SceSblGcAuthMgr

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SBL Game Card Auth Manager

Module

Version World Privilege
1.69-3.60 Non-secure Kernel

Libraries

Known NIDs

Version Name World Visibility NID
1.69-3.60 SceSblGcAuthMgrDrmBBForDriver Non-secure Kernel 0x1926B182
1.69 SceSblGcAuthMgrPcactForDriver Non-secure Kernel 0x0B8600A5
3.60 SceSblGcAuthMgrPcactForDriver Non-secure Kernel not present
1.69-3.60 SceSblGcAuthMgrMlnpsnlForDriver Non-secure Kernel 0x29ED0109
1.69 SceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBBForDriver Non-secure Kernel 0x2EFA9203
3.60 SceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBBForDriver Non-secure Kernel not present
1.69-3.60 SceSblGcAuthMgrPkgForDriver Non-secure Kernel 0x082FBA7D
1.69-3.60 SceSblGcAuthMgrSclkForDriver Non-secure Kernel 0xF24F760D
1.69-3.60 SceSblGcAuthMgrGcAuthForDriver Non-secure Kernel 0xC6627F5E
1.69-3.60 SceSblGcAuthMgr Non-secure User 0x7B13BCF7
3.60 SceSblGcAuthMgrPsmactForDriver Non-secure Kernel 0x1C53F37D
3.60 SceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBForDriver Non-secure Kernel 0x5032E8D4

Data segment layout

Address Size Description
0x0000 0x4BC4 unknown
0x4BC4 0x30 temp buffer for storing parts of cmd56 packets
0x4BF4 0x200 cmd56 request buffer
0x4DF4 0x04 packet6 gc parameter
0x4DF8 0x200 temp buffer for initializing cmd56 req packets
0x4FF8 0x20 temp buffer for storing parts of cmd56 packets
0x5018 0x34 one of Kirk responses
0x504C 0x200 cmd56 response buffer 1
0x524C 0x200 cmd56 response buffer 2
0x544C 0x20 one of Kirk responses
0x546C 0x898 unknown

SceSblGcAuthMgrDrmBBForDriver

command 0x1000B 0x11

Version NID
3.60 0x4CEA150C

Original PSP Kirk 0x11 service for 160bit ECC signature verification.

command 0x1000B 0x18

Version NID
3.60 0x4B506BE7

224bit version of PSP Kirk 0x11 service

command 0x1000B 0x21

Version NID
3.60 0x30A0B441

command 0x1000B 0x22

Version NID
3.60 0x050DC6DF

command 0x1000B 0x4

Version NID
3.60 0x500F5157

Original PSP Kirk 4 service for encrypting data

command 0x1000B 0x4

Version NID
0.990-3.60 0x6EF3C9DB

Original PSP Kirk 4 service for encrypting data

command 0x1000B 0x4

Version NID
3.60 0x7F98E4E2

Original PSP Kirk 4 service for encrypting data

command 0x1000B 0x4

Version NID
3.60 0xE950BE32

Original PSP Kirk 4 service for encrypting data

command 0x1000B 0x7

Version NID
3.60 0x3C25F9FA

Original PSP Kirk 7 service for decrypting data

command 0x1000B 0x7

Version NID
3.60 0xB13577E2

Original PSP Kirk 7 service for decrypting data

command 0x1000B 0x7

Version NID
3.60 0xC0F37F18

Original PSP Kirk 7 service for decrypting data

command 0x1000B 0x4 0x7

Version NID
3.60 0x4FE89ADB

Original PSP Kirk Enc and Dec 

int unk_4FE89ADB(int unk0, int unk1, int unk2, int unk3, int arg_0);

clear_context

Version NID
3.60 0x48D7784E 
typedef struct ctx_48D7784E { //size is 0x28
   uint32_t unk_0;
   char unk_4[0x10];
   char unk_14[0x10];
   uint32_t unk_24;
}ctx_48D7784E;

int clear_context(ctx_48D7784E *ctx, int idx);

clear_context

Version NID
3.60 0x6E6D2B89 
typedef struct ctx_6E6D2B89 { //size is 0x18
   uint32_t unk_0;
   uint32_t unk_4;
   char unk_8[0x10];
} ctx_6E6D2B89;

int clear_context(ctx_6E6D2B89 *ctx);

enc_dec

Version NID
3.60 0x4C5DE1AA

Includes both AES and PSP Kirk 0x1000B 4 and 7. 

int enc_dec(void* data, void* dec_rif_key, int unk2, void* unk3);

error

Version NID
0.990-3.60 0x535B87BC

Returns error 0x808A040A.

get_5018_data

Version NID
0.990-3.60 0xBB70DDC0

This function copies first 0x20 bytes of the buffer of size 0x34 to destination.

