challenge0.
 
- another part of the message should be equal to challenge0.
 
- this way we know that card knows how to properly encrypt.
 
- Kirk service 1B will decrypt packet 8 with key_id and master_key
 
- then it will verify challenge0


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 515: Line 930:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x4 || Set to 4
| 0x00 || 0x20 || cmd56 packet6 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x4|| 0x4 || 0
| 0x20 || 0x10 || cmd56 packet7 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x8|| 0x4|| 0
| 0x30 || 0x23 || cmd56 packet8 chunk
|}
 
==== 0x1C - generate_vita_authenticity_proof ====
 
New Vita Kirk 0x1C service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol.
This is a data generation service. Size of request is 0x40. Size of response is 0x33.
 
- Kirk service 1C will generate packet 9
 
- it will decrypt packet 8 to retrieve challenge0 and card_challenge0
 
- then challenge0 and card_challenge0 will be tweaked
 
- then it will generate secondary_key0
 
- then packet 9 will be encrypted with key_id and master_key
 
- packet 9 should contain encrypted message which can be decrypted (by card) with key_id and master_key.
 
- message should have secondary_key0, tweaked challenge0 and tweaked card_challenge0.
 
- this way card will know that we know how to properly encrypt the data and we know the layout of the data because we tweak and reorder certain fields.
 
Request:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0xC || 0x4 || Key Slot (1-0x7F not all available)
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
| 0x10|| 0x4 || Data Length
|-
|-
| 0x14|| 0x7EC || Data to encrypt
| 0x00 || 0x20 || cmd56 packet6 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x20 || 0x20 || cmd56 packet8 chunk
|}
|}


==== 0xC ====
Response:
Original PSP Kirk 0xC service for Generating a 160bit ECC private/public keypair. Call with an empty buffer of length 0x3C. The structure below is the return structure.
 
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x14 || Private Key
| 0x00 || 0x01 || command
|-
|-
| 0x14|| 0x14 || Public Key X component
| 0x01 || 0x01 || unknown
|-
|-
| 0x28|| 0x14|| Public Key Y component
| 0x02 || 0x01 || size
|-
|-
| 0x03 || 0x30 || packet 9 chunk
|}
|}


==== 0xD ====
==== 0x1D - challenge_handshake ====
Original PSP Kirk 0xD service for multiplying a 160bit ECC curve point with a value. Call with a multiplier, then a x and y point value.
 
New Vita Kirk 0x1D service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr.
This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data validation service with no response. Size of request is 0xA3.
 
- packet 13 should contain challenge1 for the card that can be encrypted (by card) with key_id and master_key.
 
- packet 14 should contain challenge1 and master_key that are encrypted (by card) with key_id and master_key.
 
- Kirk service 0x1D will decrypt secondary_key0 from packet 9 with key_id and master_key
 
- then it will decrypt packet 14
 
- then it will verify challenge1 in packet 13 against decrypted packet 14
 
- then it will verify master_key in packet 6 against decrypted packet 14


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 551: Line 1,003:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x14 || Multiplier Value
| 0x00 || 0x20 || cmd56 packet6 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x14|| 0x14 || Point X component
| 0x20 || 0x30 || cmd56 packet9 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x28|| 0x14|| Point Y component
| 0x50 || 0x10 || cmd56 packet13 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x60 || 0x43 || cmd56 packet14 chunk
|}
|}


Result
==== 0x1E - generate_packets_15_17_with_cmac_signature ====
 
New Vita Kirk 0x1E service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data generation service. Size of request is 0x51. Size of response is 0x33.
 
- Kirk service 0x1E will generate packet 15
 
- it will decrypt secondary_key0 from packet 9 with key_id and master_key
 
- then it will generate secondary_key1


- then it will create a buffer with tweaked secondary_key1 and tweak_padding
- then it will encrypt the buffer using secondary_key0
- then it will create cmd56 input like buffer with encrypted buffer
- then it will calculate cmac of cmd56 like buffer using secondary_key0
- encrypted buffer and cmac will be the resulting data of packet 15
Request:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x14 || New Point X component
| 0x00 || 0x20 || cmd56 packet6 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x14|| 0x14 || New Point Y component
| 0x20 || 0x30 || cmd56 packet9 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x50 || 0x01 || parameter (value 2 or 3)
|}
|}


==== 0xE ====
Response:
Original PSP Kirk 0xE service for 160bit Random number generation. Call with an empty buffer, the result structure is below.
 
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x14 || Cryptographic Random Number
| 0x00 || 0x01 || command
|-
| 0x01 || 0x01 || unknown
|-
| 0x02 || 0x01 || size
|-
|-
| 0x03 || 0x30 || packet 15/17 chunk
|}
|}


==== 0x10 ====
==== 0x1F - decrypt_packet_16 ====
Original PSP Kirk 0x10 service for 160bit ECC signing. Call and return structure below.


New Vita Kirk 0x1F service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data validation service. Size of request is 0xB3. Size of response is 0x20.
- Kirk service 0x1E will decrypt secondary_key0 from packet 9 with key_id and master_key
- then it will combine data from packet 16 into a cmd56 like buffer
- then it will calculate cmac of that cmd56 like buffer using secondary_key0
- then it will verify calculated cmac against cmac from packet 16
- then it will decrypt secondary_key1 and tweak_padding from packet 15
- then it will decrypt secondary_key1 and unknown data from packet 16
- then it will verify decrypted secondary_key1 from packet 15 against decrypted secondary_key1 from packet 16
- then it will verify that decrypted tweak_padding from packet 15 is properly tweaked
- then it will return unknown decrypted data from packet 16
Request:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x20 || Encrypted private key (see kirk-engine implementation for fuse_id process for encryption)
| 0x00 || 0x20 || cmd56 packet6 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x20|| 0x14 || SHA1 hash of the content you want signed
| 0x20 || 0x30 || cmd56 packet9 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x50 || 0x20 || cmd56 packet15 chunk
|-
| 0x70 || 0x43 || cmd56 packet16 chunk
|}
|}


Result
Response:
 
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x14 || ECC Signature R component
| 0x00 || 0x20 || decrypted packet16 chunk
|-
| 0x14|| 0x14 || ECC Signature S component
|-
|}
|}


==== 0x11 ====
==== 0x20 - get_hash_from_gamecard_packets ====
Original PSP Kirk 0x11 service for 160bit ECC signature verification. Call with the below structure, then function will return pass or fail.
 
New PS Vita Kirk 0x20 service. This service is related to [[SceSdif]] and is used by [[SceSblGcAuthMgr]]. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data generation service. Size of request is 0x116 bytes. Size of response is 0x34 bytes.
 
Generated data is used to obtain [[SceNpDrm#Obtaining_klicensee|klicensee]] using [[SceSblAuthMgr#sceSblAuthMgrDecBindDataForDriver|sceSblAuthMgrDecBindDataForDriver]].


Request:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x14 || Public Key X component
| 0x00 || 0x20 || cmd56 packet6 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x14|| 0x14 || Public Key Y component
| 0x20 || 0x30 || cmd56 packet9 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x28|| 0x14 || SHA1 hash of the content that is signed
| 0x50 || 0x20 || cmd56 packet17 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x3C|| 0x14 || ECC Signature R component
| 0x70 || 0x43 || cmd56 packet18 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x50|| 0x14 || ECC Signature S component
| 0xB3 || 0x10 || cmd56 packet19 chunk
|-
|-
 
| 0xC3 || 0x53 || cmd56 packet20 chunk
|}
|}


Result
Response:
 
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x14 || ECC Signature R component
| 0x00 || 0x20 || SHA-256 digest of a 0x40 bytes buffer. Used to obtain [[SceNpDrm#Obtaining_klicensee|klicensee]].
|-
| 0x14|| 0x14 || ECC Signature S component
|-
|-
| 0x20 || 0x14 || SHA-1 digest of a 0x20 bytes buffer. Checked to be identical to [[SceNpDrm#RIF|RIF file]] at offset 0xE0.
|}
|}


==== 0x14 ====
==== 0x21 - ecc160_hmac_sha256_sig_gen ====
New Vita Kirk 0x14 service for Generating a 224bit ECC private/public keypair. Call with an empty buffer of length 0x54. The structure below is the return structure.


New Vita Kirk 0x21 service for 160bit ECC signing.
Specific <code>nonce</code> is used for signing.
For example if you will implement it with openssl it will be used to calculate precomputed parts of signing operation (kinv and rp).
<code>nonce</code> is obtained by:
1. Generating 0x40 sized seed which is derived from message hash and static private key using hmac256 and sha256.
2. nonce = seed mod N
Input:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x1C || Private Key
| 0x0 || 0x20 || unknown, must be zeroes
|-
| 0x20 || 0x14 || Message hash
|}
 
Output:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x1C|| 0x1C || Public Key X component
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x38|| 0x1C|| Public Key Y component
| 0x0 || 0x14 || ECC Signature R component
|-
|-
| 0x14 || 0x14 || ECC Signature S component
|}
|}


==== 0x15 ====
==== 0x22 - ecc224_sceebootpbp_sig_gen ====
New Vita Kirk 0x15 service for multiplying a 224bit ECC curve point with a value. Call with a multiplier, then a x and y point value.
 
New Vita Kirk 0x22 service for 224bit ECC signing.  
 
Specific <code>nonce</code> is used for signing.


For example if you will implement it with openssl it will be used to calculate precomputed parts of signing operation (kinv and rp).
<code>nonce</code> is obtained by:
1. Generating 0x40 sized seed which is derived from message hash and one of two static private keys using hmac256 and sha256. Key can be selected with key id 0 or 1.
Private key 0 is only used for signing __sceebootpbp files for firmware versions before 1.8X, otherwise private key 1 is used for signing __sceebootpbp.
2. nonce = seed mod N
Input:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x1C || Multiplier Value
| 0x0 || 0x20 || unknown, must be zeroes
|-
|-
| 0x1C|| 0x1C || Point X component
| 0x20 || 0x1C || message hash
|}
 
Output:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x38|| 0x1C|| Point Y component
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0 || 0x1C || ECC Signature R component
|-
| 0x1C || 0x1C || ECC Signature S component
|}
|}


Result
==== 0x23 - generate_cmac_signature ====
 
New Vita Kirk 0x23 service.
 
It encrypts the plain message with AES128CBC, static key and null IV, then calculates the AES128CMAC of the encrypted message with another static key.


Input:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x1C || New Point X component
| 0x0 || 0x10 || Plain message
|}
 
Output:
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0x1C|| 0x1C || New Point Y component
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x0 || 0x10 || Encrypted message
|-
| 0x10 || 0x10 || Encrypted message CMAC
|}
|}


==== 0x16 ====
== pm_sm.self ==
New Vita Kirk 0x16 service for 160bit Random number generation. Call with an empty buffer, the result structure is below.
 
[[SceSblPostSsMgr#sceSblPmMgrAuthEtoIForDriver|sceSblPmMgrAuthEtoIForDriver]] uses "sd0:sm/pm_sm_sd.self" whilst other PmSm functions use "os0:sm/pm_sm.self".
 
