Ernie

Ernie is the codename for the Syscon chip. The Syscon is for exemple responsible for handling button input (including power button), reading/writing to non-volatile storage (NVS) for storing system flags (mostly encrypted and signed). For example IDU flag is stored in NVS. Syscon is also responsible for maintaining the physical address to the resume buffer during Suspend. Communication between Kermit and Syscon is mainly through SPI (see SceSyscon) but there are also some GPIO pins connecting the two. The chip model is NEC/Renesas uPD79F0109 and is likely custom designed for Sony.

See also: Ernie Secure

Boot Process

The following is logged from boot. The timestamp is in seconds (the starting time is irrelevant). The arrow at the start indicates direction: '>' means Kermit to Syscon (MOSI) and '<' means Syscon to Kermit (MISO). Then there is a 2 byte command id or response code, followed by a flag byte (response only), the payload, a checksum byte, and an (response only) unknown byte. Please note that the packets are listed in transfer order but this may not represent the logical order of the packets. It is currently unknown what the logical order should be, but one can guess that a response is "close to" a request.

First some version information seems to be sent from Syscon to Kermit. This is same for cold boot and resume boot. The last response indicates the type of boot where 0xFF80 is resume and 0xFF14 is regular boot.

< [2.048118000000000] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[0D 06 00 01 | ....], chk=0xE1, unk=0x00
> [2.048118000000000] 0x0001, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFD
< [2.048659583333333] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[00 60 40 00 | .`@.], chk=0x55, unk=0x00
> [2.048659583333333] 0x0005, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF9
< [2.049330083333333] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[32 30 31 32 31 31 30 38 31 37 30 34 | 201211081704], chk=0x92, unk=0x00
> [2.049330083333333] 0x0002, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFC
< [2.054004333333333] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x30
> [2.054004333333333] 0x0080, payload=[12 00 | ..], chk=0x6A
< [2.058172916666666] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x30
> [2.058172916666666] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.062716333333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x30
> [2.062716333333333] 0x0080, payload=[12 00 | ..], chk=0x6A
< [2.111457750000000] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[14 FF | ..], chk=0xE4, unk=0x32

Next some encrypted session is established. A 8 byte nonce is sent from Syscon (it appears random for each boot, cold or warm). Encrypted data from this point on always differs each boot.

> [2.111457750000000] 0x0010, payload=[ | ], chk=0xEE
< [2.133389000000000] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0xFF
> [2.133389000000000] 0x00A0, payload=[30 00 00 0B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 0.......................................], chk=0xFB
< [2.150567250000000] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0xFF
> [2.150567250000000] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.155149500000000] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[30 01 00 0B 00 00 00 00 A4 B0 EF 23 D6 9A 3A 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 0..........#..:.........................], chk=0x5F, unk=0x00
> [2.155149500000000] 0x00A0, payload=[30 00 00 0B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 0.......................................], chk=0xFB
< [2.163572000000000] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x01
> [2.163572000000000] 0x00A0, payload=[30 02 00 0B 01 00 00 00 6C 7F E0 79 AA 03 4B B0 96 B7 42 F0 BC F8 62 7A 35 27 53 68 3D 0D ED A7 13 F2 32 77 46 2D 54 F8 | 0.......l..y..K...B...bz5'Sh=.....2wF-T.], chk=0x9B
< [2.189271166666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x01
> [2.189271166666667] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.193866583333334] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[30 03 00 0B 00 00 00 00 7A 44 6E C8 F5 FA 35 CB 9B E9 E6 A0 B6 5C 85 1D FB A8 89 5C 9C 04 0B 29 34 59 55 EB 1D 98 AB 83 | 0.......zDn...5......\.....\...)4YU.....], chk=0xC6, unk=0x00
> [2.193866583333334] 0x00A0, payload=[30 02 00 0B 01 00 00 00 6C 7F E0 79 AA 03 4B B0 96 B7 42 F0 BC F8 62 7A 35 27 53 68 3D 0D ED A7 13 F2 32 77 46 2D 54 F8 | 0.......l..y..K...B...bz5'Sh=.....2wF-T.], chk=0x9B

Some more data is exchanged. Up until this point all the plaintext payloads appear to be the same from coldboot and warmboot.

< [2.202246333333334] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x03
> [2.202246333333334] 0x088E, payload=[01 22 | ."], chk=0x43
< [2.206411750000000] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF9, unk=0x03
> [2.206411750000000] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.217062666666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x03
> [2.217062666666667] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.221620916666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x03
> [2.221620916666667] 0x088E, payload=[01 22 | ."], chk=0x43
< [2.229805500000000] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x03
> [2.229805500000000] 0x1082, payload=[80 04 08 | ...], chk=0xDD
< [2.233887583333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x03
> [2.233887583333333] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.238363416666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[FF FF FF FF 01 FF FF FF | ........], chk=0xD7, unk=0x44
> [2.238363416666667] 0x1082, payload=[80 04 08 | ...], chk=0xDD
< [2.246473916666667] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0xFF

Now, there appears to be a branch. The next sequence only shows up for cold boots.