Buffer is obtained with KIRK command 0x20. 

int get_5018_data(char* dest);

memcmp_safe_5018

Version NID
0.990-3.60 0x22FD5D23

Temp name was memcmp_5018_fast.

This function verifies that last 0x14 bytes of last response of size 0x34 from the game card (cmd56) are valid.

CMD56 response Buffer is obtained with KIRK command 0x20

For example it is called from SceAppMgr#sceAppMgrGameDataMount.

This is a timing safe memcmp. Xyz (talk) 10:02, 1 May 2017 (UTC) 

int memcmp_safe_5018(char* in_data);

clear_sensitive_data

Version NID
0.990-3.60 0x812B2B5C

Clears some sensitive data.

Called after memcmp_safe_5018. 

int clear_sensitive_data(int unk, int* value);

clear_sensitive_data_2

Version NID
0.990-3.60 0xBB451E83

Clears sensitive data that is left after cmd56 custom initialization.

This includes data generated by Kirk services 0x1C, 0x1F, 0x20 and packet6.

Buffer offsets are 0x4BC4, 0x4FF8, 0x5018, 0x544C.

Called after initialize_sd_device. 

int clear_sensitive_data_2();

SceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBBForDriver

Present on FW 1.69. Not present on FWs >= 3.60.

sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224InitForDriver

Version NID
0.940 0xAD28D0FC

sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224ShutdownForDriver

Version NID
0.940 0xF373E805

sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224GetKeysForDriver

Version NID
0.940 0x8558BE2C

sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224Auth1ForDriver

Version NID
0.940 0x0FD3C103

sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224Auth2ForDriver

Version NID
0.940 0xCBC471F2

sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224Auth3ForDriver

Version NID
0.940 0x772914E5

sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224Auth4ForDriver

Version NID
0.940 0x7EDBBBF8

sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224Auth5ForDriver

Version NID
0.940 0x79DD1A5E

SceSblGcAuthMgrPcactForDriver

This library is present on System Software versions 0.990.000-1.692.000. Not present since System Software version 1.80.

sceSblGcAuthMgrPcactActivationForDriver

Version NID
0.990.000-1.692.000 0x46B7AA5A

Calls get_aes_dec_key then SceNpDrm set_act_data. 

typedef struct ScePcactUnkBuf { // size is 0x50 on FW 0.990
  short unk_0; // must be 0x211
  char mode;
  char reserved[0xD]; // must be zeroed
  char unk_10[0x40]; // might be keys generated from ConsoleId
} ScePcactUnkBuf;

typedef struct ScePcactActivationData { // size is 0x1090 on FW 0.990
  ScePcactUnkBuf unk_buf;
  char act_dat[0x1040];
} ScePcactActivationData;

int sceSblGcAuthMgrPcactActivationForDriver(const ScePcactActivationData *act_data, SceSize act_data_size);

sceSblGcAuthMgrPcactGetChallengeForDriver

Version NID
0.990.000-1.692.000 0xA3EEF3AD

Calls #SceSblGcAuthMgrPcactForDriver_B7AE58B9. 

// entropy (epassword) size is 0x20 bytes
// challenge size is 0x80 bytes
int sceSblGcAuthMgrPcactGetChallengeForDriver(SceUID id, const char *entropy, char *challenge);

SceSblGcAuthMgrPcactForDriver_B7AE58B9

Version NID
0.990.000-1.692.000 0xB7AE58B9 
typedef struct ScePcactCreateChallengeOpt {
    char data_offset;      // must be 0x10
    char reserved[15];     // must be zeroed
    char epassword[32];
} ScePcactCreateChallengeOpt;

// challenge size is 0x80 bytes
// prng size is 0x40 bytes
int SceSblGcAuthMgrPcactForDriver_B7AE58B9(SceUInt32 mode, ScePcactCreateChallengeOpt *pOpt, SceUInt64 *rtc_tick, void *challenge, void *prng);

get_aes_dec_key

Version NID
0.990.000-1.692.000 0xCA97CE1C

aes_dec_key is derived from act_data. prng seems to be a temporary work buffer. 