Services 8, 9 and 0xA appeared on FW 1.03 (maybe 1.00). They are not present on FW 0.990 and earlier.
 
Keyset must be between 0-12 on FW 0.931. Keyset 14 is present on FWs 3.600.011-3.740.011.
 
=== 0x1 - get_product_mode ===
 
Used by sceSblPmMgrGetProductModeFromNVS.
 
Data size is 0x28 bytes.
 
Input: 0x20 buffer read from NVS at offset 0.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Output: Product Mode
|-
|-
| 0x0|| 0x1C || Cryptographic Random Number
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Reserved
|-
|-
| 0x8 || 0x20 || Input: NVS block read at offset 0
|}
|}


==== 0x17 ====
=== 0x2 - set_product_mode ===
New Vita Kirk 0x17 service. Unknown, but buffer length is 0x3C. Almost certainly a 224bit version of 0x10


==== 0x18 ====
Used by sceSblPmMgrSetProductMode.
New Vita Kirk 0x18 service. Unknown, but buffer length is 0x8C. Almost certainly a 224bit version of 0x11


==== 0x19 ====
Data size is 0x28 bytes.
New Vita Kirk 0x19 service. Unknown, but buffer length is 0xE8. Related to IdStorage somehow. Almost certainly a 224bit version of 0x12


==== 0x1B ====
Input: 0x20 bytes buffer read from NVS at offset 0, to which is written the new product mode to set.
New Vita Kirk 0x1B service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr.
 
This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol.
Output data: 0x20 buffer to write to NVS at offset 0.
This is a data validation service with no response. Size of request is 0x53.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x00|| 0x20 || cmd56 packet6 chunk
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Input: Product Mode
|-
| 0x20|| 0x10 || cmd56 packet7 chunk
|-
|-
| 0x30|| 0x23 || cmd56 packet8 chunk
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Reserved
|-
|-
| 0x8 || 0x20 || Input and output: NVS block read/written at offset 0
|}
|}


==== 0x1C ====
=== 0x3 - gen_req_hello ===
New Vita Kirk 0x1C service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol.  
 
This is a data generation service. Size of request is 0x40. Size of response is 0x33.
This command gets the Ernie secure packet for the first JIG auth command.
 
Data size is 0x30 bytes.


Request:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x00|| 0x20 || cmd56 packet6 chunk
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Input: keyset (6, 14)
|-
|-
| 0x20|| 0x20 || cmd56 packet8 chunk
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Input: keyset_rev (1 when keyset in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when keyset in [14]; otherwise undefined)
|-
|-
| 0x8 || 0x28 || Output: Ernie secure packet
|}
|}


Response:
=== 0x4 - gen_challenge ===
 
Data size is 0x30 bytes.
 
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Input: keyset (6, 14)
|-
|-
| 0x00|| 0x01 || command
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Input: keyset_rev (1 when keyset in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when keyset in [14]; otherwise undefined)
|-
|-
| 0x01|| 0x01 || unknown
| 0x8 || 0x28 || Input and output: Ernie secure packet
|}
 
=== 0x5 - check_response ===
 
Returns 0 on success.
 
Data size is 0x30 bytes.
 
{| class="wikitable"
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x02|| 0x01 || size
| 0x0 || 0x4 || input: keyset (6, 14)
|-
|-
| 0x03|| 0x30 || data
| 0x4 || 0x4 || input: keyset_rev (1 when keyset in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when keyset in [14]; otherwise undefined)
|-
|-
| 0x8 || 0x28 || input: Ernie secure packet
|}
|}


==== 0x1D ====
=== 0x6 - gen_req_result ===
New Vita Kirk 0x1D service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr.
 
This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data validation service with no response. Size of request is 0xA3.
Encrypts Ernie secure packet for step 4 with the chosen keyset.
 
Data size is 0x30 bytes.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x00|| 0x20 || cmd56 packet6 chunk
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Input: keyset (4, 6 on FW 0.931-3.60)
|-
|-
| 0x20|| 0x30 || cmd56 packet9 chunk
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Input: keyset_rev (1 when keyset in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when keyset in [14]; otherwise undefined)
|-
|-
| 0x50|| 0x10 || cmd56 packet13 chunk
| 0x8 || 0x28 || Input and output: Ernie secure packet
|}
 
=== 0x7 - check_result ===
 
Returns 0 on success.
 
Data size is 0x30 bytes.
 
{| class="wikitable"
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x60|| 0x43 || cmd56 packet14 chunk
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Input: keyset (4, 6, 14)
|-
|-
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Input: keyset_rev (1 when keyset in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when keyset in [14]; otherwise undefined)
|-
| 0x8 || 0x28 || Input: Ernie secure packet
|}
|}


==== 0x1E ====
=== 0x8 - run_pm_command ===
New Vita Kirk 0x1E service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data generation service. Size of request is 0x51. Size of response is 0x33.
 
Not present in old FWs.
 
Used on FW 1.03+ by sceSblPmMgrGetProductModeFromNVS.
 
Data size is 0x70 bytes.


Request:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Input: Command (0: gen_get_mgmt_data_req, 1: get_mgmt_data, 3: decrypt_response, 4: set_product_mode, 5: set_product_mode_off, 7: set_sd_mode_off)
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Reserved
|-
|-
| 0x00|| 0x20 || cmd56 packet6 chunk
| 0x8 || 0x4 || Input and output: product mode
|-
|-
| 0x20|| 0x30 || cmd56 packet9 chunk
| 0xC || 0x4 || Input and output: unknown Mgmt Data
|-
|-
| 0x50|| 0x01 || parameter (value 2 or 3)
| 0x10 || 0x30 || Input and output: Ernie secure packet for setting Product Mode
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x30 || Input and output: Ernie secure packet for getting Product mode
|}
|}


Response:
=== 0x9 - gen_jig_message ===
 
Only on FW 1.03+.
 
Data size is 0x10C bytes.
 
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x00|| 0x01 || command
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Input: keyset_flag (0x48 for keyset 4, 0x49 for keyset 12)
|-
|-
| 0x01|| 0x01 || unknown
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Reserved
|-
|-
| 0x02|| 0x01 || size
| 0x8 || 0x104 || Output: jig_message
|}
 
=== 0xA - check_jig_response ===
 
Only on FW 1.03+.
 
Returns 0 on success.
 
Data size is 0x10C bytes.
 
{| class="wikitable"
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x03|| 0x30 || data
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Input: keyset_flag (0x48 for keyset 4, 0x49 for keyset 12)
|-
|-
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Reserved
|-
| 0x8 || 0x104 || Input: jig_response
|}
|}


==== 0x1F ====
== qaf_sm.self ==
New Vita Kirk 0x1F service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data validation service. Size of request is 0xB3. Size of response is 0x20.
 
=== 0x0 ===
 
Decrypt or check QAF Token. Used on 1.03 PDEL.
 
=== 0x1 ===


Request:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Type !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x00|| 0x20 || cmd56 packet6 chunk
| 0x0 || 0x4 || in || unk
|-
|-
| 0x20|| 0x30 || cmd56 packet9 chunk
| 0x4 || 0x4 || N/A || unk
|-
|-
| 0x50|| 0x20 || cmd56 packet15 chunk
| 0x8 || 0x4 || out || some data
|-
|-
| 0x70|| 0x43 || cmd56 packet16 chunk
| 0xC || 0x4 || out || some data
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x30 || in || Syscon secure packet data
|}
|}


Response:
=== 0x2 ===
 
=== 0x3 ===
 
=== 0x4 - decrypt_qafv ===
 
Input: 0x20 buffer read from NVS offset 0x2A0.
 
Output: QAF version in this buffer of size 0x20:
 
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x00|| 0x20 || unknown
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Magic
|-
| 0x4 || 0x4 || QAF version
|-
| 0x8 || 0x8 || Reserved
|-
|-
| 0x10 || 0x10 || CMAC
|}
|}


==== 0x20 ====
=== 0x5 - encrypt_qafv ===
New Vita Kirk 0x20 service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data validation service. Size of request is 0x116. Size of response is 0x34.
 
Input QAF version in this buffer of size 0x20:


Request:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x00|| 0x20 || cmd56 packet6 chunk
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Magic
|-
|-
| 0x20|| 0x30 || cmd56 packet9 chunk
| 0x4 || 0x4 || QAF version
|-
|-
| 0x50|| 0x20 || cmd56 packet17 chunk
| 0x8 || 0x8 || Reserved
|-
|-
| 0x70|| 0x43 || cmd56 packet18 chunk
| 0x10 || 0x10 || CMAC
|}
 
Output of size 0x20 is then written to NVS offset 0x2A0.
 
=== 0x6 - check_flag (decrypt) ===
 
Input: 0x20 buffer read from NVS at offset 0.
 
Returns error if flag is bad, 0 on success.
 
Output
 
=== 0x7 - set_flag (encrypt) ===
 
Input: 0x20 buffer.
 
Output: 0x20 encrypted buffer that can be written to NVS at offset 0.
 
=== 0xC - check_qaftoken ===
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
| 0xB3|| 0x10 || cmd56 packet19 chunk
! Offset !! Size !! Type !! Description
|-
|-
| 0xC3|| 0x53 || cmd56 packet20 chunk
| 0x0 || 0x80 || in || Qa Flags token
|-
|-
| 0x80 || 0x100 || in || RSA signature
|}
|}


Response:
=== 0xD - get_qaftoken ===
 
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! Offset !! Size !! Type !! Description
|-
| 0x0 || 0x80 || inout || Qa Flags token
|-
| 0x80 || 0x100 || in || RSA signature
|}
== rmauth_sm.self ==
Removable Media (Memory Card) authentication. Used by [[SceMsif]].
=== 0x1 - get_key_master_gen_no ===
Response (size 0x20 bytes):
{| class="wikitable"
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x00|| 0x34 || unknown
| 0x0 || 0x10 || unknown
|-
|-
| 0x10 || 0x4 || Returned ID?
|-
| 0x14 || 0xC || unknown
|}
|}


==== 0x21 ====
=== 0x2 - set_index_key ===
New Vita Kirk 0x21 service. Unknown, but buffer length is 0x34.


==== 0x22 ====
Scrambles and sets the [[DMAC#DMAC5_Key_Ring|DMAC5 keyring 0x1C]] key.
New Vita Kirk 0x22 service. Unknown, but buffer length is 0x3C.  
The scrambling process consists of encrypting the first and second halves of the key seed with a private internal (could be considered as a couple of 0x10 keys) <code>rmmauth_sm</code> key using AES128-CBC.


==== 0x23 ====
Request (size 0x20 bytes):
New Vita Kirk 0x23 service. Unknown, but buffer length is 0x20.
{| class="wikitable"
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
| 0x00|| 0x20 || Key seed
|}


== pm_sm.self ==
=== 0x1 ===
=== 0x2 ===
=== 0x3 ===
=== 0x3 ===
=== 0x4 ===
=== 0x5 ===
=== 0x6 ===
=== 0x7 ===
=== 0x8 ===
=== 0x9 ===
=== 0xA ===


== qaf_sm.self ==
?clear_index_key?