> [2.246473916666667] 0x1082, payload=[A0 04 01 | ...], chk=0xC4
< [2.250555000000000] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0xFF
> [2.250555000000000] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.255030833333334] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[FF | .], chk=0xD9, unk=0x00
> [2.255030833333334] 0x1082, payload=[A0 04 01 | ...], chk=0xC4
< [2.259176583333333] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[01 01 13 00 | ....], chk=0xE0, unk=0xFF
> [2.259176583333333] 0x1100, payload=[ | ], chk=0xED
< [2.263720583333333] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x01
> [2.263720583333333] 0x00D0, payload=[30 00 00 0F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 0.......................................], chk=0xC7
< [2.267827000000000] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF9, unk=0x01
> [2.267827000000000] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.278339666666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x01
> [2.278339666666667] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.282830833333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[30 01 00 0F 00 00 00 00 E1 CA 65 96 BB 7E 81 7A 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 0.........e..~.z........................], chk=0x97, unk=0x00
> [2.282830833333333] 0x00D0, payload=[30 00 00 0F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 0.......................................], chk=0xC7
< [2.291023500000000] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x01
> [2.291023500000000] 0x00D0, payload=[30 02 00 0F 01 00 00 00 4E D7 C0 7C D5 E8 BB D7 3E 9E 43 7B B2 E3 4D 81 23 C8 C4 BF B8 4D 9B 25 0A 3D C7 45 E6 0D 23 43 | 0.......N..|....>.C{..M.#....M.%.=.E..#C], chk=0x38
< [2.295129250000000] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF9, unk=0x01
> [2.295129250000000] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.305641750000000] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x01
> [2.305641750000000] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.310132916666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[30 03 00 0F 00 00 00 00 5B 3E 5C 5F 11 F9 E4 6A 85 0D 1E 06 9E F9 33 25 9B 95 55 21 39 48 FC 55 C7 BF A7 E4 32 AD FC 65 | 0.......[>\_...j......3%..U!9H.U....2..e], chk=0x55, unk=0x00
> [2.310132916666667] 0x00D0, payload=[30 02 00 0F 01 00 00 00 4E D7 C0 7C D5 E8 BB D7 3E 9E 43 7B B2 E3 4D 81 23 C8 C4 BF B8 4D 9B 25 0A 3D C7 45 E6 0D 23 43 | 0.......N..|....>.C{..M.#....M.%.=.E..#C], chk=0x38
< [2.318358166666667] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x03
> [2.318358166666667] 0x00D0, payload=[30 04 00 0F 00 00 00 00 52 8D 6D BC 90 C9 00 EE FA CA 47 63 10 D1 4A E5 5A FD BB 91 3A 6C DA EF 64 CA 71 01 4A A9 D5 31 | 0.......R.m.......Gc..J.Z...:l..d.q.J..1], chk=0x4B
< [2.322464250000000] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF9, unk=0x03
> [2.322464250000000] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.332976833333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x03
> [2.332976833333333] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.337468000000000] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[30 05 00 0F 00 00 00 00 52 8D 6D BC 90 C9 00 EE FA CA 47 63 10 D1 4A E5 5A FD BB 91 3A 6C DA EF 64 CA 71 01 4A A9 D5 31 | 0.......R.m.......Gc..J.Z...:l..d.q.J..1], chk=0xF5, unk=0x00
> [2.337468000000000] 0x00D0, payload=[30 04 00 0F 00 00 00 00 52 8D 6D BC 90 C9 00 EE FA CA 47 63 10 D1 4A E5 5A FD BB 91 3A 6C DA EF 64 CA 71 01 4A A9 D5 31 | 0.......R.m.......Gc..J.Z...:l..d.q.J..1], chk=0x4B
< [2.345696333333333] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x05

Then another set of shared sequence. Some differences in the warmboot responses though. On line 18,

FF BF FF 74

becomes

FF FF FF 74

. On line 12, the

00 00 00 00

becomes the physical address of the resume context buffer. Example:

F0 1E 1F 41

> [2.345696333333333] 0x00D2, payload=[20 7A 3E 7B 31 DE FC 3A 11 5F 64 E7 AB A4 EC 17 | .z>{1..:._d.....], chk=0x77
< [2.349790333333333] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF9, unk=0x05
> [2.349790333333333] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.360448916666666] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x05
> [2.360448916666666] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.364930250000000] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[9D 0B BC 4D BA 66 40 2C 63 BE F3 79 D0 31 26 1E 47 3A 64 DE 68 2F AE E2 8A B6 F0 27 37 46 89 16 0E 71 04 FA BF C9 4A A1 DF 4B EF D3 3D 0D 39 CD | ...M.f@,c..y.1&.G:d.h/.....'7F...q....J..K..=.9.], chk=0x11, unk=0x00
> [2.364930250000000] 0x00D2, payload=[20 7A 3E 7B 31 DE FC 3A 11 5F 64 E7 AB A4 EC 17 | .z>{1..:._d.....], chk=0x77
< [2.373236666666667] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x0B
> [2.373236666666667] 0x0090, payload=[0C 00 04 | ...], chk=0x5B
< [2.377318583333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x0B
> [2.377318583333333] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.381794416666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[00 00 00 00 | ....], chk=0xD5, unk=0x66
> [2.381794416666667] 0x0090, payload=[0C 00 04 | ...], chk=0x5B
< [2.385879750000000] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[40 00 | @.], chk=0xB7, unk=0x00
> [2.385879750000000] 0x0800, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF6
< [2.386382583333333] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[FF BF FF 74 | ...t], chk=0xC4, unk=0x66
> [2.386382583333333] 0x0100, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFD
< [2.386871833333333] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[10 00 00 00 | ....], chk=0xE5, unk=0x66
> [2.386871833333333] 0x0003, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFB
< [2.387380083333333] 0x0000, flags=3F, payload=[ | ], chk=0xBE, unk=0x00
> [2.387380083333333] 0x0006, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF8
< [2.481997666666667] 0x0000, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x7D, unk=0x00
> [2.481986333333333] 0x00D2, payload=[30 14 F4 B8 84 89 81 AB 3D 07 66 DE AE B6 D3 24 | 0.......=.f....$], chk=0x10
< [2.514678500000000] 0x0020, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xDD, unk=0x00
> [2.514678500000000] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.519163916666667] 0x0020, flags=00, payload=[1A 1F BC 74 AA 16 59 D6 5C E7 FF 5B E0 85 B2 C8 39 2D D6 95 98 2F B7 4B 71 64 34 D7 8D 2C 94 A1 91 CB 73 D7 8D E1 D0 07 E6 1E 0F DA E7 51 BC 69 | ...t..Y.\..[....9-.../.Kqd4..,....s..........Q.i], chk=0x3C, unk=0x00
> [2.519163916666667] 0x00D2, payload=[30 14 F4 B8 84 89 81 AB 3D 07 66 DE AE B6 D3 24 | 0.......=.f....$], chk=0x10
< [2.527551416666667] 0x0000, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x7D, unk=0x1F
> [2.527540083333333] 0x088E, payload=[02 29 | .)], chk=0x3B
< [2.531619416666667] 0x0000, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFD, unk=0x1F
> [2.531619416666667] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.542392416666666] 0x0020, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xDD, unk=0x1F
> [2.542392416666666] 0x0000, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFE
< [2.546867583333333] 0x0020, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xDD, unk=0x1F
> [2.546867583333333] 0x088E, payload=[02 29 | .)], chk=0x3B

Then, the two boot paths diverge completely (also note the time jump). It is suspected that at this point the kernel is started up on coldboot, and the kernel resumes for warmboot. For cold boot only, we see the beginning init sequence again, which is likely done in SceSyscon.

< [3.322105750000000] 0x0000, flags=00, payload=[0D 06 00 01 | ....], chk=0xE5, unk=0x16
> [3.322105750000000] 0x0001, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFD
< [3.326563916666667] 0x0000, flags=00, payload=[32 30 31 32 31 31 30 38 31 37 30 34 | 201211081704], chk=0x96, unk=0x85
> [3.326552583333333] 0x0002, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFC
< [3.331090666666667] 0x0000, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x7D, unk=0x30
> [3.331079333333333] 0x0080, payload=[12 00 | ..], chk=0x6A
< [3.331576333333333] 0x0020, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xDD, unk=0x30
> [3.331576333333333] 0x0080, payload=[12 00 | ..], chk=0x6A
< [3.332068833333333] 0x0000, flags=00, payload=[10 00 00 00 | ....], chk=0xE9, unk=0x31
> [3.332068833333333] 0x0004, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFA
< [3.332541666666667] 0x0000, flags=00, payload=[00 FF 04 00 | ....], chk=0xF6, unk=0x31
> [3.332541666666667] 0x0103, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFA
< [3.336980333333333] 0x0000, flags=00, payload=[10 00 00 00 | ....], chk=0xE9, unk=0x31
> [3.336980333333333] 0x0003, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFB
...

Packet checksum

The checksum byte of the packet is calculated as the binary negation of the sum of all the bytes of the packet (including the 2 bytes of the command id and the byte for the length). The checksum calculation can be implemented as follows:

void syscon_calc_checksum(unsigned char packet[32], int length)
{
	int i;
	unsigned char hash = 0;
	
	for (i = 0; i < 3 + length; i++)
		hash += packet[i];

	packet[3 + length] = ~hash;
}

Commands

Commands are listed in the order seen in cold boot. The numbers in the captured packets indicate the assumed order with some unused packets filtered out (they appear to be resent). The ordering and grouping are assumed and may contain errors.

CMD 0x0001 - sceSysconGetErnieVersion

Gets version of the current installed Ernie firmware. Can also be seen in the packet header in Syscon Update. Also sent at kernel boot.

SEND 1    > [2.881037083333333] 0x0001, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFD
RESP 1    < [2.881037083333333] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[0D 06 00 01 | ....], chk=0xE1, unk=0x71

SEND 23   > [4.167151583333333] 0x0001, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFD
RESP 23   < [4.167151583333333] 0x0000, flags=00, payload=[0D 06 00 01 | ....], chk=0xE5, unk=0x32

CMD 0x0005 - sceSysconGetHardwareInfo

See KBL Param#Hardware_Info.

SEND 2    > [2.881578833333333] 0x0005, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF9
RESP 2    < [2.881578833333333] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[00 60 40 00 | .`@.], chk=0x55, unk=0x71

CMD 0x0002 - sceSysconGetTimeStamp

Gets Ernie firmware timestamp. Also sent at kernel boot.

SEND 3    > [2.882249083333333] 0x0002, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFC
RESP 3    < [2.882249083333333] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[32 30 31 32 31 31 30 38 31 37 30 34 | 201211081704], chk=0x92, unk=0x00

SEND 24   > [4.171598000000000] 0x0002, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFC
RESP 24   < [4.171598000000000] 0x0000, flags=00, payload=[32 30 31 32 31 31 30 38 31 37 30 34 | 201211081704], chk=0x96, unk=0xF7

CMD 0x0080

Unknown. Sends data 0x0012 on FW 3.60. Does not get return data. Also sent at kernel boot.