// prng size is 0x40 bytes
// aes_dec_key size is 0x10 bytes
int get_aes_dec_key(const ScePcactActivationData *act_data, void *prng, void *aes_dec_key);

SceSblGcAuthMgrMlnpsnlForDriver

sceSblGcAuthMgrMlnpsnlAuth1ForDriver

Version NID
0.940-3.60 0xDABC01F5

sceSblGcAuthMgrMlnpsnlAuth2ForDriver

Version NID
0.940-3.60 0x296ABD68

SceSblGcAuthMgrPkgForDriver

sceSblGcAuthMgrPkgVryForDriver

Version NID
0.990-3.60 0xE459A9A8

Calls Secure_Modules_Functions#0x11_kirk_ecc160_verify KIRK command 0x11 to verify PKG ECDSA signature. 

// pHash: sha1 hash of data (0x14 bytes)
// pSig: ECDSA signature (2 * 0x14 bytes)
int sceSblGcAuthMgrPkgVryForDriver(const char *pHash, const char *pSig);

SceSblGcAuthMgrSclkForDriver

Related to Secure clock.

sceSblGcAuthMgrSclkGetData1ForDriver

Version NID
0.990-3.60 0x11D5570B

AES256ECB encrypts a buffer made from a "genuine random number" followed by zeroes. 

typedef struct SceSblGcAuthMgrSclkData1 { // size is 0x30
  int unk_0; // ex: 1
  int unk_4; // ex: 1
  int unk_8; // ex: 0
  int unk_C; // ex: 0
  char enc_data_0[0x10]; // seed = zeroes
  char enc_data_1[0x10]; // seed = hardcoded
} SceSblGcAuthMgrSclkData1;

int sceSblGcAuthMgrSclkGetData1ForDriver(SceSblGcAuthMgrSclkData1 *pData);

sceSblGcAuthMgrSclkSetData2ForDriver

Version NID
0.990-3.60 0xF723A9BA

Checks header, sha256, AES256ECB decrypts then sets some secure RTC. 

typedef struct SceSblGcAuthMgrSclkData2 { // size is at least 0x30
  int unk_0; // ex: 1
  int unk_4; // ex: 1
  int unk_8; // ex: 0
  int unk_C; // ex: 0
  char enc_data_0[0x10];
  char enc_data_1[0x10];
  // more, maybe sha256
} SceSblGcAuthMgrSclkData2;

int sceSblGcAuthMgrSclkSetData2ForDriver(SceSblGcAuthMgrSclkData2 *pData);

SceSblGcAuthMgrGcAuthForDriver

cmd56_handshake

Version NID
3.60 0x68781760

This is a wrapper function that starts initialization subroutine through SceKernelThreadMgr#_sceKernelExtendKernelStackWideForDriver. 

int cmd56_handshake(int sd_ctx_index);

SceSblGcAuthMgrPsmactForDriver

get_act_data

Version NID
0.931.010-1.692.000 not present
1.800.071-3.740.011 0x39222A58

Executes KIRK command 0x1000B 19. 

// data is of size 0x80
int get_act_data(void* data);

SceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBForDriver

sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBCipherInitForDriver

Version NID
3.60 0x3C185A67

AES encrypts with null IV using a Kirk command.

sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBMacInitForDriver

Version NID
3.60 0x4A249828 
int sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBMacInitForDriver(void *pDst, SceUInt32 initValue);

sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBMacUpdateForDriver

Version NID
3.60 0x79A9BE44

AES encrypts a 0x800 buffer.

sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBCipherFinalForDriver

Version NID
3.60 0x805C860B

sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBMacFinalForDriver

Version NID
3.60 0x8E6626A0

sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBCipherUpdateForDriver

Version NID
3.60 0xF66D5F76

AES decrypts a 0x800 buffer then AES decrypts with null IV using a Kirk command.

SceSblGcAuthMgr

_sceSblGcAuthMgrPcactActivation

Version NID
0.990-3.60 0x032E7CEA 
int _sceSblGcAuthMgrPcactActivation(const ScePcactActivationData *act_data, SceSize act_data_size);

_sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBCipherInit

Version NID
3.60 0x064BA38A

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB160Shutdown

Version NID
3.60 0x076ADAB3

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB160UniCastEncrypt

Version NID
3.60 0x08C4EE5F

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB160GetKeys

Version NID
3.60 0x09E1E270

_sceSblGcAuthMgrGetMediaIdType01

Version NID
1.03 not present
1.69-3.60 0x0AC64154

Returns MediaIdType01 by using Kirk command 0x23 on a global buffer. 