=== 0x1 ===
Clears the [[DMAC#DMAC5_Key_Ring|DMAC5 keyring 0x1C]] key (to 0).
=== 0x2 ===


== rmauth_sm.self ==
== spkg_verifier_sm_w_key_2.self ==


=== 0x1 ===
This is an extension of update_service_sm.self. It was added to support command 0xE0002.
=== 0x2 ===


== spkg_verifier_sm_w_key_2.self ==
=== 0xE0002 - sceSblUsSmAuthSpkgWithKey2 ===


=== 0xE0002 ===
Used to decrypt downloaded lists (SPKGs). Same format as [[#0x40002|0x40002]].


Used to decrypt lists stored in updates. Same format as [[F00D Commands#0x40002|0x40002]].
Lists URLS:
<source>
.list_0_version:0000000125.list_0_url:http://vitacl.ww.dl.playstation.net/vitacl/ww/j/list_launch_vita.dat
.list_1_version:0000000111.list_1_url:http://vitacl.ww.dl.playstation.net/vitacl/ww/j/list_launch_emu.dat
.list_2_version:0000000001.list_2_url:http://vitacl.ww.dl.playstation.net/vitacl/ww/j/list_launch_teleport.dat
</source>


== update_service_sm.self ==
== update_service_sm.self ==


This is used by [[SceSblSsUpdateMgr]] to decrypt update packages extracted from [[PUP]] files. Both 0x40002 and 0x50002 reference buffers in the following way: an inner paddr list is generated for the buffer containing the data to encrypt/decrypt, then an outer paddr list is generated for the inner list. That means there's two levels of indirection in the paddr list.
This is used by [[SceSblUpdateMgr]] to decrypt update packages extracted from [[PUP]] files.
 
<s>Both 0x40002 and 0x50002 reference buffers in the following way: an inner PA vector is generated for the buffer containing the data to encrypt/decrypt, then an outer PA vector is generated for the inner list. That means that there are two levels of indirection in the PA vector.</s>
 
Services with PA vectors to pass data to cmep decide whether to use normal vectors or deep vectors depending on the flag of the argument.
 
=== 0x10002 - sceSblUsSmAuthPupHeader ===
 
SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_PUP_HEADER.
 
Checks PUP header (with hash check).
 
Input data size: 0xFC0.


=== 0x10002 ===
Input: PA vector of the PUP header including the PUP Hash (size: 0x80 + segment_num * 0x20 + segment_num * 0x40 + 0x20)


Verify PUP header.
=== 0x20002 - sceSblUsSmAuthPupSegment ===


=== 0x20002 ===
SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_PUP_SEGMENT.


Verify PUP segment.
Checks PUP segment HMAC-SHA256 hash.


=== 0x30002 ===
Input data size: 0xFC0.


Verify watermark.
=== 0x30002 - sceSblUsSmAuthPupWatermark ===


=== 0x40002 ===
SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_PUP_WM.


Decrypt package. Allocate a page aligned buffer and read the complete pkg file into the buffer. The buffer is decrypted in place.
Checks PUP watermark.
 
Input data size: 0xFC0.
 
Input data: a packet embedding at least two physical addresses (?in a PA vector?): PUP Watermark (0x1000 bytes) and PUP Hash (0x20 bytes).
 
=== 0x40002 - sceSblUsSmAuthSpkg ===
 
SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_SPKG.
 
Decrypt a SPKG. Allocate a page aligned buffer and read the complete SPKG file into the buffer. The buffer is decrypted in place.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 917: Line 1,609:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x8 || Set to 0x0
| 0x0 || 0x8 || Set to 0x0
|-
|-
| 0x48 || 0x8 || Set to 0x1
| 0x8 || 0x8 || Set to 0x1
|-
|-
| 0x50 || 0x14 || <code>struct paddr_list_req</code> for Paddr list below
| 0x10 || 0x14 || <code>struct paddr_list_req</code> for PA vector below
|-
|-
| 0x64 || 0x14 || <code>struct paddr_list_req</code> for pkg buffer
| 0x24 || 0x14 || <code>struct paddr_list_req</code> for pkg buffer
|-
| 0x78 || Variable (max 0xF48) || Copy of paddr list for pkg buffer (contents described at 0x50)
|-
|-
| 0x38 || Variable (max 0xF88(0x1F1 entry)) || Copy of PA vector for pkg buffer (contents described at 0x50)
|}
|}


=== 0x50002 ===
=== 0x50002 - sceSblUsSmEncryptIndividualSLSK ===


Re-encrypt enp files
SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_ENCIND_SLSK.
 
Re-encrypt individual SLSK files (.enp files).


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 937: Line 1,630:
! Offset !! Size !! Description
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
|-
| 0x40 || 0x8 || Unknown/Zero
| 0x0 || 0x8 || Unknown/Zero
|-
|-
| 0x48 || 0x8 || Set to 1
| 0x8 || 0x8 || Set to 1
|-
|-
| 0x50 || 0x14 || <code>struct paddr_list_req</code> for paddr list copied to 0x78. Only count field is used.
| 0x10 || 0x14 || <code>struct paddr_list_req</code> for PA vector copied to 0x78. Only count field is used.
|-
|-
| 0x64 || 0x14 || <code>struct paddr_list_req</code> for inner paddr list. Not used.
| 0x24 || 0x14 || <code>struct paddr_list_req</code> for inner PA vector. Not used.
|-
| 0x78 || Variable (max 0xF88) || Paddr list to paddr list to encrypt
|-
|-
| 0x38 || Variable (max 0xF88(0x1F1 entry)) || Outer PA vector. PA vector to PA vector to encrypt.
|}
|}


=== 0x60002 ===
Each inner PA vector is first copied to temporary cmep memory, then they all are checked for validity at once. Maximum size of inner PA vector is 0xFF7 (so probably 0xFF7 / 8 * 8 = 0xFF0). Any higher length results in <code>SCE_SBL_ERROR_SL_ENOMEM = 0x800F020C</code> error.
=== 0x70002 ===
=== 0x80002 ===
=== 0x90002 ===


=== 0xA0002 ===
How it works:
* first, all inner entries are checked for validity, if something is invalid, bail out <code>SCE_SBL_ERROR_SL_EINVAL 0x800f0216</code>
* start at last outer entry and move towards the first
* if current entry looks valid (length >= 8), proceed to inner physical address encryption
* if no valid entries found, error=<code>SCE_SBL_ERROR_SL_EINVAL 0x800f0216</code>
* if multiple valid entries found, error=<code>SCE_SBL_ERROR_SL_EIO 0x800f0205</code> (???) (but the first one found is always encrypted)
* if only one valid entry is found, return success


Verify additional data.
Bugs(?):
* encrypting same physical address twice or more times within a single inner PA vector always results in same output, no matter what input was, reproducible with length=0x10 or less
* sum(inner list sizes) must be <= 0xFF0, but there is no overflow check, a large inner list causes cmep to overwrite memory with data like:
<pre>
00:00:26 0 // this is physical address 0x1F000000
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 2000
00:00:26 8
00:00:26 812d40
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 1f000020 // this is physical address 0x1F00001C
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 2000
00:00:26 8
00:00:26 812d40
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 1f000040
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 2000
00:00:26 8
00:00:26 812d40
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 1f000060
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 2000
00:00:26 8
00:00:26 812d40
00:00:26 0
00:00:26 1f000080
</pre>
 
=== 0x60002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsEncryptSectors ===
 
SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_SNVS_ENC_SECTORS.
 
The input is plain SNVS sectors read from NVS.
 
Calculates a XTS encrypt using the per console keys in keyring 0x502, and 0x503 for the tweak and decryption keys. Appears to be intended for up to 0x3E0 bytes in size, but the (size in cmep packet + 4) derives the XTS size and memcpy.
 
The result is XTS encrypted SNVS sectors.
 
Data size is (8 bytes + sectors size).
 
<source lang="C">
typedef struct data { // size is variable, at least 0x28 bytes
  int sectors_index; // input: between 1 and 20 (SNVS sectors)
  int sectors_count; // input
  char sectors[0x20 * sectors_count]; // input: read from NVS.
} data;
</source>
 
=== 0x70002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsDecryptSectors ===
 
SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_SNVS_DEC_SECTORS.
 
The input is XTS encrypted sectors.
 
Calculates a XTS decrypt using the per console keys in keyring 0x502, and 0x503 for the tweak and decryption keys. Appears to be intended for up to 0x3E0 in size, but the (size in cmep packet + 4) derives the XTS size and memcpy.
 
The result is plain sectors.
 
Data size is (8 bytes + sectors size).
 
<source lang="C">
typedef struct data { // size is variable, at least 0x28 bytes
  int sectors_index; // input: between 1 and 20 (SNVS sectors)
  int sectors_count; // input
  char sectors[0x20 * sectors_count]; // input: read from NVS.
} data;
</source>
 
=== 0x80002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsEncryptMgmtData ===
 
SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_SNVS_ENC_MGMT.
 
The input are the new status and flags, and the current Mgmt Data sector read from NVS at offset 0.
 
Calculates a XTS decrypt using the per console keys in keyring 0x502, and 0x503 for the tweak and decryption keys. It then calculates an HMAC using the keyring 0x504 to check the block passed in. If ok, then it uses the seed 0xACA9B1AC to recalculate the block, generate a new hmac, and xts encrypt the block.
 
The result is a new Mgmt Data sector, which is to be written to NVS at offset 0.
 
Data size is 0x28 bytes.
 
<source lang="C">
typedef struct data { // size is 0x28 bytes
  int status; // input
  char flags[4]; // input
  char sector[0x20]; // input: read from NVS at offset 0. Likely to be 0x10 bytes of data followed by 0x10 bytes of HMAC.
} data;
</source>
 
=== 0x90002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsDecryptMgmtData ===
 
SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_SNVS_DEC_MGMT.
 
The input is the current Mgmt Data sector read from NVS at offset 0.
 
Calculates a XTS decrypt using the per console keys in keyring 0x502, and 0x503 for the tweak and decryption keys. It then calculates an HMAC using the keyring 0x504 to check the block passed in.
 
The result is the current status and flags.
 
Data size is 0x28 bytes.
 
<source lang="C">
typedef struct data { // size is 0x28 bytes
  int status; // output
  char flags[4]; // output
  char sector[0x20]; // input: read from NVS at offset 0. Likely to be 0x10 bytes of data followed by 0x10 bytes of HMAC.
} data;
</source>
 
<source lang="C">
// SCE_SBL_SS_SNVS_FLAGS
#define SCE_SBL_SS_SNVS_UPDATER_FLAG_INDEX 0
</source>
 
If flags[SCE_SBL_SS_SNVS_UPDATER_FLAG_INDEX] is not set, updater init is skipped:
<source lang="C">
      if (((byte)flags & 1) == 0)
        sceKernelPrintfLevelForDriver(2, "skip init for updater\n");
      else {
        sceKernelPrintfLevelForDriver(2, "do init for updater\n");
        if (SpkgInfoUtilInitForUpdater(&status, &flags) != 0)
          sceKernelPrintfLevelForDriver(2,"SpkgInfoUtilInitForUpdater() failure = 0x%x\n",iVar2);
      }
</source>
 
=== 0xA0002 - sceSblUsSmAuthAdditionalSign ===
 
SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_PUP_AS.
 