SEND 4    > [2.895635416666666] 0x0080, payload=[12 00 | ..], chk=0x6A
RESP 4    < [2.886923416666667] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x30
RESP 4    < [2.891092083333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x30
RESP 4    < [2.895635416666666] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x30

SEND 25   > [4.176620750000000] 0x0080, payload=[12 00 | ..], chk=0x6A
RESP 25   < [4.176123750000000] 0x0000, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x7D, unk=0x30
RESP 25   < [4.176620750000000] 0x0020, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xDD, unk=0x30

CMD 0x0010 - sceSysconGetWakeupFactor

See Wakeup Factor.

Boot type indicator. 0xFF14 on cold boot. 0xFF80 on resume boot.

SEND 5    > [2.950546416666667] 0x0010, payload=[ | ], chk=0xEE
RESP 5    < [2.950546416666667] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[14 FF | ..], chk=0xE4, unk=0x32

CMD 0x00A0 - Handshake

Runs twice. Appears to contain a 8 byte inner header. First packet sends all zeros and gets back a 8 byte random response. This is likely a nonce or challenge. This likely establishes an encrypted session. Encrypted data differs on each boot. There does not appear to be data transferred using the established session.

SEND 6    > [2.994470666666667] 0x00A0, payload=[30 00 00 0B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 0.......................................], chk=0xFB
RESP 6    < [2.972471333333333] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0xFF
RESP 6    < [2.989889500000000] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0xFF
RESP 6    < [2.994470666666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[30 01 00 0B 00 00 00 00 CA 71 11 BA 86 87 EF 0D 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 0........q..............................], chk=0x66, unk=0x00

SEND 7    > [3.033187750000000] 0x00A0, payload=[30 02 00 0B 01 00 00 00 92 45 B4 A5 49 15 CE F2 39 0E 9E 4C BF FA 19 E6 5D CF BA 5A 6E C3 7C ED 2A 6D 4E 79 84 28 1C 2A | 0........E..I...9..L....]..Zn.|.*mNy.(.*], chk=0x97
RESP 7    < [3.002893083333333] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x01
RESP 7    < [3.028592333333334] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x01
RESP 7    < [3.033187750000000] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[30 03 00 0B 00 00 00 00 12 77 A5 98 67 F7 38 9B B4 54 48 FE 84 82 CF 84 41 42 87 A2 EA D1 CF 9C 5B D1 2A 3F 1E 50 B9 3D | 0........w..g.8..TH.....AB......[.*?.P.=], chk=0x0A, unk=0x00

CMD 0x088E - sceSysconCtrlVoltage

Controls voltage. Sends value 0x2201 on FW 3.60 and does not get any response.

SEND 8    > [3.061354583333333] 0x088E, payload=[01 22 | ."], chk=0x43
RESP 8    < [3.041713500000000] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x03
RESP 8    < [3.046148250000000] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF9, unk=0x03
RESP 8    < [3.056796250000000] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x03
RESP 8    < [3.061354583333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x03

CMD 0x1082 - NVS Read

Get data from NVS. 2-byte offset followed by 1 byte length. For example used to fetch boot-time flags, like Update Mode.

Get Qaf Token area:
SEND 9    > [3.078212500000000] 0x1082, payload=[80 04 08 | ...], chk=0xDD
RESP 9    < [3.069790250000000] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x03
RESP 9    < [3.073736583333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x03
RESP 9    < [3.078212500000000] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[FF FF FF FF 01 FF FF FF | ........], chk=0xD7, unk=0x77

Get Update Mode:
SEND 10   > [3.094879833333333] 0x1082, payload=[A0 04 01 | ...], chk=0xC4
RESP 10   < [3.086322916666667] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0xFF
RESP 10   < [3.090404000000000] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0xFF
RESP 10   < [3.094879833333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[FF | .], chk=0xD9, unk=0x00

CMD 0x1100 - sceSysconGetErnieDLVersion

Gets Ernie DownLoader Version i.e. version of Ernie firmware.

SEND 11   > [3.099025500000000] 0x1100, payload=[ | ], chk=0xED
RESP 11   < [3.099025500000000] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[01 01 13 00 | ....], chk=0xE0, unk=0xFF

CMD 0x00D0 - Handshake before SNVS RW

Some encrypted transfer that looks close to Syscon#CMD 0x00A0 in format. Different on each boot.

SEND 12   > [3.122679833333333] 0x00D0, payload=[30 00 00 0F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 0.......................................], chk=0xC7
RESP 12   < [3.103569583333333] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x01
RESP 12   < [3.107676166666667] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF9, unk=0x01
RESP 12   < [3.118188666666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x01
RESP 12   < [3.122679833333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[30 01 00 0F 00 00 00 00 9F CC 4A 69 73 E9 C0 5A 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | 0.........Jis..Z........................], chk=0xDD, unk=0x00

SEND 13   > [3.150031916666667] 0x00D0, payload=[30 02 00 0F 01 00 00 00 98 6D 3A 1E C5 B1 E9 AF 54 65 55 91 3B DF 2B A8 0F AD B0 73 A0 A2 0F EE 5D 0A AF 41 A5 6D 32 20 | 0........m:.....TeU.;.+....s....]..A.m2.], chk=0xF4
RESP 13   < [3.130872500000000] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x01
RESP 13   < [3.134978166666667] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF9, unk=0x01
RESP 13   < [3.145539833333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x01
RESP 13   < [3.150031916666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[30 03 00 0F 00 00 00 00 F5 19 C0 67 09 80 C6 DB 58 8D FB E1 86 22 D1 00 DA BB D2 AF AA 51 F9 57 7C 56 92 0A 94 D6 60 4D | 0..........g....X....".......Q.W|V....`M], chk=0xF0, unk=0x00