typedef struct SceMediaIdType01 {
  char enc_data[0x10]; // encrypted data
  char enc_data_cmac[0x10]; // CMAC of encrypted data
} SceMediaIdType01;

int _sceSblGcAuthMgrGetMediaIdType01(SceMediaIdType01 **pMediaId);

_sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBCipherFinal

Version NID
3.60 0x18EAAD73

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB160BroadCastDecrypt

Version NID
3.60 0x2193A7CB

_sceSblGcAuthMgrPsmactVerifyR1

Version NID
3.60 0x2B604356

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224Auth1

Version NID
1.69-3.60 0x307FD67C

_sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBMacInit

Version NID
3.60 0x3A92780D

_sceSblGcAuthMgrPsmactCreateC1

Version NID
3.60 0x3BD8B007

_sceSblGcAuthMgrPkgVry

Version NID
1.69-3.60 0x3E168BC4 
typedef struct SceSblGcAuthMgrPkgVryInfo { // size is 0x10
  SceSize hashSize; // ex: 0x14
  SceSize sigSize; // ex: 0x28
  SceUInt64 reserved;
} SceSblGcAuthMgrPkgVryInfo;

// pHash: sha1 hash of data (0x14 bytes)
// pSig: ECDSA signature (2 * 0x14 bytes)
int _sceSblGcAuthMgrPkgVry(const char *pHash, const char *pSig, SceSblGcAuthMgrPkgVryInfo *pInfo);

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224Auth5

Version NID
1.69-3.60 0x459F5503

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224Init

Version NID
1.69-3.60 0x5AB126A7

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224Auth4

Version NID
1.69-3.60 0x5CCC216C

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB160Auth1

Version NID
3.60 0x5E56F845

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB160BroadCastEncrypt

Version NID
3.60 0x6125C3D9

_sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBMacUpdate

Version NID
3.60 0x716C0C3B

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224Auth2

Version NID
1.69-3.60 0x788C0517

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB160Auth4

Version NID
3.60 0x7F33DE86

_sceSblGcAuthMgrSclkSetData2

Version NID
0.990-3.60 0x837D0FB6

_sceSblGcAuthMgrSclkGetData1

Version NID
0.990-3.60 0x8A3AF1E8

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224Shutdown

Version NID
1.69-3.60 0x8ECEACF9

_sceSblGcAuthMgrPcactGetChallenge

Version NID
0.990-3.740.011 0x98153286 
typedef struct ScePcactGetChallengeOpt { // size is 0x10 on FWs 0.990-3.740.011
  SceSize epasswordSize; // Maximum size is 0x20 bytes
  SceSize challengeSize; // Maximum size is 0x80 bytes
  char reserved[8];
} ScePcactGetChallengeOpt;

int _sceSblGcAuthMgrPcactGetChallenge(SceUInt32 id, const char *epassword, char *challenge, ScePcactGetChallengeOpt *pOpt);

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224GetKeys

Version NID
1.69-3.60 0xC236FB28

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB160Auth3

Version NID
3.60 0xD1777A14

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB160Auth2

Version NID
3.60 0xD2218A6E

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB224Auth3

Version NID
1.69-3.60 0xD3F95259

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB160UniCastDecrypt

Version NID
3.60 0xD79A1B31

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB160Auth5

Version NID
3.60 0xD84C2E0C

_sceSblGcAuthMgrAdhocBB160Init

Version NID
3.60 0xE4AA1BB2

_sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBCipherUpdate

Version NID
3.60 0xF6FECCE0

_sceSblGcAuthMgrMsSaveBBMacFinal

Version NID
3.60 0xFDDDD1D4

gcauthmgr_sm calls to Kirk commands in cmep

The use of os0:sm/gcauthmgr_sm.self is to support the new generation of Kirk. It uses a similar input structure to the original Kirk on the PSP.

PSP Kirk support

4, 7, 0xC, 0xD, 0xE, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12 are the classic PSP Kirk services supported by gcauthmgr_sm. However, keys and seeds are sometimes different and look similar to PS3 crypto.

New PS Vita Kirk services

0x14-0x19, 0x1B-0x23 are the new Kirk services supported by gcauthmgr_sm. Most are just 224bit versions of original Kirk commands.