Checks PUP Additional Signatures.
 
=== 0xB0002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsEncryptDecryptSector ===
 
Added on FW 1.03. Usage similar to pm_sm command 8.
 
Data size is 0x88 bytes.
 
<source lang="C">
typedef struct data { // size is 0x88
  uint mode; // 0 before read, 1 after read, 2 before write, 3 after write
  uint sector_index; // between 1 and 20 (SNVS sectors)
  char base_buf[0x20]; // input: full of 0xdeadbeef
  char inter_buf[0x30]; // output: input for sceSysconSnvsReadDataForDriver or sceSysconSnvsWriteDataForDriver
  char final_buf[0x30]; // input: output for sceSysconSnvsReadDataForDriver or sceSysconSnvsWriteDataForDriver
} data;
</source>
 
Usage:
* 1) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xB0002, &response, data, 0x88);
For read:
* 2) sceSysconSnvsReadDataForDriver(data + 0x28, 0x10, data + 0x58, 0x30);
For write:
* 2) sceSysconSnvsWriteDataForDriver(data + 0x28, 0x30, data + 0x58, 0x10);
* 3) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xB0002, &response, data, 0x88);
 
=== 0xC0002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsEncryptDecryptMgmtData ===
 
Added on FW 1.03. Usage similar to pm_sm command 8.
 
Data size is 0x70 bytes.
 
<source lang="C">
typedef struct data { // Size is 0x70 bytes on FW 3.60
  int mode; // ex: 0 before read, 1 after read, 2 before write, 3 after write
  int sector_count; // always 0 (Mgmt Data)
  int status; // not set for read, set for write
  int flags; // not set for read, set for write
  char unk_10[0x30]; // output: input for sceSysconSnvsReadDataForDriver or sceSysconSnvsWriteDataForDriver
  char unk_40[0x30]; // input: output for sceSysconSnvsReadDataForDriver or sceSysconSnvsWriteDataForDriver
} data;
</source>
 
Usage:
* 1) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xC0002, &response, data, 0x70);
For write:
* 2) sceSysconSnvsWriteDataForDriver(data + 0x10, 0x30, data + 0x40, 0x10);
For read:
* 2) sceSysconSnvsReadDataForDriver(data + 0x10, 0x10, data + 0x40, 0x30);
* 3) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xC0002, &response, data, 0x70);


=== 0xB0002 ===
=== 0xC0002 ===
=== 0xD0002 ===
=== 0xD0002 ===
Syscon update related. Usage is to proxy encrypted data cmep <=> Syscon.
Data size is 0x58 bytes.
<source lang="C">
typedef struct data { // Size is 0x58 bytes on FW 3.60
  int mode; // ex: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
  int unk_4; // Maybe unused
  char unk_8[0x28]; // input: syscon command 0xD2 output
  char unk_30[0x28]; // output: syscon command 0xD2 input
} data;
</source>
Usage:
* 1) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xD0002, &response, data, 0x58);
For modes 0, 1 and 3:
* 2) memcpy(data + 8, data + 0x30, 0x28); SceSysconForDriver_4D03754A(data + 8, 0x28, data + 0x30, 0x28); // Calls Syscon command 0xD0.
* 3) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xD0002, &response, data, 0x58);
Mode:
* 0 - Do init 0x28 buffer.
* 1 - Do Bigmac unknown crypto with some blob.
* 2 - Do Bigmac unknown crypto with some blob.
* 3 - Do Bigmac unknown crypto with some blob.
* 4 - Do some working. And reset Syscon ticket count with Bigmac PRNG (keyring 0x512).


== utoken_sm.self ==
== utoken_sm.self ==


=== 0x1 ===
=== 0x1 - check_utoken ===
=== 0x2 ===
 
Checks [[SceSblPostSsMgr#Types|SceUtoken]] buffer.
 
{| class="wikitable"
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Physical address of [[SceSblPostSsMgr#Types|SceUtoken]] buffer
|-
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Size of [[SceSblPostSsMgr#Types|SceUtoken]] buffer (usually 0x800)
|-
| 0x8 || 0x4 || Time (got using [[SceRtc#sceRtcGetCurrentSecureTickForDriver|sceRtcGetCurrentSecureTickForDriver]] or 0xFFFFFFFF (-1)
|-
| 0xC || 0x10 || [[OpenPsId]]
|}
 
=== 0x2 - decrypt_utoken ===
 
Decrypt [[SceSblPostSsMgr#Types|SceUtoken]] buffer, in order to get UT Flags.
 
{| class="wikitable"
! Offset !! Size !! Description
|-
| 0x0 || 0x4 || Physical address of [[SceSblPostSsMgr#Types|SceUtoken]] buffer
|-
| 0x4 || 0x4 || Size of [[SceSblPostSsMgr#Types|SceUtoken]] buffer (usually 0x800)
|-
| 0x8 || 0x4 || Time (got using [[SceRtc#sceRtcGetCurrentSecureTickForDriver|sceRtcGetCurrentSecureTickForDriver]] or 0xFFFFFFFF (-1))
|-
| 0xC || 0x10 || [[OpenPsId]]
|}


== mgkm_sm.self ==
== mgkm_sm.self ==


=== 0x1 ===
Magic Gate Key Manager secure module.
=== 0x2 ===
 
Present on 0.931-3.73. Commands are almost the same on any FW, only KEY_31 varies.
0
These commands are used to set keys (as seen on FWs from 0.940 to 3.60) to [[DMAC#DMAC5||DMAC5]] registers in NS memory. These keys are used in to do encryption stuff with AES-ECB and TripleDES-ECB algorithms through [[DMAC#DMAC5||DMAC5]].
 
On FW 0.940, commands 1 and 2 are only called by SceSblMgKeyMgrForDriver_1C5388D0 which consists of:
<source lang="C">
int SceSblMgKeyMgrForDriver_1C5388D0(void *in, void *out) {
  int ret;
  uint8_t tmp_buffer[16];
  ret = call_cmd_1();
  if ((ret == 0) && (ret = call_cmd_2(), ret == 0)) {
    aesECBDec16B(in, tmp_buffer, 0x1E);
    aesECBEnc16B(tmp_buffer, out, 0x1F);
  }
  return ret;
}
</source>
 
=== 0x1 - set_key_31 ===
 
<source lang="C">
memset(buffer, 0, 0x20);
memcpy(buffer, KEY_31, 0x10);
bigmac_memcpy(0xE04E0000 + 0x1F * 0x20, buffer, 0x20);
</source>
 
=== 0x2 - set_key_30 ===
 
<source lang="C">
memset(buffer, 0, 0x20);
memcpy(buffer, pOpenPsId, 0x10);
memcpy(buffer + 0x10, KEY_30_SEED, 0x10);
bigmac_sha256(buffer, buffer, 0x20);
bigmac_memcpy(0xE04E0000 + 0x1E * 0x20, buffer, 0x20);
</source>
 
=== 0x3 - unset_key_31 ===
 
<source lang="C">
memset(buffer, 0, 0x20);
bigmac_memcpy(0xE04E0000 + 0x1F * 0x20, buffer, 0x20);
</source>
 
=== 0x4 - unset_key_30 ===
 
<source lang="C">
memset(buffer, 0, 0x20);
bigmac_memcpy(0xE04E0000 + 0x1E * 0x20, buffer, 0x20);
</source>


[[Category:Kernel]]
[[Category:Cmep]]
[[Category:Library]]

Latest revision as of 21:55, 10 January 2024

Depending on the Secure Modules that is currently loaded, different commands are handled.

Request Buffer

Each request that is made sends a page aligned buffer that has a max size of a page. After as 64 byte header common to all commands, the data afterwards is specific to each command. The documentation for each command below specifies the data that goes after the header. The special command id of -1 (0xFFFFFFFF) is used to stop the current loaded Secure Module.

Command buffer structure (as seen on FWs 3.60-3.73):

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Size of the structure (header + data)
0x4 0x4 Command ID
0x8 0x4 Command return value is written here by the SM
0xC 0x4 unk2
0x10 0x30 padding
0x40 variable, chosen by NS Kernel, max=0x1000-0x40 data buffer

On FW 0.931, and maybe in later prototype FWs, the data buffer is located at offset 0x10 instead of 0x40. Thus we can wonder why has been added the 0x30 bytes padding.

Physical Address Vector

A common format used in these requests is the Physical Address Vector which is a list of Physical Address Ranges. The simple structure of Physical Address Range is defined below. See sceKernelVARangeToPARangeForDriver for information on creating this vector.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Physical Address
0x4 0x4 Size

This data format is used when passing large buffers of data to CMeP. The reason is that the memory manager in kernel could allocate contiguous virtual addresses that corresponds to varying physical addresses.

kprx_auth_sm.self

Kprx auth sm is a special SM stored in the SLB2 partition. The raw (encrypted) SELF is stored in ARM TrustZone memory. It is placed there by an early bootloader.

kprx_auth_sm is used to decrypt SELF and SPSFO files for ARM. The CF header is passed into a page aligned buffer and a PA vector is generated from it.

0x10001 - sceSblAuthMgrAuthHeader

Used by sceSblAuthMgrAuthHeaderForKernel.

Checks the SELF header for decryption. The header is copied to the cmep private memory region first (on FW 1.69 with 0x1000 sized header, it is at 0x00811CC0 in cmep memory space.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x130 SceSblSmCommContext130
0x130 0x4 Number of PA vector entries for buffer
0x134 0x4 Physical address of PA vector

0x20001 - sceSblAuthMgrSetupAuthSegment

Used by sceSblAuthMgrSetupAuthSegmentForKernel.

Set the program segment to decrypt. This corresponds to the segment index in the ELF program headers in the SELF header passed in with the command above.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Segment number
0x4 0x4 Return value. 1 if not compressed, 2 if compressed.
0x8 0x8 Unknown

0x30001 - sceSblAuthMgrLoadBlock

Used by sceSblAuthMgrAuthSegmentForKernel.

Decrypt a buffer from the SELF corresponding to the program segment number passed in above. The segment is read in 0x10000 bytes chunks and is decrypted in place (the input buffer will contain the decrypted data). A PA vector is generated from the buffer. The input buffer and output buffer can be the same.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Number of entries in input PA vector
0x4 0x4 Physical address of the input PA vector
0x8 0x4 Number of entries in output PA vector
0xC 0x4 Physical address of the output PA vector

0x40001 - sceSblAuthMgrGetEKc

Decrypts provided buffer in AES ECB mode using one of three keys (NPDRM keys ?).

Used by sceSblAuthMgrGetEKcForDriver for getting klicensee.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x100 Data Buffer
0x100 0x4 Data Size. Max value is 0x100.
0x104 0x4 Key ID. Must be 0, 1 or 2.
0x108 0x4 Set to 0
0x10C 0x4 Set to 0

0x50001 - sceSblAuthMgrSetDmac5Key

Used by sceSblAuthMgrSetDmac5KeyForKernel to set a key in DMAC5 keyring for decryption.