SEND 14   > [3.177452416666667] 0x00D0, payload=[30 04 00 0F 00 00 00 00 87 4E 59 41 22 98 F8 62 BD B4 C8 4F 4C 0A 81 90 47 1E 1E 70 D6 51 57 42 E5 EC 07 A2 D4 CF E5 02 | 0........NYA"..b...OL...G..p.QWB........], chk=0x9A
RESP 14   < [3.158257166666667] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x03
RESP 14   < [3.162363250000000] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF9, unk=0x03
RESP 14   < [3.172875666666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x03
RESP 14   < [3.177452416666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[30 05 00 0F 00 00 00 00 87 4E 59 41 22 98 F8 62 BD B4 C8 4F 4C 0A 81 90 47 1E 1E 70 D6 51 57 42 E5 EC 07 A2 D4 CF E5 02 | 0........NYA"..b...OL...G..p.QWB........], chk=0x44, unk=0x00

CMD 0x00D2 - SNVS RW

This command is used twice during boot and also quite often after boot. Data is different on each boot. Encrypted session using key from handshake above. Second transaction is the firmware version data written during the update process.

SEND 15   > [3.204733083333333] 0x00D2, payload=[32 78 88 CF 3E 63 56 19 75 3A 0A 2D F3 49 63 E2 | 2x..>cV.u:.-.Ic.], chk=0xA4
RESP 15   < [3.185595250000000] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x05
RESP 15   < [3.189740333333333] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF9, unk=0x05
RESP 15   < [3.200251666666666] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x05
RESP 15   < [3.204733083333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[D3 57 9B F2 A2 45 E2 7A 2A FC 84 12 97 8E 23 5F C8 AB FB 58 97 EC DE 20 94 0A 78 28 C6 EE C5 45 18 29 00 F4 56 22 53 AF 24 47 8E FF B1 5C DA 2F | .W...E.z*.....#_...X......x(...E.)..V"S.$G...\./], chk=0x4C, unk=0xFF

SEND 21   > [3.359112250000000] 0x00D2, payload=[1C 0B 9E FF FB 68 90 4B FD C2 05 CD D8 67 4D D0 | .....h.K.....gM.], chk=0x2D
RESP 21   < [3.321934500000000] 0x0000, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x7D, unk=0x00
RESP 21   < [3.354626666666667] 0x0020, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xDD, unk=0x00
RESP 21   < [3.359112250000000] 0x0020, flags=00, payload=[6C B4 26 F3 CD 32 D3 3E 6F 80 F2 0F 68 F7 E2 96 58 DB 2F BB AB A6 98 DD 26 14 DD 61 12 E4 55 BA BB 32 1D 1F 75 D5 D1 4C 7E 4A 19 42 E5 B0 C6 AB | l.&..2.>o...h...X./.....&..a..U..2..u..L~J.B....], chk=0x84, unk=0xFF

CMD 0x0090 - sceSysconReadScratchPad

This command reads data from Ernie Scratch Pad. This is the inverse of command 0x91.

This is used for example to fetch the saved resume context buffer physical address. Kernel sets this before suspending and this value is passed to the resume function. See Suspend. The format is 2 byte offset and 1 byte length.

SEND 16   > [3.221743166666667] 0x0090, payload=[0C 00 04 | ...], chk=0x5B
RESP 16   < [3.213273166666667] 0x0004, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x79, unk=0x57
RESP 16   < [3.217267333333333] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xD9, unk=0x57
RESP 16   < [3.221743166666667] 0x0024, flags=00, payload=[F0 0E 1F 41 | ...A], chk=0x77, unk=0x45

CMD 0x0091 - sceSysconWriteScratchPad

This command writes data to Ernie Scratch Pad. This is the inverse of command 0x90.

CMD 0x0800 - SceSysconForDriver_A2FE9BF9

See KBL Param.

SEND 17   > [3.225828583333334] 0x0800, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF6
RESP 17   < [3.225828583333334] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[40 00 | @.], chk=0xB7, unk=0x41

CMD 0x0100 - sceSysconGetControlsInfo

See Boot Controls Info.

SEND 18   > [3.226331500000000] 0x0100, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFD
RESP 18   < [3.226331500000000] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[FF BF FF 74 | ...t], chk=0xC4, unk=0x45

CMD 0x0003 - sceSysconGetSleepFactor

See Sleep Factor.

SEND 19   > [3.226820750000000] 0x0003, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFB
RESP 19   < [3.226820750000000] 0x0004, flags=00, payload=[10 00 00 00 | ....], chk=0xE5, unk=0x45

CMD 0x0006 - sceSysconGetHardwareInfo2

See Hardware Info 2.

SEND 20   > [3.227328833333333] 0x0006, payload=[ | ], chk=0xF8
RESP 20   < [3.227328833333333] 0x0000, flags=3F, payload=[ | ], chk=0xBE, unk=0x00

CMD 0x088E - sceSysconCtrlVoltage

Last command sent before a time-jump (likely indicating completion of early-boot).