  • 0x14 is the 224bit version of ECDSA key pair gen (Kirk command 0xC). The only input is an empty buffer size (3*0x1C) it returns 3 values: Private key, Public X point, Public Y point. Each value is 0x1C bytes long.
  • 0x16 is the 224bit version of pseudo random number generator (Kirk command 0xE). It will return 0x1C bytes of random data into the buffer.
  • 0x17-0x19 are the 224bit ECDSA versions of PSP's 160bit Kirk commands 0x10-0x12.
  • 0x1B-0x23 have no equivalent on PSP Kirk but are maybe also present on PS3

PSN Activation Block

On 7/29/2017, all hacked Vitas on 3.60 spoofing the latest firmware (3.65) were blocked from console activation. This is particularly odd because the PSN passphrase did not change in 3.65. Additionally with the release of [ensō](https://enso.henkaku.xyz/) added to the confusion of what happened. Here is the result of a preliminary investigation of the situation.

Upon game activation, the Vita displays an dialog that shows the error number E-80558325. This error number is used in SceNpKdc, which is found in vs0:external/np_kdc.suprx. The error code itself is created when the activation response is received: 

v5 = v45 | 0x80558300;

Here, v5 is the return code and v45 is the string error code from the server converted to a number. The request made to Sony's server looks like the following 

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: My heart leaps up when I behold A rainbow in the sky
X-I-5-DRM-Version: 1.0

loginid=PSNID&epassword=ENCRYPTEDPASSWORD&platform=psp2&c1=CHALLENGESTRING

The request from a 3.65 stock console has the same headers and loginid and epassword (for the same account) so the only change visible to Sony is the challenge string c1.

The response you get on 3.60 is 

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: Apache
X-I-5-DRM-Version: 1.0
X-I-5-DRM-Status: NG; reason=25
Content-Length: 0
Content-Type: application/x-i-5-drm
X-N: S
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2017 23:01:31 GMT
Connection: keep-alive

Challenge

The challenge string is constructed in SceNpKdc with a call to SceLibKernel#sceSblGcAuthMgrPcactGetChallenge. It is called with id = 0 and epassword set to uninitialized stack space. Tracing this call, you eventually arrive at SceSblGcAuthMgr#SceSblGcAuthMgrPcactForDriver_B7AE58B9. It appears that data from aimgr_sm.self (see Secure Modules Functions) along with pOpt, rtc_tick (the RTC in seconds), DMAC engine, and maybe other data are entangled together into a 0x70-byte sized block. Then a 20 byte SHA1-HMAC is computed over the buffer with some key. It is likely that the data itself is unimportant and just has to be random and console unique.

This is the challenge string generation code, reverse engineered from PSP openpsid.prx (almost same code as in PS Vita): 

#define KIRK_CMD_ENCRYPT_IV_0 4
#define KIRK_CMD_DECRYPT_IV_0 7
#define KIRK_CMD_SHA1_HASH 11
#define KIRK_CMD_PRNG 14

static int DecryptIV0(u32 *buf, u32 size, u32 code) {
	buf[0] = 5;
	buf[1] = 0;
	buf[2] = 0;
	buf[3] = code;
	buf[4] = size;

	return sceUtilsBufferCopyWithRange(buf, size+0x14, buf, size+0x14, KIRK_CMD_DECRYPT_IV_0);
}

static int EncryptIV0(u32 *buf, u32 size, u32 code) {
	buf[0] = 4;
	buf[1] = 0;
	buf[2] = 0;
	buf[3] = code;
	buf[4] = size;

	return sceUtilsBufferCopyWithRange(buf, size+0x14, buf, size+0x14, KIRK_CMD_ENCRYPT_IV_0);
}

static int generate_challenge(u8 mode, u8 *psid, u8 *epassword, u64 *rtc_tick, u8 *challenge, u8 *prng) {
	static u8 data_38BC[0x10] = { 0x38, 0x0A, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x36, 0x58, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0x70, 0x64, 0x69, 0xE3, 0x29, 0x60, 0x81, 0xF9 };
	static u8 data_38DC[0x10] = { 0xCA, 0x0E, 0x20, 0x6E, 0xCE, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x66, 0x68, 0x28, 0x65, 0x42, 0xEF, 0x4F, 0xF8, 0x8F };
	static u8 work[0xB8];
	static u8 challenge_work[0x70];

	int res;
	int i;

	memset(work, 0, 0xB8);
	memset(challenge_work, 0, 0x70);

	memset(challenge, 0, 0x80);
	memset(prng, 0, 0x40);

	// get random data
	res = sceUtilsBufferCopyWithRange(work, 0x14, 0, 0, KIRK_CMD_PRNG);
	if (res < 0)
		return -2;

	memcpy(prng, work, 0x10);