This SM function uses AES128ECB or AES128CBC and hardcoded AES keys and IVs to encrypt the provided key into the final DMAC5 key. Then it writes the final DMAC5 key into the chosen Dmac5 keyring.

Input/output size is 0x110 bytes. Buffer is untouched by the SM function as it makes an internal copy.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x20 Key. Key that will be encrypted with kprx_auth_sm hardcoded keys and written to DMAC5 keyring.
0x20 0xE0 Reserved.
0x100 0x4 Key size (in bytes). Usually 0x10 or 0x20 bytes. Not used in kprx_auth_sm function 0x60001 as it entirely clears selected 0x20 bytes DMAC5 keyring.
0x104 0x4 Mode. Affects both AES mode (ECB or CBC), AES key and IV and data size (0x10 or 0x20 bytes). Possible values: 0 (aes128ecb on 0x10 bytes), 0x10000 (aes128ecb on 0x10 bytes), 0x10001 (aes128ecb on 0x10 bytes, requires QA flag 0xF mask 1), 0x20000 (aes128cbc on 0x10 bytes), 0x20001 (aes128cbc on 0x20 bytes).
0x108 0x4 Destination DMAC5 Keyring ID. Possible values: 0-0x1A, 0x1C-0x1F. 0x1B is forbidden by kprx_auth_sm for unknown reason.
0x10C 0x4 Unused. Key size & 0xF. Should be 0.

0x60001 - sceSblAuthMgrClearDmac5Key

Used by sceSblAuthMgrClearDmac5KeyForKernel to clear the Dmac5 Key.

This function writes zeroes into the chosen DMAC5 keyring.

Input/output size is 0x110 bytes. Buffer is untouched by the SM function as it makes an internal copy.

It has exactly same structure as kprx_auth_sm function 0x50001 and is parsed in the same kprx_auth_sm subroutine function.

0x70001 - sceSblAuthMgrDecBindData

Used by sceSblAuthMgrDecBindDataForDriver and SceNpDrm for gamecard binding data used in conjunction with the RIF license file on the gamecard for deriving the klicensee.

Input/output size is 0x18 bytes. Buffer is untouched by the SM function as it makes an internal copy, however encrypted bind data at specified physical address will be decrypted after SM function execution.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x8 Bind data PA Range. Must be 0x40-byte aligned and of maximum length 0x1000 bytes.
0x8 0x8 Seed PA Range. Must be 0x40-byte aligned and of maximum length 0x1000 bytes.
0x10 0x4 HMAC-SHA256 Key revision. Only revision 0 is supported on FW 3.60.
0x14 0x4 Unknown. Must be zero on FW 3.60.

Algorithm:

  • Compute HMAC-SHA256 of seed. It gives a 0x20-byte digest.
  • First 0x10 bytes of the digest make the AES128CBC key and last 0x10 bytes make the AES128CBC IV.
  • AES128CBC decrypt bind data.

0x80001 - sceSblAuthMgrVerifySpsfo

Used by sceSblAuthMgrVerifySpsfoForDriver.

applier_sm.self

applier_sm is used to decrypt and even encrypt SELFs for ARM. It is only present in some old prototype System Software builds like 0.931.010.

0x10001 - sceSblApplierSmOpen

0x20001 - sceSblApplierSmClose

0x30001 - sceSblApplierSmSetupSegment

0x40007 - sceSblApplierSmDecryptSegment

0x50007 - sceSblApplierSmEncryptSegment

0x60007 - sceSblApplierSmVerifySegment

act_sm.self

0x1 - check_activation_code_1

Removed on FW 2.10.

Checks SceKitActivationData read from sd0:/act.dat.

Uses different keys (AES256CBC and AES256CMAC) than check_activation_code_2.

Used only on TOOL rev 3.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x80 Input: SceKitActivationData

0x2 - check_activation_code_2

Removed on FW 2.10.

Checks SceKitActivationData read from sd0:VITA.ACT.

Uses different keys (AES256CBC and AES256CMAC) than check_activation_code_1.

Used on any Kit other than TOOL rev 3 (uses command 1), TEST, TOOL rev 4, Manufacturing Mode and QA flagged (bypasses activation).

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x80 Input: SceKitActivationData

0x4 - check_nvs_cmac

Not present on FW 0.931.

Checks NVS activation data authenticity using CMAC.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x20 Input: SceNVSKitActivationData

0x5 - gen_nvs_cmac

Removed on FW 2.10.

Generate CMAC of NVS activation data. The returned data is written to NVS at offset 0x520 or 0x530.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Magic "act\0"
0x4 0x4 Issue number
0x8 0x4 Start validity time unix timestamp
0xC 0x4 End validity time unix timestamp
0x10 0x10 Output: CMAC of the 0x10 input bytes

0x7

Removed on FW 2.10.

Check if activation is valid. The input activation data is read from NVS at offset 0x520.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x10 SceNVSKitActivationData without CMAC
0x10 0x20 SceNVSKitActivationData

0xA - gen_activation_with_sig

Introduced in FW 2.10.

Check if new activation is valid. Extended activation check with a signature. This is ran when installing a new afv.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x80 Input: SceKitActivationData (new activation data)
0x80 0x100 Input: RSA signature over new activation data
0x180 0x80 Input: SceKitActivationData (previous activation data)
0x200 0x100 Input: RSA signature over previous activation data
0x300 0x20 Output: SceNVSKitActivationData

0xB - check_activation_with_sig

Introduced in FW 2.10.

Check if Kit Activation Data is valid and not expired. Extended activation check with signature. This command is ran on boot.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Input: Previous return value
0x4 0x4 Input: Current time
0x8 0x4 Output: License Status
0xC 0x4 Output: Expire Date
0x10 0x8 Reserved
0x18 0x20 Input: SceNVSKitActivationData (read from NVS offset 0x520)
0x38 0x80 Input: SceKitActivationData (read from tm0:activate/act.dat)
0xB8 0x100 Input: RSA signature over activation data (read from tm0:activate/actsig.dat)

aimgr_sm.self

0x1 - GetConsoleId

Returns the console's ConsoleId.

Used in sceSblAimgrGetConsoleIdForDriver.

0x2 - GetOpenPsId

Returns the console's OpenPsId.

Used in sceSblAimgrGetOpenPsIdForDriver.

0x3 - GetVisibleId

Returns the console's VisibleId.

Used in sceSblAimgrGetVisibleIdForDriver.

0x4 - GetPsCode

Returns the console's PsCode.

Used in sceSblAimgrGetPscode2ForDriver.

0x5 - CreatePassPhrase

Creates NP passphrase (per-console and per NP account).

Used in sceSblSsCreatePassPhraseForDriver.

Input size is 0x220 bytes.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x8 Secure Tick
0x8 0x4 Unknown. Maybe version or reserved. ex: 0.
0xC 0x4 Arguments size in usermode (0x18 bytes)
0x10 0x10 NP Account ID in ASCII
0x10 0x200 IdStorage leaf 0x44 (contains PS Vita IDPS Certificate)

Output size is 0x220 bytes.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x8 Secure Tick
0x8 0x4 Unknown. Maybe version or reserved. ex: 0.
0xC 0x4 Arguments size in usermode (0x18 bytes)
0x10 0x10 NP Account ID in ASCII
0x20 0x200 NP PassPhrase

compat_sm.self

Compat SM functions only works on DEX and CEX units, or on units in Manufacturing Mode or with a certain QA Flag. This is why most DevKit units don't have access to PSPEmu.

0x10006 - sceCompatSecLoadSCBootCode

Load Secure CPU Boot Code. PSP main CPU (Tachyon codename) is an Allegrex 32-bit little-endian RISC CPU with FPU and VFPU, 1 ~ 333MHz, MIPS III-based.

Called on init and before resume of PSP.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Boot/resume cookie. Pass 0 when cold booting, resume_handler ^ magic when resuming
0x4 0x4 Set to 0 (unused)

On FW 3.73 (simplified): 

*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 4;
syncm();
memcpy(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100000, g_pre_ipl, 0x1000);  // PRE-IPL
memcpy(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100fc0, g_challenge, 0x40);  // Challenge (IPL XOR key)
memcpy(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100fbc, &cookie, 4);         // Boot/resume cookie
syncm();
*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 0;

If an error occurs during SCBootCode loading: 

memset(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100000, 0, 0x1000); // PRE-IPL
syncm();
*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 10;

The cookie, which represents the address where PRE-IPL will jump to when resuming, is passed by MIPS to ARM (written to 0xBFC001FC) just before suspending, and it is calculated the same way as on actual PSP, only that using 

u8 data[] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x00, 0xde, 0xf0 };

as input to the SHA1, instead of the MAC address.

0x20006 - sceCompatSecSetSSRAMAcl

Set Shared Static Random Access Memory Access-control list.

Removed since FW 3.50 and replaced by command 0x30006.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Set to 0
0x4 0x4 Set to 0

0x30006 - sceCompatSecSetSSRAMAcl2

Set Shared Static Random Access Memory Access-control list 2.

Appeared on FW 3.50 as replacement for command 0x20006. This change is related to the huge memory management improvement since FW 3.50. See PS Vita System software 3.50 adds 30% more memory for game use.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Unused

On 3.73-CEX (simplified): 

*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 4;
syncm();
ret = memcmp(SceCompatSharedSram_e8100fc0, g_challenge_result, 0x40); // Check challenge output
if (ret == 0) {
    // Success!!
}
syncm();
*(u32 *)SceSonyRegbus_e8000004 = 10;

encdec_w_portability_sm.self

This seems to be used to do some kind of key derivation. May also be used as a general purpose encryption engine.

0x1000A - EncryptWithPortability

Encrypt data. Actually it always returns 0x800F1725, so it does nothing and is never used.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Key ID (max 0xA)
0x4 0x4 Output Length
0x8 0x20 Output
0x28 0x4 Input Length (max 0x20)
0x2C 0x20 Input
0x4C 0x10 IV

0x2000A - DecryptWithPortability

Used by sceSblSsDecryptWithPortabilityForDriver.

Decrypt data by using AES-256-CBC with an internal key selected by key_id.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Key ID (1 - 20)
0x4 0x4 Input Length (max 0x20)
0x8 0x20 Input
0x28 0x4 Output Length (must match Input Length)
0x2C 0x20 Output
0x4C 0x10 IV

Return value of 0x800f0002 means invalid service ID. For encdec_w_portability_sm, only commmands 0x1000A and 0x2000A are supported.

Return value of 0x800f1716 means invalid argument such as invalid key ID. Valid key IDs are only 1-20.

gcauthmgr_sm.self

0x1000B

Execute KIRK services.

This is one of the variable sized buffers that can be placed inside Request_Buffer.

Response value returned to Kernel comes from Request Buffer at offset 8. 