SEND 22   > [3.386554833333333] 0x088E, payload=[02 29 | .)], chk=0x3B
RESP 22   < [3.367488416666667] 0x0000, flags=80, payload=[ | ], chk=0x7D, unk=0xB4
RESP 22   < [3.371567833333333] 0x0000, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFD, unk=0xB4
RESP 22   < [3.382079833333334] 0x0020, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xDD, unk=0xB4
RESP 22   < [3.386554833333333] 0x0020, flags=00, payload=[ | ], chk=0xDD, unk=0xB4

CMD 0x0004

Unknown. Likely happens after initial boot.

SEND 26   > [4.177113250000000] 0x0004, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFA
RESP 26   < [4.177113250000000] 0x0000, flags=00, payload=[10 00 00 00 | ....], chk=0xE9, unk=0x31

CMD 0x0103 - sceSysconGetMultiCnInfo

Likely happens after initial boot.

SEND 27   > [4.177586083333333] 0x0103, payload=[ | ], chk=0xFA
RESP 27   < [4.177586083333333] 0x0000, flags=00, payload=[00 FF 04 00 | ....], chk=0xF6, unk=0x31

Syscon Scratch Pad

Offset	Size	Name	Comment	Used by
0x0	8	unknown
0x8	4	Syscon power on time	ex on DevKit: 0xA, 0x16, 0x1F, 0x24. ex on retail: 0x01BC0CD0, 0x05AC1AF7, 0x80000269	SceRtc#sceRtcSetCurrentTickForDriver
0xC	4	Resume context physical address	Set on retail. Not set on DevKit. ex: 0x411F1EF0	second_loader
0x10	5	Current Tick	Set on retail and DevKit. Stored in microseconds since 01/01/0001 divided by 2^19.	SceRtc#sceRtcSetCurrentTickForDriver
0x15	3	Padding of Current Tick
0x18	5	Current Secure Tick	Set on retail. Not set on DevKit.	SceRtc#sceRtcSetCurrentSecureTickForDriver
0x1D	5	Current Network Tick	Always a bit earlier than Current Tick and Current Secure Tick.	SceRtc#sceRtcSetCurrentNetworkTickForDriver
0x22	5	Current ?Debug Secure?/?Tool Secure? Tick	Set on DevKit. Not set on retail.	SceRtc#sceRtcGetCurrentToolSecureTickForDriver
0x27	5	Current Aux Tick		SceRtc#sceRtcSetCurrentAuxTickForDriver
0x2C	5	Current Debug Network Tick		SceRtc#sceRtcSetCurrentDebugNetworkTickForDriver
0x31	0x8F	unknown	Maybe reserved. Probably unused.
0xE0	0x20	CP DIP Switches	Set on DevKit having a CP. Hence not set on Retail nor TestKit.	?secure_kernel? before system suspend, second_loader after system resume

Types

typedef struct SceSysconRtcTick { // size is 5 bytes
  uint8_t tick[5];
} SceSysconRtcTick;

typedef struct SceSysconScratchPad { // size is 0x100 bytes
  uint8_t unk_0[8];
  SceUInt32 powerOnTime;
  void *resumeContextPA;
  SceRtcSysconTick currentTick;
  uint8_t padding[3];
  SceSysconRtcTick currentSecureTick;
  SceSysconRtcTick currentNetworkTick;
  SceSysconRtcTick unk_0x22;
  SceSysconRtcTick currentAuxTick;
  SceSysconRtcTick currentDebugNetworkTick;
  uint8_t reserved[0x8F];
  SceDIPSW dipsw;
} SceSysconScratchPad;

NVS

Ernie Non-volatile storage (NVS) is a persistent storage allocated on Ernie Data Flash that is used by PS Vita OS for data required at boot time. Indeed, reading NVS requires no driver except the driver to communicate with Syscon, whilst reading PS Vita eMMC requires its AES-XTS decryption.

Not every NVS sector is directly readable from Kermit: the first sectors are part of SNVS (Secure NVS) which means that they are XTS-encrypted and must be accessed through a Secure handshake.

NVS actual size is 0xBA0 bytes on new Syscon hardware revisions and 0xC20 on old. However, only 0xB60 bytes are accessible from Kermit on System Software 3.600.011 and more recent. The hidden area is probably used internally by Syscon as it is not blanked nor 0xFFed.

On FW 3.60, NVS size accessible from Kermit is 0xB60 bytes:

• Area from 0 to 0x3FF is named Ernie Secure#SNVS. It has an additional level of encryption. It cannot be read using SceSblSsMgr#sceSblNvsReadForKernel nor written using SceSblSsMgr#sceSblNvsWriteForKernel. This area is handled by Secure Modules.
• Area from 0x400 to 0x75F is handled by Non-secure Kernel SceSblSsMgr module.
• Area from 0x760 to 0xB5F is reserved for Test and Tool consoles. However this area seems unused.
• Area from 0xB60 to the end of NVS is not accessible from Kermit.