	// encrypt prng
	memcpy(work+0x14, prng, 0x10);
	res = DecryptIV0(work, 0x10, 0x68);
	if (res < 0)
		return -3;

	memcpy(prng+0x10, work, 0x10);
	prng[0x20] = mode;

	memcpy(challenge_work, work, 0x10);              // random data
	memcpy(challenge_work+0x10, data_38DC, 0x10);    // constant data

	// encrypt psid
	memcpy(work+0x14, psid, 0x10);
	res = DecryptIV0(work, 0x10, 0x68);
	if (res < 0)
		return -3;

	memcpy(challenge_work+0x20, work, 0x10);         // encrypted psid
	memcpy(challenge_work+0x30, rtc_tick, 0x8);
	memcpy(challenge_work+0x38, epassword+0x10, 0x20);

	// fuseid
	u32 fuseid0 = *(u32 *)0xBC100090;
	u32 fuseid1 = *(u32 *)0xBC100094;
	challenge_work[0x58] = fuseid1 >> 24;
	challenge_work[0x59] = fuseid1 >> 16;
	challenge_work[0x5A] = fuseid1 >> 8;
	challenge_work[0x5B] = fuseid1;
	challenge_work[0x5C] = fuseid0 >> 24;
	challenge_work[0x5D] = fuseid0 >> 16;
	challenge_work[0x5E] = fuseid0 >> 8;
	challenge_work[0x5F] = fuseid0;

	memcpy(work+0x14, challenge_work, 0x60);

	// xor with data_38BC keys
	for (i = 0; i < 0x60; i++)
		work[0x14+i] ^= data_38BC[i % 0x10];

	// encrypt data
	res = EncryptIV0(work, 0x60, 0x13);
	if (res < 0)
		return -4;
	
	// xor encrypted data with data_38BC keys
	for (i = 0; i < 0x60; i++)
		work[0x14+i] ^= data_38BC[i % 0x10];

	// build challenge string
	memset(challenge_work, 0, 0x10);
	challenge_work[0x00] = 0x11;
	challenge_work[0x01] = 0x01;
	challenge_work[0x02] = mode;
	memcpy(challenge_work+0x10, work+0x14, 0x60);

	// get sha1 hash digest
	*(u32 *)work = 0x80;
	memcpy(work+0x04, data_38BC, 0x10);
	memcpy(work+0x14, challenge_work, 0x70);
	res = sceUtilsBufferCopyWithRange(work, 0x84, work, 0x84, KIRK_CMD_SHA1_HASH);
	if (res < 0)
		return -5;

	// encrypt hash digest
	memcpy(work+0x14, work, 0x10);
	res = EncryptIV0(work, 0x10, 0x13);
	if (res < 0)
		return -4;

	// copy challenge string
	memcpy(challenge, challenge_work, 0x70);
	memcpy(challenge+0x70, work+0x14, 0x10);

	return 0;
}

How Sony Blocked Activation

There are at least two possible ways. First is that on 3.65, the random-looking data block has some specific structure that Sony looks for (or some console unique data in this block gives away the fact that the console is on 3.60). Second is that they changed the SHA1-HMAC key. If it is the latter case, then the next step is to find how this key is constructed. It is likely that the key is constructed in Cmep and therefore spoofing it would require a Cmep hack.

How Hackers Bypassed The Block

See ReStore / ReNpDrm vulnerability by CelesteBlue.

How Sony Unblocked Activation

Since May 2018, the challenge string in requests sent from PS Vita to PSN for Content and PSN Account (per-console) activations is not checked anymore. Strange...

I can think about 4 reasons:

1) Sony wanted to fight ReStore by killing its purpose. In this case, they would have better patched the vulnerability...

2) Sony has done that by mistake. Impossible.

3) Sony is working on a more secure PSN. We have an exemple: Sony removed ConsoleId checks on its servers for 3 months, around 2016-11-11, then restored the verification with even more securities. In the PS Vita case, they would have been quicker at fixing the challenge if that was for security.

4) Sony is working on a big change of PSN. This is very plausible since we discovered that they are adapting old PSN to work with a new "Account Id" because now people can change Sony Entertainment Network (PSN) ID. Moreover, on 2022-05-10, Sony released System Software version 3.74 to enforce the two-factor authentication system. This change also targets PS3 and PS4 and makes ReStore totally obsolete if it was needed again.

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