// gc_param is generated by game card and has value 0x01
typedef struct SceSblSmCommGcData { // size is 0x814
	int unk_0; // 1
	int command;
	char data[0x800];
	int key_id;
	int size;
	int unk_810; // 0
} SceSblSmCommGcData;
Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Set to 1
0x4 0x4 Command (0x4, 0x7, 0xC etc.)
0x8 0x800 Data Buffer (Input/Output)
0x808 0x4 Key ID (different meaning for different commands. usually used to select one of specific static keys)
0x80C 0x4 Data Buffer Length - Input/Written - Output
0x810 0x4 Set to 0

Following are the supported Kirk services.

0x4 - encrypt_with_portability

Original PSP Kirk 4 service for encrypting data.

Does not use any specific data structure in Data Buffer.

Just encrypts data located in Data Buffer.

Uses one set of keys.

Available Key ID values are (key is encrypted with key from keyring 0x345 and put into keyring 0x21): 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83.

Special Key ID 0x100 is available. Uses keys from keyrings 0x601 and 0x602.

Key 0x601 is scrambled and used as seed.

Key 0x602 is scrambled and used as key.

Seed is aes cbc encrypted with key to produce resulting key.

0x7 - decrypt_with_portability

Original PSP Kirk 7 service for decrypting data.

Does not use any specific data structure in Data Buffer.

Just decrypts data located in Data Buffer.

Uses two sets of keys.

Available key ids are (key is encrypted with key from keyring 0x345 and put into keyring 0x21): 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83.

Available Key ID values are (key is encrypted with key from keyring 0x340 and put into keyring 0x10): 0x44, 0x53, 0x57, 0x63, 0x64, 0x68, 0xC0, 0xC1, 0xC2, 0xC3.

Special Key ID 0x100 is available. Uses keys from keyrings 0x601 and 0x602 (will be documented later).

Key 0x601 is scrambled and used as seed.

Key 0x602 is scrambled and used as key.

Seed is aes cbc encrypted with key to produce resulting key.

0xC - ecc160_generate_keys

Original PSP Kirk 0xC service for Generating a 160bit ECC private/public keypair. Call with an empty buffer of length 0x3C. The structure below is the return structure.

Private key dA is obtained by:

1. Generating 0x40 sized random number rng.

2. dA = rng mod N

Public key Qa us obtained by:

Qa = dA * G

Output:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x14 Private Key
0x14 0x14 Public Key X component
0x28 0x14 Public Key Y component

0xD - ecc160_multiply

Original PSP Kirk 0xD service for multiplying a 160bit ECC curve point with a value. Call with a multiplier, x and y point value.

Input:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x14 Multiplier Value
0x14 0x14 Point X component
0x28 0x14 Point Y component

Output:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x14 New Point X component
0x14 0x14 New Point Y component

0xE - ecc160_prngen

Original PSP Kirk 0xE service for 160bit Random number generation. Call with an empty buffer.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x14 Output: Pseudo Random Number

0x10 - ecc160_sig_gen

Original PSP Kirk 0x10 service for 160bit ECC signing.

Specific nonce is used for signing.

For example if you will implement it with openssl it will be used to calculate precomputed parts of signing operation (kinv and rp).

nonce is obtained by:

1. Generating 0x40 sized random number rng.

2. nonce = rng mod N

Input:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x20 Encrypted private key
0x20 0x14 SHA1 hash of the content to sign

Output:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x14 ECC Signature R component
0x14 0x14 ECC Signature S component

0x11 - ecc160_sig_verify

Original PSP Kirk 0x11 service for 160bit ECC signature verification. Call with the below structure, then function will return pass or fail.

Input size is 0x64 bytes.

Input:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x14 Public Key X component
0x14 0x14 Public Key Y component
0x28 0x14 SHA1 hash of the signed content
0x3C 0x14 ECC Signature R component
0x50 0x14 ECC Signature S component

No output.

0x12 - cert_verify

This function checks that CMAC of Message equals Encrypted CMAC value.

CMAC value of Message is calculated using key from keyring 0x212.

Encrypted CMAC value is decrypted using a key from keyring 0x0.

Key in keyring 0x0 is derived using key from keyring 0x204 with static seed value.

Input:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0xA8 Message
0xA8 0x10 Encrypted CMAC value

0x14 - ecc224_generate_keys

New Vita Kirk 0x14 service for generating a 224bit ECC private/public keypair. Call with an empty buffer of length 0x54. The structure below is the return structure.

Private key dA is obtained by:

1. Generating 0x40 sized random number rng.

2. dA = rng mod N

Public key Qa us obtained by:

Qa = dA * G

Output:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x1C Private Key
0x1C 0x1C Public Key X component
0x38 0x1C Public Key Y component

0x15 - ecc224_multiply

New Vita Kirk 0x15 service for multiplying a 224bit ECC curve point with a value. Call with a multiplier, x and y point value.

Input:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x1C Multiplier Value
0x1C 0x1C Point X component
0x38 0x1C Point Y component

Output:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x1C New Point X component
0x1C 0x1C New Point Y component

0x16 - ecc224_prngen

New Vita Kirk 0x16 service for 224bit Random number generation. Call with an empty buffer.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x1C Output: Pseudo Random Number

0x17 - ecc224_sig_gen

New Vita Kirk 0x17 service for 224bit ECC signing.

Specific nonce is used for signing.

For example if you will implement it with openssl it will be used to calculate precomputed parts of signing operation (kinv and rp).

nonce is obtained by:

1. Generating 0x40 sized random number rng.

2. nonce = rng mod N

Input:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x20 Encrypted private key
0x20 0x1C SHA224 hash of the content you want signed

Output:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x1C ECC Signature R component
0x1C 0x1C ECC Signature S component

0x18 - ecc224_sig_verify

New Vita Kirk 0x18 service for 224bit ECDSA signature verification. Call with the below structure, then function will return pass or fail.

Input:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x1C Public Key X component
0x1C 0x1C Public Key Y component
0x38 0x1C SHA224 hash of the content that is signed
0x54 0x1C ECC Signature R component
0x70 0x1C ECC Signature S component

0x19 - cert_verify_new

This function checks that CMAC of Message equals Encrypted CMAC value.

CMAC value of Message is calculated using key from keyring 0x212.

Encrypted CMAC value is decrypted using a key from keyring 0x0.

Key in keyring 0x0 is derived using key from keyring 0x204 with static seed value.

This function is used to verify PS Vita new IdStorage Certificates.

Input:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0xE8 Input: Certificate

0x1B - check_gc_authenticity

New Vita Kirk 0x1B service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data validation service with no response. Size of request is 0x53.

- packet 7 should contain challenge0 for the card that can be encrypted (by card) with key_id and master_key.

- packet 8 should contain encrypted message which can be decrypted (by vita) with key_id and master_key.

- part of message should be card_challenge0.

- another part of the message should be equal to challenge0.

- this way we know that card knows how to properly encrypt.

- Kirk service 1B will decrypt packet 8 with key_id and master_key

- then it will verify challenge0

Offset Size Description
0x00 0x20 cmd56 packet6 chunk
0x20 0x10 cmd56 packet7 chunk
0x30 0x23 cmd56 packet8 chunk

0x1C - generate_vita_authenticity_proof

New Vita Kirk 0x1C service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data generation service. Size of request is 0x40. Size of response is 0x33.

- Kirk service 1C will generate packet 9

- it will decrypt packet 8 to retrieve challenge0 and card_challenge0

- then challenge0 and card_challenge0 will be tweaked

- then it will generate secondary_key0

- then packet 9 will be encrypted with key_id and master_key

- packet 9 should contain encrypted message which can be decrypted (by card) with key_id and master_key.

- message should have secondary_key0, tweaked challenge0 and tweaked card_challenge0.

- this way card will know that we know how to properly encrypt the data and we know the layout of the data because we tweak and reorder certain fields.

Request:

Offset Size Description
0x00 0x20 cmd56 packet6 chunk
0x20 0x20 cmd56 packet8 chunk

Response:

Offset Size Description
0x00 0x01 command
0x01 0x01 unknown
0x02 0x01 size
0x03 0x30 packet 9 chunk

0x1D - challenge_handshake

New Vita Kirk 0x1D service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data validation service with no response. Size of request is 0xA3.

- packet 13 should contain challenge1 for the card that can be encrypted (by card) with key_id and master_key.

- packet 14 should contain challenge1 and master_key that are encrypted (by card) with key_id and master_key.

- Kirk service 0x1D will decrypt secondary_key0 from packet 9 with key_id and master_key

- then it will decrypt packet 14

- then it will verify challenge1 in packet 13 against decrypted packet 14

- then it will verify master_key in packet 6 against decrypted packet 14

Offset Size Description
0x00 0x20 cmd56 packet6 chunk
0x20 0x30 cmd56 packet9 chunk
0x50 0x10 cmd56 packet13 chunk
0x60 0x43 cmd56 packet14 chunk

0x1E - generate_packets_15_17_with_cmac_signature

New Vita Kirk 0x1E service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data generation service. Size of request is 0x51. Size of response is 0x33.

- Kirk service 0x1E will generate packet 15

- it will decrypt secondary_key0 from packet 9 with key_id and master_key

- then it will generate secondary_key1

- then it will create a buffer with tweaked secondary_key1 and tweak_padding

- then it will encrypt the buffer using secondary_key0

- then it will create cmd56 input like buffer with encrypted buffer

- then it will calculate cmac of cmd56 like buffer using secondary_key0

- encrypted buffer and cmac will be the resulting data of packet 15

Request:

Offset Size Description
0x00 0x20 cmd56 packet6 chunk
0x20 0x30 cmd56 packet9 chunk
0x50 0x01 parameter (value 2 or 3)

Response:

Offset Size Description
0x00 0x01 command
0x01 0x01 unknown
0x02 0x01 size
0x03 0x30 packet 15/17 chunk

0x1F - decrypt_packet_16

New Vita Kirk 0x1F service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data validation service. Size of request is 0xB3. Size of response is 0x20.

- Kirk service 0x1E will decrypt secondary_key0 from packet 9 with key_id and master_key

- then it will combine data from packet 16 into a cmd56 like buffer

- then it will calculate cmac of that cmd56 like buffer using secondary_key0

- then it will verify calculated cmac against cmac from packet 16

- then it will decrypt secondary_key1 and tweak_padding from packet 15

- then it will decrypt secondary_key1 and unknown data from packet 16

- then it will verify decrypted secondary_key1 from packet 15 against decrypted secondary_key1 from packet 16

- then it will verify that decrypted tweak_padding from packet 15 is properly tweaked

- then it will return unknown decrypted data from packet 16

Request:

Offset Size Description
0x00 0x20 cmd56 packet6 chunk
0x20 0x30 cmd56 packet9 chunk
0x50 0x20 cmd56 packet15 chunk
0x70 0x43 cmd56 packet16 chunk

Response:

Offset Size Description
0x00 0x20 decrypted packet16 chunk

0x20 - get_hash_from_gamecard_packets

New PS Vita Kirk 0x20 service. This service is related to SceSdif and is used by SceSblGcAuthMgr. This service is part of SD MMC CMD56 custom initialization protocol. This is a data generation service. Size of request is 0x116 bytes. Size of response is 0x34 bytes.

Generated data is used to obtain klicensee using sceSblAuthMgrDecBindDataForDriver.