Offset	Size	Name	Comment	Used by
0	0x400	SNVS	See Ernie Secure#SNVS.
0x400	0x80	Qaf Token		second_loader
0x480	0x1	Qaf Token Flag	1 when Qaf Token is not set (FFed), 0 when Qaf Token is set	second_loader
0x481	0x1	Extra UART Flag	See KBL Param#Boot flags.	second_loader
0x482	0x1	Unknown		SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsGetNvsDataForDriver, SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsSetNvsDataForDriver
0x483	0x1	Safe Mode Flag	See KBL Param#Boot flags.	SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsGetNvsDataForDriver, SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsSetNvsDataForDriver, second_loader
0x484	0x1	KervResult/KervDiagResultFlag		Factory test preCheckFactTest
0x485	0x1	Unknown
0x486	0x1	MCEmu Flag	See KBL Param#Boot flags. Not present on FWs 0.931-0.990. Present on FW 3.60.	SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsGetNvsDataForDriver, SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsSetNvsDataForDriver, second_loader
0x487	0x1	Unknown	See KBL Param#Boot flags.	second_loader
0x4A0	0x1	Update Mode	See KBL Param#Boot flags.	SceSblUpdateMgr#sceSblUsGetUpdateModeForUser, SceSblUpdateMgr#sceSblUsSetUpdateModeForUser
0x4A1	0x3	Unknown. Unused.
0x4A4	0x4	System Language		SceRegistryMgr, SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsGetNvsDataForDriver, SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsSetNvsDataForDriver
0x4A8	0x1C	Unknown. Unused.
0x4C4	0x1	Unknown. Set to 0 by default.
0x4C5	0x1B	Unknown. Unused.
0x4E0	0x20	KibanID		ASCII string of length 22 characters. This is a serial number also present in PS3 and PS4 Serial Flash. SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsGetNvsDataForDriver, SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsSetNvsDataForDriver
0x500	0x1	Wlan/Bt Flag		SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsGetNvsDataForDriver, SceSblSsMgr#sceSblSsSetNvsDataForDriver, SceWlanBt module_start
0x501	0x1F	Unknown. Unused.
0x520	0x80	Activation Area	first 0x20 bytes are SceNVSKitActivationData	SceSblSsMgr, SceSblPostSsMgr
0x5A0	0x100	Qaf Token RSA signature	Not present on FW 0.990. Present on FW 3.60. Maybe added on FW 1.80.	second_loader
0x6A0	0xC0	Unknown. Unused.
0x760	0x400	Reserved for Test and Tool consoles.	Seems unused.

Types

typedef struct SceNVSKitActivationData { // size is 0x20 bytes
  char magic[4]; // "act\n"
  uint32_t issue_no;
  uint32_t end_date;
  uint32_t start_date;
  char cmac_hash[0x10];
} SceNVSKitActivationData;

Config Storage

Config Storage is a similar storage than NVS but is accessed in a different manner. Whilst NVS is read and written by 32-byte sectors and is physically stored with a sort of history, Config Storage is written by sending scripts from Kermit to Syscon, and is not really readable but instead affects KBL Param#Hardware Info.

Sample scripts

Below are sample configstorage scripts hardcoded in SceSyscon:

const char syscon_idu_set_config[0x20] = {
    0x1F, 0x54, 0x35, 0x63, 0x38, 0x62, 0x31, 0x64,
    0x61, 0x63, 0x62, 0x38, 0x33, 0x36, 0x64, 0x64,
    0x36, 0x63, 0x39, 0x39, 0x36, 0x38, 0x65, 0x34,
    0x63, 0x30, 0x35, 0x30, 0x61, 0x36, 0x66, 0x35
};

const char syscon_idu_set_config2[0x20] = {
    0x07, 0x57, 0xA8, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x00,
    0x01, 0x4E, 0x15, 0x48, 0x51, 0xBD, 0x52, 0x2C,
    0x4C, 0x83, 0x70, 0xDA, 0x4D, 0xF3, 0x8E, 0x82,
    0x6B, 0xD6, 0x34, 0x98, 0x3A, 0xFD, 0xA6, 0x94
};

const char syscon_show_set_config[0x20] = {
    0x1F, 0x54, 0x66, 0x63, 0x33, 0x39, 0x38, 0x39,
    0x30, 0x61, 0x33, 0x32, 0x64, 0x30, 0x66, 0x32,
    0x37, 0x36, 0x31, 0x35, 0x62, 0x65, 0x36, 0x65,
    0x63, 0x64, 0x63, 0x35, 0x65, 0x32, 0x63, 0x63
};

const char syscon_show_set_config2[0x20] = {
    0x07, 0x57, 0xA8, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00,
    0x01, 0x4E, 0x15, 0x48, 0xB8, 0x1A, 0x54, 0xD1,
    0xF2, 0xA0, 0xD1, 0x05, 0x18, 0xEA, 0x22, 0x09,
    0x0A, 0x02, 0x2E, 0xAE, 0x00, 0x08, 0x25, 0xF1
};

const char syscon_clear_config[0x20] = {
    0x1F, 0x54, 0x65, 0x34, 0x61, 0x65, 0x38, 0x62,
    0x37, 0x61, 0x65, 0x38, 0x36, 0x33, 0x32, 0x65,
    0x64, 0x64, 0x39, 0x61, 0x61, 0x65, 0x38, 0x38,
    0x38, 0x39, 0x66, 0x30, 0x65, 0x65, 0x61, 0x38
};

const char syscon_clear_config2[0x20] = {
    0x07, 0x57, 0xA8, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x01, 0x4E, 0x15, 0x48, 0x88, 0xEA, 0xC7, 0xAD,
    0x65, 0xB1, 0x73, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x48, 0xC7, 0x29,
    0x1B, 0x2B, 0x8A, 0x32, 0x89, 0xCF, 0xB3, 0xC1
};