Request:

Offset Size Description
0x00 0x20 cmd56 packet6 chunk
0x20 0x30 cmd56 packet9 chunk
0x50 0x20 cmd56 packet17 chunk
0x70 0x43 cmd56 packet18 chunk
0xB3 0x10 cmd56 packet19 chunk
0xC3 0x53 cmd56 packet20 chunk

Response:

Offset Size Description
0x00 0x20 SHA-256 digest of a 0x40 bytes buffer. Used to obtain klicensee.
0x20 0x14 SHA-1 digest of a 0x20 bytes buffer. Checked to be identical to RIF file at offset 0xE0.

0x21 - ecc160_hmac_sha256_sig_gen

New Vita Kirk 0x21 service for 160bit ECC signing.

Specific nonce is used for signing.

For example if you will implement it with openssl it will be used to calculate precomputed parts of signing operation (kinv and rp).

nonce is obtained by:

1. Generating 0x40 sized seed which is derived from message hash and static private key using hmac256 and sha256.

2. nonce = seed mod N

Input:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x20 unknown, must be zeroes
0x20 0x14 Message hash

Output:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x14 ECC Signature R component
0x14 0x14 ECC Signature S component

0x22 - ecc224_sceebootpbp_sig_gen

New Vita Kirk 0x22 service for 224bit ECC signing.

Specific nonce is used for signing.

For example if you will implement it with openssl it will be used to calculate precomputed parts of signing operation (kinv and rp).

nonce is obtained by:

1. Generating 0x40 sized seed which is derived from message hash and one of two static private keys using hmac256 and sha256. Key can be selected with key id 0 or 1.

Private key 0 is only used for signing __sceebootpbp files for firmware versions before 1.8X, otherwise private key 1 is used for signing __sceebootpbp.

2. nonce = seed mod N

Input:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x20 unknown, must be zeroes
0x20 0x1C message hash

Output:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x1C ECC Signature R component
0x1C 0x1C ECC Signature S component

0x23 - generate_cmac_signature

New Vita Kirk 0x23 service.

It encrypts the plain message with AES128CBC, static key and null IV, then calculates the AES128CMAC of the encrypted message with another static key.

Input:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x10 Plain message

Output:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x10 Encrypted message
0x10 0x10 Encrypted message CMAC

pm_sm.self

sceSblPmMgrAuthEtoIForDriver uses "sd0:sm/pm_sm_sd.self" whilst other PmSm functions use "os0:sm/pm_sm.self".

Services 8, 9 and 0xA appeared on FW 1.03 (maybe 1.00). They are not present on FW 0.990 and earlier.

Keyset must be between 0-12 on FW 0.931. Keyset 14 is present on FWs 3.600.011-3.740.011.

0x1 - get_product_mode

Used by sceSblPmMgrGetProductModeFromNVS.

Data size is 0x28 bytes.

Input: 0x20 buffer read from NVS at offset 0.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Output: Product Mode
0x4 0x4 Reserved
0x8 0x20 Input: NVS block read at offset 0

0x2 - set_product_mode

Used by sceSblPmMgrSetProductMode.

Data size is 0x28 bytes.

Input: 0x20 bytes buffer read from NVS at offset 0, to which is written the new product mode to set.

Output data: 0x20 buffer to write to NVS at offset 0.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Input: Product Mode
0x4 0x4 Reserved
0x8 0x20 Input and output: NVS block read/written at offset 0

0x3 - gen_req_hello

This command gets the Ernie secure packet for the first JIG auth command.

Data size is 0x30 bytes.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Input: keyset (6, 14)
0x4 0x4 Input: keyset_rev (1 when keyset in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when keyset in [14]; otherwise undefined)
0x8 0x28 Output: Ernie secure packet

0x4 - gen_challenge

Data size is 0x30 bytes.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Input: keyset (6, 14)
0x4 0x4 Input: keyset_rev (1 when keyset in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when keyset in [14]; otherwise undefined)
0x8 0x28 Input and output: Ernie secure packet

0x5 - check_response

Returns 0 on success.

Data size is 0x30 bytes.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 input: keyset (6, 14)
0x4 0x4 input: keyset_rev (1 when keyset in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when keyset in [14]; otherwise undefined)
0x8 0x28 input: Ernie secure packet

0x6 - gen_req_result

Encrypts Ernie secure packet for step 4 with the chosen keyset.

Data size is 0x30 bytes.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Input: keyset (4, 6 on FW 0.931-3.60)
0x4 0x4 Input: keyset_rev (1 when keyset in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when keyset in [14]; otherwise undefined)
0x8 0x28 Input and output: Ernie secure packet

0x7 - check_result

Returns 0 on success.

Data size is 0x30 bytes.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Input: keyset (4, 6, 14)
0x4 0x4 Input: keyset_rev (1 when keyset in [4, 6, 12]; 2 when keyset in [14]; otherwise undefined)
0x8 0x28 Input: Ernie secure packet

0x8 - run_pm_command

Not present in old FWs.

Used on FW 1.03+ by sceSblPmMgrGetProductModeFromNVS.

Data size is 0x70 bytes.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Input: Command (0: gen_get_mgmt_data_req, 1: get_mgmt_data, 3: decrypt_response, 4: set_product_mode, 5: set_product_mode_off, 7: set_sd_mode_off)
0x4 0x4 Reserved
0x8 0x4 Input and output: product mode
0xC 0x4 Input and output: unknown Mgmt Data
0x10 0x30 Input and output: Ernie secure packet for setting Product Mode
0x40 0x30 Input and output: Ernie secure packet for getting Product mode

0x9 - gen_jig_message

Only on FW 1.03+.

Data size is 0x10C bytes.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Input: keyset_flag (0x48 for keyset 4, 0x49 for keyset 12)
0x4 0x4 Reserved
0x8 0x104 Output: jig_message

0xA - check_jig_response

Only on FW 1.03+.

Returns 0 on success.

Data size is 0x10C bytes.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Input: keyset_flag (0x48 for keyset 4, 0x49 for keyset 12)
0x4 0x4 Reserved
0x8 0x104 Input: jig_response

qaf_sm.self

0x0

Decrypt or check QAF Token. Used on 1.03 PDEL.

0x1

Offset Size Type Description
0x0 0x4 in unk
0x4 0x4 N/A unk
0x8 0x4 out some data
0xC 0x4 out some data
0x40 0x30 in Syscon secure packet data

0x2

0x3

0x4 - decrypt_qafv

Input: 0x20 buffer read from NVS offset 0x2A0.

Output: QAF version in this buffer of size 0x20:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Magic
0x4 0x4 QAF version
0x8 0x8 Reserved
0x10 0x10 CMAC

0x5 - encrypt_qafv

Input QAF version in this buffer of size 0x20:

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Magic
0x4 0x4 QAF version
0x8 0x8 Reserved
0x10 0x10 CMAC

Output of size 0x20 is then written to NVS offset 0x2A0.

0x6 - check_flag (decrypt)

Input: 0x20 buffer read from NVS at offset 0.

Returns error if flag is bad, 0 on success.

Output

0x7 - set_flag (encrypt)

Input: 0x20 buffer.

Output: 0x20 encrypted buffer that can be written to NVS at offset 0.

0xC - check_qaftoken

Offset Size Type Description
0x0 0x80 in Qa Flags token
0x80 0x100 in RSA signature

0xD - get_qaftoken

Offset Size Type Description
0x0 0x80 inout Qa Flags token
0x80 0x100 in RSA signature

rmauth_sm.self

Removable Media (Memory Card) authentication. Used by SceMsif.

0x1 - get_key_master_gen_no

Response (size 0x20 bytes):

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x10 unknown
0x10 0x4 Returned ID?
0x14 0xC unknown

0x2 - set_index_key

Scrambles and sets the DMAC5 keyring 0x1C key. The scrambling process consists of encrypting the first and second halves of the key seed with a private internal (could be considered as a couple of 0x10 keys) rmmauth_sm key using AES128-CBC.

Request (size 0x20 bytes):

Offset Size Description
0x00 0x20 Key seed

0x3

?clear_index_key?

Clears the DMAC5 keyring 0x1C key (to 0).

spkg_verifier_sm_w_key_2.self

This is an extension of update_service_sm.self. It was added to support command 0xE0002.

0xE0002 - sceSblUsSmAuthSpkgWithKey2

Used to decrypt downloaded lists (SPKGs). Same format as 0x40002.

Lists URLS: 

.list_0_version:0000000125.list_0_url:http://vitacl.ww.dl.playstation.net/vitacl/ww/j/list_launch_vita.dat
.list_1_version:0000000111.list_1_url:http://vitacl.ww.dl.playstation.net/vitacl/ww/j/list_launch_emu.dat
.list_2_version:0000000001.list_2_url:http://vitacl.ww.dl.playstation.net/vitacl/ww/j/list_launch_teleport.dat

update_service_sm.self

This is used by SceSblUpdateMgr to decrypt update packages extracted from PUP files.

Both 0x40002 and 0x50002 reference buffers in the following way: an inner PA vector is generated for the buffer containing the data to encrypt/decrypt, then an outer PA vector is generated for the inner list. That means that there are two levels of indirection in the PA vector.

Services with PA vectors to pass data to cmep decide whether to use normal vectors or deep vectors depending on the flag of the argument.

0x10002 - sceSblUsSmAuthPupHeader

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_PUP_HEADER.

Checks PUP header (with hash check).

Input data size: 0xFC0.

Input: PA vector of the PUP header including the PUP Hash (size: 0x80 + segment_num * 0x20 + segment_num * 0x40 + 0x20)

0x20002 - sceSblUsSmAuthPupSegment

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_PUP_SEGMENT.

Checks PUP segment HMAC-SHA256 hash.

Input data size: 0xFC0.

0x30002 - sceSblUsSmAuthPupWatermark

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_PUP_WM.

Checks PUP watermark.

Input data size: 0xFC0.

Input data: a packet embedding at least two physical addresses (?in a PA vector?): PUP Watermark (0x1000 bytes) and PUP Hash (0x20 bytes).

0x40002 - sceSblUsSmAuthSpkg

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_SPKG.

Decrypt a SPKG. Allocate a page aligned buffer and read the complete SPKG file into the buffer. The buffer is decrypted in place.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x8 Set to 0x0
0x8 0x8 Set to 0x1
0x10 0x14 struct paddr_list_req for PA vector below
0x24 0x14 struct paddr_list_req for pkg buffer
0x38 Variable (max 0xF88(0x1F1 entry)) Copy of PA vector for pkg buffer (contents described at 0x50)

0x50002 - sceSblUsSmEncryptIndividualSLSK

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_ENCIND_SLSK.

Re-encrypt individual SLSK files (.enp files).

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x8 Unknown/Zero
0x8 0x8 Set to 1
0x10 0x14 struct paddr_list_req for PA vector copied to 0x78. Only count field is used.
0x24 0x14 struct paddr_list_req for inner PA vector. Not used.
0x38 Variable (max 0xF88(0x1F1 entry)) Outer PA vector. PA vector to PA vector to encrypt.

Each inner PA vector is first copied to temporary cmep memory, then they all are checked for validity at once. Maximum size of inner PA vector is 0xFF7 (so probably 0xFF7 / 8 * 8 = 0xFF0). Any higher length results in SCE_SBL_ERROR_SL_ENOMEM = 0x800F020C error.

How it works:

  • first, all inner entries are checked for validity, if something is invalid, bail out SCE_SBL_ERROR_SL_EINVAL 0x800f0216
  • start at last outer entry and move towards the first
  • if current entry looks valid (length >= 8), proceed to inner physical address encryption
  • if no valid entries found, error=SCE_SBL_ERROR_SL_EINVAL 0x800f0216
  • if multiple valid entries found, error=SCE_SBL_ERROR_SL_EIO 0x800f0205 (???) (but the first one found is always encrypted)
  • if only one valid entry is found, return success

Bugs(?):

  • encrypting same physical address twice or more times within a single inner PA vector always results in same output, no matter what input was, reproducible with length=0x10 or less
  • sum(inner list sizes) must be <= 0xFF0, but there is no overflow check, a large inner list causes cmep to overwrite memory with data like:
00:00:26	0 // this is physical address 0x1F000000
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	2000
00:00:26	8
00:00:26	812d40
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	1f000020 // this is physical address 0x1F00001C
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	2000
00:00:26	8
00:00:26	812d40
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	1f000040
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	2000
00:00:26	8
00:00:26	812d40
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	1f000060
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	2000
00:00:26	8
00:00:26	812d40
00:00:26	0
00:00:26	1f000080

0x60002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsEncryptSectors

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_SNVS_ENC_SECTORS.

The input is plain SNVS sectors read from NVS.

Calculates a XTS encrypt using the per console keys in keyring 0x502, and 0x503 for the tweak and decryption keys. Appears to be intended for up to 0x3E0 bytes in size, but the (size in cmep packet + 4) derives the XTS size and memcpy.

The result is XTS encrypted SNVS sectors.

Data size is (8 bytes + sectors size). 

typedef struct data { // size is variable, at least 0x28 bytes
  int sectors_index; // input: between 1 and 20 (SNVS sectors)
  int sectors_count; // input
  char sectors[0x20 * sectors_count]; // input: read from NVS.
} data;

0x70002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsDecryptSectors

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_SNVS_DEC_SECTORS.

The input is XTS encrypted sectors.

Calculates a XTS decrypt using the per console keys in keyring 0x502, and 0x503 for the tweak and decryption keys. Appears to be intended for up to 0x3E0 in size, but the (size in cmep packet + 4) derives the XTS size and memcpy.

The result is plain sectors.

Data size is (8 bytes + sectors size). 

typedef struct data { // size is variable, at least 0x28 bytes
  int sectors_index; // input: between 1 and 20 (SNVS sectors)
  int sectors_count; // input
  char sectors[0x20 * sectors_count]; // input: read from NVS.
} data;

0x80002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsEncryptMgmtData

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_SNVS_ENC_MGMT.

The input are the new status and flags, and the current Mgmt Data sector read from NVS at offset 0.

Calculates a XTS decrypt using the per console keys in keyring 0x502, and 0x503 for the tweak and decryption keys. It then calculates an HMAC using the keyring 0x504 to check the block passed in. If ok, then it uses the seed 0xACA9B1AC to recalculate the block, generate a new hmac, and xts encrypt the block.

The result is a new Mgmt Data sector, which is to be written to NVS at offset 0.

Data size is 0x28 bytes. 

typedef struct data { // size is 0x28 bytes
  int status; // input
  char flags[4]; // input
  char sector[0x20]; // input: read from NVS at offset 0. Likely to be 0x10 bytes of data followed by 0x10 bytes of HMAC.
} data;

0x90002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsDecryptMgmtData

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_SNVS_DEC_MGMT.

The input is the current Mgmt Data sector read from NVS at offset 0.

Calculates a XTS decrypt using the per console keys in keyring 0x502, and 0x503 for the tweak and decryption keys. It then calculates an HMAC using the keyring 0x504 to check the block passed in.

The result is the current status and flags.

Data size is 0x28 bytes. 

typedef struct data { // size is 0x28 bytes
  int status; // output
  char flags[4]; // output
  char sector[0x20]; // input: read from NVS at offset 0. Likely to be 0x10 bytes of data followed by 0x10 bytes of HMAC.
} data;
// SCE_SBL_SS_SNVS_FLAGS
#define SCE_SBL_SS_SNVS_UPDATER_FLAG_INDEX 0

If flags[SCE_SBL_SS_SNVS_UPDATER_FLAG_INDEX] is not set, updater init is skipped: 

      if (((byte)flags & 1) == 0)
        sceKernelPrintfLevelForDriver(2, "skip init for updater\n");
      else {
        sceKernelPrintfLevelForDriver(2, "do init for updater\n");
        if (SpkgInfoUtilInitForUpdater(&status, &flags) != 0)
          sceKernelPrintfLevelForDriver(2,"SpkgInfoUtilInitForUpdater() failure = 0x%x\n",iVar2);
      }

0xA0002 - sceSblUsSmAuthAdditionalSign

SCE_SBL_SM_COMM_FID_SM_AUTH_PUP_AS.

Checks PUP Additional Signatures.

0xB0002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsEncryptDecryptSector

Added on FW 1.03. Usage similar to pm_sm command 8.

Data size is 0x88 bytes. 

typedef struct data { // size is 0x88
  uint mode; // 0 before read, 1 after read, 2 before write, 3 after write
  uint sector_index; // between 1 and 20 (SNVS sectors)
  char base_buf[0x20]; // input: full of 0xdeadbeef
  char inter_buf[0x30]; // output: input for sceSysconSnvsReadDataForDriver or sceSysconSnvsWriteDataForDriver
  char final_buf[0x30]; // input: output for sceSysconSnvsReadDataForDriver or sceSysconSnvsWriteDataForDriver
} data;

Usage:

  • 1) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xB0002, &response, data, 0x88);

For read:

  • 2) sceSysconSnvsReadDataForDriver(data + 0x28, 0x10, data + 0x58, 0x30);

For write:

  • 2) sceSysconSnvsWriteDataForDriver(data + 0x28, 0x30, data + 0x58, 0x10);
  • 3) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xB0002, &response, data, 0x88);

0xC0002 - sceSblUsSmSnvsEncryptDecryptMgmtData

Added on FW 1.03. Usage similar to pm_sm command 8.

Data size is 0x70 bytes. 

typedef struct data { // Size is 0x70 bytes on FW 3.60
  int mode; // ex: 0 before read, 1 after read, 2 before write, 3 after write
  int sector_count; // always 0 (Mgmt Data)
  int status; // not set for read, set for write
  int flags; // not set for read, set for write
  char unk_10[0x30]; // output: input for sceSysconSnvsReadDataForDriver or sceSysconSnvsWriteDataForDriver
  char unk_40[0x30]; // input: output for sceSysconSnvsReadDataForDriver or sceSysconSnvsWriteDataForDriver
} data;

Usage:

  • 1) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xC0002, &response, data, 0x70);

For write:

  • 2) sceSysconSnvsWriteDataForDriver(data + 0x10, 0x30, data + 0x40, 0x10);

For read:

  • 2) sceSysconSnvsReadDataForDriver(data + 0x10, 0x10, data + 0x40, 0x30);
  • 3) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xC0002, &response, data, 0x70);

0xD0002

Syscon update related. Usage is to proxy encrypted data cmep <=> Syscon.

Data size is 0x58 bytes. 

typedef struct data { // Size is 0x58 bytes on FW 3.60
  int mode; // ex: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
  int unk_4; // Maybe unused
  char unk_8[0x28]; // input: syscon command 0xD2 output
  char unk_30[0x28]; // output: syscon command 0xD2 input
} data;

Usage:

  • 1) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xD0002, &response, data, 0x58);

For modes 0, 1 and 3:

  • 2) memcpy(data + 8, data + 0x30, 0x28); SceSysconForDriver_4D03754A(data + 8, 0x28, data + 0x30, 0x28); // Calls Syscon command 0xD0.
  • 3) sceSblSmCommCallFunc(id, 0xD0002, &response, data, 0x58);

Mode:

  • 0 - Do init 0x28 buffer.
  • 1 - Do Bigmac unknown crypto with some blob.
  • 2 - Do Bigmac unknown crypto with some blob.
  • 3 - Do Bigmac unknown crypto with some blob.
  • 4 - Do some working. And reset Syscon ticket count with Bigmac PRNG (keyring 0x512).

utoken_sm.self

0x1 - check_utoken

Checks SceUtoken buffer.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Physical address of SceUtoken buffer
0x4 0x4 Size of SceUtoken buffer (usually 0x800)
0x8 0x4 Time (got using sceRtcGetCurrentSecureTickForDriver or 0xFFFFFFFF (-1)
0xC 0x10 OpenPsId

0x2 - decrypt_utoken

Decrypt SceUtoken buffer, in order to get UT Flags.

Offset Size Description
0x0 0x4 Physical address of SceUtoken buffer
0x4 0x4 Size of SceUtoken buffer (usually 0x800)
0x8 0x4 Time (got using sceRtcGetCurrentSecureTickForDriver or 0xFFFFFFFF (-1))
0xC 0x10 OpenPsId

mgkm_sm.self

Magic Gate Key Manager secure module.

Present on 0.931-3.73. Commands are almost the same on any FW, only KEY_31 varies. 0 These commands are used to set keys (as seen on FWs from 0.940 to 3.60) to |DMAC5 registers in NS memory. These keys are used in to do encryption stuff with AES-ECB and TripleDES-ECB algorithms through |DMAC5.

On FW 0.940, commands 1 and 2 are only called by SceSblMgKeyMgrForDriver_1C5388D0 which consists of: 

int SceSblMgKeyMgrForDriver_1C5388D0(void *in, void *out) {
  int ret;
  uint8_t tmp_buffer[16];
  ret = call_cmd_1();
  if ((ret == 0) && (ret = call_cmd_2(), ret == 0)) {
    aesECBDec16B(in, tmp_buffer, 0x1E);
    aesECBEnc16B(tmp_buffer, out, 0x1F);
  }
  return ret;
}

0x1 - set_key_31

memset(buffer, 0, 0x20);
memcpy(buffer, KEY_31, 0x10);
bigmac_memcpy(0xE04E0000 + 0x1F * 0x20, buffer, 0x20);

0x2 - set_key_30

memset(buffer, 0, 0x20);
memcpy(buffer, pOpenPsId, 0x10);
memcpy(buffer + 0x10, KEY_30_SEED, 0x10);
bigmac_sha256(buffer, buffer, 0x20);
bigmac_memcpy(0xE04E0000 + 0x1E * 0x20, buffer, 0x20);

0x3 - unset_key_31

memset(buffer, 0, 0x20);
bigmac_memcpy(0xE04E0000 + 0x1F * 0x20, buffer, 0x20);

0x4 - unset_key_30

memset(buffer, 0, 0x20);
bigmac_memcpy(0xE04E0000 + 0x1E * 0x20, buffer, 0x20);
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