The only actual differences between those scripts are:

• the ascii string: we do not know how it is generated and what it means
• the mode value:
  • A8 01 00 00 00 00 = mode clear
  • A8 01 01 00 0D 00 = idu mode set
  • A8 01 03 00 10 00 = show mode set

Types

// TODO

Offset	Size	Name	Sample value	Comment
0	1	ascii_data_size	0x1F
1	1	ascii_data_flag	0x54
2	0x1E	ascii_data		ASCII hexadecimal string so maybe a hash
0x20	1	unk_7_data_size	7
0x21	1	unk_7_data_flag
0x22	6	unk_7_data
0x28	1	unk_1_data_size	1
0x29	1	unk_1_data_flag	0x4E
0x2A	1	sha1_hash_size	0x15
0x2B	1	sha1_hash_flag	0x48
0x2C	0x14	sha1_hash		sha1 hash of the previous blocks (data from 0 of size 0x2A)

Config storage scripts have in theory a variable size. It is the concatenation of some blocks where the first byte is the length of the body, followed by the body of variable size. Body structure is always the same: 1 byte representing the flag, followed by data of variable size.

Usage

Theory by CelesteBlue (untested):

• 0) Begin Transaction

• 1) Load Script (part 1)
• A) configstorage data is read from SceSyscon memory
• B) configstorage data is sent by SceSyscon to Ernie
• C) Ernie FW checks hash of data and returns xx on success

if success:

• 2) Load Script (part 2)
• A) configstorage data is read from SceSyscon memory
• B) configstorage data is sent by SceSyscon to Ernie using Load
• C) Ernie FW loads data to memory and executes it

• 6) Commit Transaction
• 7) End Transaction

Pinout

A candidate package for this chip is Renesas' P121F1-50-BAL-1. It has the same size and number of pins.

UART

Name	Pin	Description
CTS0	J7	UART0 clear to send
RTS0	C6	UART0 request to send
TX0	B6	UART0 transmit
RX0	F11	UART0 receive
SW0	A8	Switch, see UART Console#OLED PSVita UART0 location

SPI

Main communication with Kermit.

Name	Pin	Description
SS	A7	Slave Select (often active low, output from master)
MISO	A6	Master In Slave Out (data output from slave)
MOSI	C7	Master Out Slave In (data output from master)
SCLK	B7	Serial Clock (output from master)

Other

Name	Pin	Description
?	C11	UDC pin 11
?	F9	UDC pin 12
?	G4	UDC pin 13
?	G8	SN99057 pin 38
PWR_SW	G6	Power switch through two transistor buffers

Versions

Hardware Versions

There are three hardware versions of Ernie:

• NEC 78K0R/Kx3-L: present on early PS Vita prototypes (never seen)
• NEC 78K0R/Kx3: present on Fat PS Vita and PS TV models, including some prototypes such as DEM-3000L
• Renesas RL78/G13: present on Slim PS Vita models

NEC 78K0R/Kx3-L

Never seen yet but exists according to Ernie update packages.

NEC 78K0R/Kx3

NEC D79F0109 (78K0R/KH3, 121 pin)

Device Name : D79F0109

Other Device Name : SK0RT02N200GV120 (on DEM-3000L and PCH-1000)

Label:

Model <- always D79F0109
Revision <- on DEM-3000H: ES1.0, blank on others
Build <- XXYYZZWWW <- XX: year, YY: week, ZZ: 2 letters (unknown usage), WWW: serial number
Manufacturing country <- always "MALAYSIA"

Renesas RL78/G13

Renesas R5F1ZCRK (RL78/G13, 121 pin)

R5F1ZCRKABG#U0
R5    Renesas MCU
F      Flash
1      RL78
Z      Customer specific
C      Product group
R      121-pin
K      384KB
A      Consumer grade
BG    VFBGA 0.4mm
#U0  Tray*2

Device Name : R5F1ZCRK
Device Code : 10 00 06
Firmware Version : V3.03
Code Flash 1 (Address : 0x00000000,  Size : 384 K,  Erase Size : 1 K)
Data Flash 1 (Address : 0x000F1000,  Size : 8 K,  Erase Size : 1 K)

Label:

(C) XXXX <- Year
Revision <- A0xxx SCEI
Build <- XXYYZZWWW <- XX: year, YY: week, ZZ: 2 letters (unknown usage), WWW: serial number
Unknown data

Block sizes

Ernie flash memory is erasable in blocks. Size of one block in bytes depends on the hardware version:

• NEC 78K0R/Kx3-L: 0x800
• NEC 78K0R/Kx3: 0x400
• Renesas RL78/G13: 0x400

See also [1].

Software Versions

See also [2].

Ernie firmware can be partly updated and downgraded with software updates embedded in PUP.

Ernie firmware is dependant of the hardware version and detects it based on Hardware Info.

Examples

With DevKit connected, psp2ctrl info queries return the following results:

DEM-3000H running FW 0.990:

SysConVersion: 591105

-> converted to hexadecimal: 0x00090501 -> 0.9.5.1

PDEL-1001 running FW 1.692:

SCVersion: 0.9.2.4

PDEL-1001 running FW 3.600-3.680:

SCVersion: 1.0.3.6

Downgrade

Syscon is downgradable on DEM/PDEL/PTEL/QAF units. It might also be downgraded on retail when using a downgrade enabler like modoru.

Firmware

See Ernie Firmware